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BUDDHISM

ITS BIRTH AND DISPERSAL

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TO

MY TEACHERS

G. CROOM ROBERTSON

T. W. RHYS DAVIDS

"*Too little payment for so great a debt*"

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

Twenty-two years have passed since this slender study in its first shape was published in the Home University Library Series. The canon of scriptures in the literary diction called Pali, " the Text ", had by then become almost wholly accessible. After years of work on the canon's third part, Abhidhamma, I was coming to know something of the second part, the " Suttas ", and an honorary post about " Indian Philosophy ", given me at the University of Manchester, led me to search, so far as I had come, for anything in those two parts that might be called " philosophy ". Then a request came to furnish at short notice a handbook on " Buddhism " in this series. My only possible contribution, of an original kind, was the consideration of certain *mantras*, or affirmations, which were virtually philosophical data, and on which a more systematic " philosophy " *might* have been founded. It was not a very promising scheme for a popular manual, and I said so to my editors. But it was, if a poor thing, mine own.

But the " poor thing " has now outlived its usefulness. It is as *passé* as would be to-day a text-book of twenty-two years old on electricity, ether, magnetism. Like these, the historical study of Buddhism is a very new science.

The opening up of materials is still going on under our eyes. To patch my book had become impossible. It had tried to be historical; it was not nearly historical enough. Its first chapter, suggested by a lecture I had heard the editor, Professor Gilbert Murray, give at Oxford on "The Hellenic Tradition", was called "The Pali Tradition". Nothing amiss in that. But I had not discerned that this "tradition", as shown in the Pali Canon, is but a "tradition of the elders", not necessarily the New Word brought fresh into Indian religion by the founders of "Buddhism". I made, as other writers make, that "tradition" begin nearly three centuries too far back. I did not know enough to see that the New Word had survived only in a fragment here, a fragment there, built over by the later superstructure of the "teaching of the elders",[1] which was largely a matter of formula and ritual of the mind. The book had to be rewritten. And for permission to do that I am sincerely grateful to the broad-mindedness of the present publishers.

Yet I am fully sensible, that neither is the successor likely to be patted on the back as a popular manual. There is too much blocking the way before that can be properly done. There should be as yet no easy promenade for the reader; he is needed to help clear the road by coming along with me to think.

His task in other words is to help me show him that "early Buddhism" is not to be learnt

[1] Indian readers please consult Gospels of Matthew and Mark.

in a few formulas: "eightfold path", "four truths", "three marks" and the like; that it is a discerning of what I have here called fragments" as it were left-in in a surrounding structure of "doctrine". To discern, he must survey the surrounding structure, and then agree, or disagree with me as to what are more justly to be called "fragments". Further, he has to see the forces at work which have gone to make that earliest teaching mere occasional fragments, forces which prevented the New Word of the founders from accomplishing their real aim, forces which have suffered but one powerful result of that New Word to survive—that of moral urgency—but which show this as stripped of its source, its well-spring, its goal, and with a relatively worthless source and goal substituted.

Those "forces" are mainly the growing vogue of the cenobitic monk and his peculiar ideals, and the growing vogue of the study of mind, of mental procedure, as complicating the main fact about the old world view of man:—the *man*: experiencer, valuer, thinker, willer, doer, and his *body*. The former vogue thrust a pessimistic ideal into the heart of the new expansion of Indian religion taught by Gotama Sakyamuni, known now as "Buddha". The latter vogue submerged the "man" in mind. These vogues were but a "middle distance" in values when Buddhism was born. But in time this middle distance came to the front, dominating the picture, obscuring the earlier foreground. To find this now, much must be cleared away.

For an ancient civilization a case can be made out for monasticism. And to study mind is a gain, so it banish not from reality the mind-er. But an excessive preoccupation with both resulted, for Buddhism, in a teaching which showed the man to men as a Less: a less in reality, in nature, life, destiny. We find the Founder assuming the self in terms of the Immanence current in Indian teaching, and professing ignorance of a doctrine which denied the self as agent. But the monk said: the "self", the Divine self, and then the human self also, is not real. The Founder bade men see in life an instant opportunity for pressing onward in the Way of Becoming in the worlds, and to rejoice in those opportunities. The monk bade men so live as to cut short that becoming. The Founder showed the man as *choosing* his way in religion, showed *dharma* within as man's one safe guide. (I have discarded "norm", as not adequate for *dharma*.) The monk whittled away the choosing, and showed instead a superman and an externalized "dhamma" (or body of doctrine) to be obeyed. Man, a wayfarer in the Way of becoming ever a More, bound ultimately to reach an ineffable Most, Highest, Best, is thrown back on to a lesser self of mind and body only, mainly concerned, once he is of the elect, to end life here and now.

Now my background is, that World-religions show a More of some kind in man, but never a Less. And I see in (original) Buddhism no exception. But its later shepherds diverted it, made it in a way exceptional, albeit in the Far

East a tendency towards less abnormality may be seen.

It is the fight to win recognition for this more historical view which makes it impossible for me to turn out a manual of Buddhism in better proportions than this new edition. Unhistorical treatment of Buddhism lies right across the road, like George Stephenson's cow lying across his new railroads—and I seek to make things " vairy awkward, especially for the coo ". Maybe it does not make the reader's task easy. To help him I have shown (*a*) the superstructure of the tradition, (*b*) the fragments (or some of them) in detail, (*c*) the two main distracting forces, (*d*) the cleavage resulting mainly from their impact. For a tidy all-inclusive sketch of the history of Buddhism this doubtless does not suffice, but it is the best the present state of things, the lack of sympathetic co-operation, suffers me to do to-day. May the writer of the next edition find that " cow " no longer across the track !

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CHAPTER I

THE PALI TRADITION

The general growth of interest in Buddhism is due to more than one assignable cause. But we may class the various causes fairly enough under the growth of general knowledge. And under this fact of expanding knowledge we may distinguish between growth of intellectual curiosity and sympathy in the knower, and additional facilities in the means of knowing.

We must resist the temptation, in the limited scope at our disposal, of lingering over the former group of causes, and glance forthwith at the latter.

In the first place we are now beginning to reap the harvest sown by certain pioneers, who returned last century from countries where creed and culture are or have been Buddhist, in their hearts the wish, on their shoulders the task, to make known in the West a literature venerable in its tradition, and, where still followed, a living force in the present, but practically unknown outside Asia. This was the religious literature of Ceylon, Siam, and Burma, written on palm-leaf manuscripts, and, for the most part, in a language not at any time native

to any of those countries, but hailing from the ancient dialects of North-East India. Closely akin to this language, which, as a literary diction, is known in the mediæval portion of the literature as *pāli* ('row', 'text'), is that of certain inscriptions in Prakrit dialects carved on rock and pillar, found in different parts of India. These are known as the Edicts of Asoka, the Indian over-lord who reigned *about* 272–36 B.C. They consist largely of injunctions to righteous and fraternal conduct, and *one* of them refers to passages contained in the more ancient of those Pāli compositions. These compositions are treasured, in the three countries above-named, as canonical scriptures. And the Pāli language is judged to be a literary version of an Indo-European or Aryan dialect, later than the language of the Vedas and Brāhma*n*as, or oldest known Brahman texts, but earlier than what is called Sanskrit, that is, the literary language of India during nearly the whole of the Christian era.

Now this Pāli was the vehicle of what were, so far as we have yet been able to discover, the earliest formulated records of Buddhism. Less revered than of yore, it still lives on as a literary instrument in the native colleges or monasteries of Ceylon, Siam, Burma, etc., just as Latin was the mediæval, and is, to some extent still, the modern vehicle for ecclesiastical Christianity. It appears to have been the literary diction compiled from Prakrit vernaculars current, when the Buddhist missioners began their tours, in the Ganges valley, especially the Prakrit of

Magadha. It was in this kingdom that the Buddhist movement first took root. Its mother-settlement was the Bamboo Grove near the capital Rājagaha, under the patronage of the king Bimbisāra.[1] When, a generation later, the Buddhist movement transferred its centre to Sāvatthī, the capital of the kingdom of Kosălă, it is possible that the Kosălan Prakrit may have become a stronger factor.

Buddhism was from its start a missionizing movement. Further India eventually professed it, and it was in Further India, that the Pāli scriptures, embodied at the third centre, Patna, the new Magadhese capital, were preserved, and committed to writing on the palm-leaves of Ceylon, Burma and Siam.

Now while Prinsep on the one hand first deciphered the rock-cut inscriptions of the Emperor Asoka, containing historical evidence of inestimable value, Turnour, Childers, Gogerly, Fausböll, Oldenberg, Rhys Davids, for over half a century, have been educating European culture in the contents of the Pāli palm-leaf MSS. Prior to this, our knowledge of early Buddhism was derived from certain books of an early mediæval date, such as that from which the late Edwin Arnold derived his famous poem,

[1] This is not to say that the Māgadhese of the Asokan Edicts is the Pāli of the Canon. *That* was the Prakrit used by the king's officials and scribes. *This* was shaped from the Magadhese when Patna became both the political and the Buddhist centre. We may compare the difference in the English of a proclamation by Henry VII (1485) and the English in the Jacobean Bible (1620).

" The Light of Asia ". These books were written in the Sanskrit, which as a *general literary* vehicle of thought (and not as merely the language of a priestly class) had gradually superseded the earlier literary vehicle of Pāli. So far, no manuscripts from Northern India, or from Buddhist centres North and North-East of India, have yielded us anything, in diction or in subject-matter, so apparently near to the beginnings of Buddhism, as a religion and a body of culture, as some of these Pāli books that Ceylon, Siam and Burma have preserved. These oldest books, together with several of a somewhat later date, claim, by their own testimony, and the ancient tradition of these southern Buddhist countries, to have been collected into a Canon or Bible of sacred documents, entitled the *Three Pit'ăkăs*, or *Baskets of Tradition*. They were, and are, held " sacred " in this sense, that they are believed to contain the genuine sayings of Go'tămă, the Buddha, the founder of Buddhism, as well as other books, which are elaborations of subjects stated by him in outline; sacred also in this, that they may not be added to, nor otherwise altered.

Besides these Three Piṭakas, the Pāli literature contains a great body of exegetical commentary on the Piṭakas, mainly as to the oldest group of it, the work of two scholars, both Indian—Buddhaghosa and Dhammapāla—dating from the fifth century A.D. a great number of sub-commentaries added gradually from that date till the present, and lastly a number of other

treatises, some older and some more recent than the great commentaries. These are independent works, in that they are not systematic expositions of the sacred texts. But they are, again, dependent in that they express opinions in conformity with those texts, and frequently cite them as authoritative.

Now it is the editing of this palm-leaf literature in printed books, and the translating of them by the scholars I have named, aided by many others, that has been gradually, for the last half-century, bringing a knowledge of early Buddhism to the educated public in Europe and America. The Pāli Text Society alone, founded by Rhys Davids in 1881, has published 144 volumes of texts and translations. *The Sacred Books of the East*, founded by Max Müller, published several translations. *The Sacred Books of the Buddhists* series, the Harvard *Oriental Series*, the German *Pali-Socicty* have published more.

Just as the treaty of Amiens (1802) opened up to us the Buddhism of Ceylon, so have recent political events in Asia also aided in bringing Buddhism nearer to us. The annexation of Upper Burma by Great Britain in 1889 resulted in bringing a number of Government officials and European teachers to reside in, and become acquainted with, Burma and its religion and culture. French and English interference in Siam has had a somewhat similar result. And the rise of Japan, as a great power among the Great Powers, has set Europe considering the part played in that rise by the

Buddhist factor in Japanese religion. Lastly, the secrets of the cult of Tibet—a curious adulterated Buddhism—and of its ecclesiastical libraries, seem at length to be becoming a little less inaccessible to us. More than this one cannot say, but the additional factors in the general interest in Buddhism remain.

Once more, there is the awakening to new and international activity in Buddhist countries, in connection with their own religion and culture, that must be taken into account. More than two thousand years after the period of its first missionary zeal, we hear, simultaneously from all the five countries named above, of fresh movements, not only of self-defence against the invasion of other creeds, but also of attack.

Of these movements the system of ultramontane, chiefly political propaganda, started by the Tibetan Church is well known to exist and may have important results at least in Asia, but at present of those results, or of its organization, we can say nothing, and its effective influence for Europe is as yet *nil.* Elsewhere new activity is purely religious, and consists chiefly in (1) the printing of the canonical and other Pāli classical works in the national script; (2) the inclusion of these and other printed books in monastic and other libraries; (3) the increase of Buddhist colleges; (4) the establishment of foreign missions; (5) the circulation of periodical propagandist literature in East and West; (6) the institution of societies, chiefly in the West, for the study of

Buddhism; (7) *the translation of Pali texts into many South and East Asian vernaculars.*[1]

The movement last named dates only from the last few years. In Burma, in Japan, in the South-Eastern States it is being pursued with zeal, and amidst the sympathy of a growing world of readers willing, to a surprising extent, to purchase the new volumes. I foresee in the not distant future a profound effect on the Buddhist lay world. It will learn for the first time what its scripture contains and what it does not. The man will learn, and learn much that the monk has not told him. We of Europe came so to learn a few centuries ago, and the effects we know.

Whatever may be the final result of the opening up of so many avenues, political, geographical, literary and educational, the immediate consequences involve a wider acquaintance among ourselves with Buddhists and with all the varieties of their traditions and culture as Buddhists.

But that wider acquaintance will profit us little, in so far as we honestly wish to get a just idea of those traditions and an intelligent appreciation of that culture, if we rigidly estimate the one or the other by the measure of our traditional standpoints. These standpoints have been slowly built up in the past by a certain selection among notions and beliefs. Some we

[1] Excepting, at present, those of Ceylon and Siam. These countries remain inert, not to say, hostile to the new revival.

threw away; some we adopted; and from time to time we made alterations or reforms. And where we altered, we found it not always possible to make our traditions of speech conform to our reforms. For instance, we have ceased to believe that the sun "rises" or "sets". We *believe* that when each of those events happen, our portion of earth rolls sunwards, and away from the sun, respectively, in its rotation around its own axis and the sun. But the old phrases hold firm, so that we should expect to hear even our astronomers use them.

These facts, then:—a specific tradition in knowledge, and a vehicle of expression that has not coincided in its growth with the growth of that knowledge—should make us wary in estimating another tradition, another standpoint, other modes of expression. We may fancy that we are measuring other views by standpoints that are not only absolutely true, but the only standpoints possible or conceivable. But in fact we are measuring, by what is relatively true, by what has come to be accepted among ourselves as true, a different range of standpoints, which have come to hold good, analogously and equally, for other sections of humanity.

And it is just the otherness in standpoint, in the midst of much that is like our own, that we need to discern before we judge, and from which, in contributing unit-wise to modify the thought of our day, we have most to learn.

The story of the origin and growth of Buddhism, as revealed in the life and teaching of him whom Buddhists and their books adore as

its founder, has been repeatedly told, in every language of Europe, and the telling of it adapted to all classes of readers. Most of us have read, in some form, the story of the wonderful noble of North-East India, known as Siddhattha Go'tămă or Sakyamuni (in Pali; in Sanskrit Gautama Shākyamuni [1]), and of the Church or community of religious brethren, and of lay-followers founded by him, and by him taught and guided for the last forty years of his entirely devoted life. A scholar here and there has sought to explain away the legend of the Buddha's renunciation and ministry as an evolution and adaptation of that great group of fantasies entitled sun-myths. But since these explanations were attempted, the pile of historic evidence, archæological and documentary, has been ever growing, till at this time of day we may say that the life of Siddhattha Gotama of the Sakyas, as an historical fact, is at least as well demonstrated as that of the founder of any other religion of any antiquity.

Draped and embroidered with myth and legend it is, no less than the story of every such founder's life. But a personal mission extending over years, devolving on to, and carried on by unbroken apostolic succession, till as an organized institution it was accepted for a time as a prominent religious guide in

[1] Siddhattha (Sanskrit, Siddhartha) Gotama = personal and family names; Sakyamuni, sage or saint of the Sakyans, his clan; Buddha = Awakened, Enlightened, Wise, a title equivalent to our Messiah or Christ, a title conferred on him long after his day.

the culture of India, is a stubborn thing to argue away. The acceptance of it as, in the main, historically true may show a less extravagant recourse to forced interpretations, and assumptions of improbable happenings, than the denial of it as such.

Be that as it may, about the existence of a tradition of culture, religious, philosophical, ethical, handed down by that apostolic succession till this day in Southern Asia with remarkable tenacity and consistency, there can be no reasonable question whatever. Here too, it is true, a few sceptical minds have suggested that the documents, attesting this unbroken tradition of events alleged to have happened in North-East India, were not originally compiled *soon after*, and *there*, as they claim to have been, but took written shape much later, in the earliest home of their creed's adoption, to wit, in Ceylon. They are therefore only the pious romancing of religious writers in the Buddhist monasteries of that island, working on a basis of stored-up runes and legends.

It is true that the Pāli Canon was not committed to writing till long after it had existed as an unwritten compilation, and till nearly 200 years after Buddhism had been brought to, *or* revived in Ceylon. This last-named event took place in the 3rd century B.C. ; the writing down of the Canon began about 80 B.C. But it is well known that, in India, memory and oral tradition have ever been considered a safer method of protecting sacred doctrines from the introduction and perpetuation of

errors than writing. We read, in the Pāli Canon itself, of how the Brahmans in India met, in certain towns at stated intervals, to con over their own unwritten hymns and prayers. And even the hearing of these was jealously guarded from certain castes. Even at the present day, it is we, and not the Hindus, who need the written letter of their sacred literature. And it was an innovation when the Buddhists of Ceylon, fearing lest the brutal hand of war, in a small island, might at any moment crush out the existence of these machine-made memories, decided to make use of the secular art of writing, wherewith to register their mental stores. And so we read in the two classic chronicles of Ceylon :—

The elders wise of former days, they handed down by word of mouth
The text of the three Pit'akas, and all the Commentary too.
Seeing how men were perishing, the elders of Dharma then together came,
And that the faith might be maintained, writing made in books.

There is no evidence in any portion of this literature, either in Pitaka or Commentary, that this late recourse to writing was due to any mystery-mongering or esotericism. The Buddha, it is stated, said that his was not the hand of a teacher, closed now and again to withhold doctrines. The teaching was adapted to the listener : milk for babes, strong meat for those who were strong. But this was all.

No one then who knew anything of these " memory-libraries ", as a remarkable feature

of past and present Indian culture, would judge the Pāli books to be late, and quasi-spurious documents because, as *written records*, they came into being more than four centuries after their adherents claim that they were compiled. It is the fact that there is no surviving tradition of the Buddhist Churches in India taking similar steps, when their existence was threatened, that has helped to throw doubt on the authenticity of the Pāli books as genuine North-East Indian compilations, put together as remembered *oral sayings*, mostly in the third century B.C., some being added later.

The whole question of the history of Pāli-classic literature is far from being settled. But that it is a question of deep interest for philology, for the history of writing, for the history of Indian culture, for the history of religion, is coming at last to be recognized. And it is they who most deeply study the literature who tend to be convinced that, in the Canon or Three Piṭakas, we have no mere literary production composed far away, in space and time, from the centre of the movement of which it tells, but an accretion of works, compiled as the geologist would say, *in situ*, and at different dates, and at different centres, with variations, both in doctrines, and in degree of emphasis on this and that doctrine. The absence of symmetry and of system in its structure, its imperfectly coinciding repetitions, its variety of diction, all testify against its being wholly the work of a remote, late, provincial centre. The folk-lore with which it

abounds is of that great stock which made its way out of North-West India into Europe. The similes with which it abounds are those of a sub-tropical continent and a great river-valley, rather than those of a tropical island. The scenes and places are North-East Indian, and may fairly be said to be described or alluded to as things seen.

The history of Pāli literature does not exhaust the question of Buddhist literature. But so far as we know, it does cover the history of the original Canon of Buddhist doctrine, considered as Canon. By Canon I mean any document or group of documents handed down, by persons acknowledged to be authoritative teachers, as containing the doctrine they teach, and, as to its contents, considered *closed.* In India itself have survived a few early works by Buddhists, written in a transitional diction between the earlier Pāli and the encroaching later Sanskrit; and a few Buddhist works in purer Sanskrit. But the great majority of Buddhist works, other than those that the Southern centres have preserved as Canonical, and have themselves added, are to be found in China, translated into Chinese. It is from re-translations of these into English, French or German—and this is the great task before the newer generation of Buddhist scholars—that we may expect to enrich our knowledge of classic Buddhist literature. From the Tibetan libraries too, when these become more accessible, we may yet win materials. But we may not hope to discover there, or in China, a Buddhist

literary tradition handed down in unbroken continuity from the third century B.C., like that of the Pāli Canon in Ceylon.

From the following century China began to incline to the teaching of Buddhism, and from B.C. 217 till the eighth century A.D. we read of scholars and pilgrims going or returning to China at first as "living books", laden, later, with Buddhist literature. But meanwhile from the tradition, represented by the teaching of the Pāli Canon, there were growing out many limbs of divergent doctrines and sects. The story of these growths, told only in Commentaries, is obscure, but it points to a calamitous schism, in which the *upholders of the older teaching* were expelled by the new majority, entitled, for the occasion, Vibhajjavādins, or Analysts. The expelled upholders, who refused to deny the persisting reality of the man or soul, found their way to China, and came *later* to be called Mahāyānists. The Analysts, represented *then* mainly by Ceylon, were called Hīnayānists, *i.e.* men of the Great and the Low Vehicle respectively.

It can hardly be reasonably doubted, in the absence of any historical testimony, that this great and growing division in Indian Buddhism as a religious institution must have greatly aided the renaissance of Brahmanism during the early centuries of the Christian era. Buddhism started from its birth as a religious movement among the laity, as distinct from Brahman teachers and priests. These possessed privileges from of old, to wit, a monopoly of

erudition in sacred runes, hymns, doctrine, and spells, and of the right to celebrate priestly rites. Buddhism, at its start, had no quarrel with the doctrine of monotheistic Immanence taught by Brahmans; actually the majority of its first missioners were Brahmans who do not appear to have been seceders. But nobles and commoners also thronged into the movement, which, from the first, criticized Brahman monopolies, and the inevitable result was a growing estrangement from, not these only, but all that Brahman religious teaching made central.

No creed needed so much as Buddhism to be left severely alone by political patronage, and to work out its slowly permeating and leavening effect undisturbed by ignorance in high places. But just as, in the Protestant Reformation, with the assumption by civil rulers of states of the headship over the reformed Churches, there went along with it a great advance of organization, discipline, and propaganda in the Roman Church; so in India, under Asoka, the development of the khattĭyas into the new imperialism of civil and (virtually) religious headship over India, was met by a corresponding consolidation of Brahman tradition and influence. Gods and heavens and beliefs as to the soul and its destiny had undergone no little modification, since first their Aryan ancestors brought the Vedic hymns into India. Nevertheless the religious ritual upheld by the Brahmans met a chronic popular demand relatively ignored by Buddhism. It gave ceremonial dignity and sacramental sanction to all the vital features of physical and social

life. Hardly may any religion endure as solely sufficient, that does not recognize and enhance the ordinary life of man in all its aspects.

If in the long run its political allies proved bad friends, Indian Buddhism, in the philosophical aberration of its degeneracy, went far to surrender itself into the hands of its foes. It abandoned its own original trend of philosophy, and went off to a side-track which has figured so greatly in such metaphysic as this country has produced—the question of the reality of the external world. And thus, as Dr. Walleser has recently pointed out,[1] by over-emphasizing the negation of that reality, it played up to what we should now call the Absolutist position of its Vedântist opponents, namely, that the only reality behind the illusions which our senses bring us, is the soul in man and in the universe. Dr. Walleser holds that the consequent victory of Brahmanism over Buddhism was thus won by intellect and logic. And he is right by the extent to which the Buddhist schools in India were unfaithful to their earlier religious position.

To this we may return later. We need not here dwell on the story, told elsewhere, in manuals on Buddhism, of the decline and expulsion of that which once, as cult and culture, was paramount in India, gathering under its wing the learning and the science, the philosophy and the literature, the ethics and the social melioration of its age. The evidence as to episodes of persecution at the hands of certain rājas and Brahmans, in the days when

[1] *Der ältere Vedânta*, Heidelberg, 1910.

Buddhism was going under, is so far not firmly based. Equally scanty as yet is our knowledge of the decline and fall of the Asokan empire, of the extension of Buddhism to Kashmir under the patronage of the Scythian king, Kanishka, or of its shrinkage elsewhere in India back to its earlier centres in and around Magadha, once the nucleus of Asoka's dominion. Were it not for the invaluable records left by three famous Chinese Buddhist pilgrims who visited the chief seats of Buddhist, that is, Indian culture—Fa-Hien in A.D. 400, Sung Yun in A.D. 518, and Yuan-Chwang in A.D. 629–48—the darkness would be yet greater than it is. When the Buddhist and Jain literature of this period—*i.e.* of the centuries just before, and the first four after, the beginning of our era—shall have emerged from their chrysalis-state of manuscript; when the archæological research shall be carried on in a way befitting our rule in India, we may at length be able to construct something like a continuous history.

If I have alluded, even in the barest outline, to the historical fact of the waning of Buddhist paramountcy in India, it was in order the better to limit and simplify the scope of our inquiries in the following pages. The reader should never forget that to treat of "Buddhism" is just as complex and many-sided as to treat of "Christism", or, as we have selected to say, of "Christianity". The latter subject admits of very different treatment according to the aspect selected, the period of time, the centre of development, and so on. To the best of my

belief, no European writer has ever been called upon to deal, even in outline, with the whole subject of Christianity or Christendom in a book of this compass. It is equally impracticable to do so in the case of Buddhism. By the foregoing the reader will see that, under that title, a book might be written with equal pertinence either on the story of the inception of the Buddhist movements and its legends, on the Buddhism of the Pāli Canon, on the history of that Canon, on the Mahā-Yānist evolution, on schools of Buddhist philosophy, on Buddhist India, on Trans-Indian Buddhism, and so forth.

It is true that these subjects are not mutually independent. As with Christianity so here, but one Founder is acknowledged, and but one and the same cradle land. And that which we have seen called the Lower Vehicle, is as yet generally, albeit as I hold wrongly, admitted to be the parent stem. We must get behind *both Hīnayāna* and Mahāyāna to find the original teaching. No Mahā-Yānist, however, and no Lamaist would concede that any treatment entitled "Buddhism" was adequate, that did not show the history of the doctrine as a progressive inspiration, and their own cult as the expanded and perfect flower of the parent gospel.

And more: the range of the subject of Buddhism is not to be confined to the cult and its adherents. India could not for a time have so far adopted that cult that we may speak of Buddhist India, and of Buddhist thought and culture, as temporarily Indian thought and culture, without being indelibly modified by it.

The influence of Buddhist religion on the post-Buddhistic Indian literature is well marked. The profoundly religious importance attached by early Buddhism to life and conduct, as well as the pessimism of its dominant monastic outlook, may be heard reverberating through the later devotional and philosophical literature of India, even of schools opposed to Buddhism. Very forcibly was it said by the late Edmund Hardy: "Buddhism wasted away after rival sects had appropriated everything from it that they could make any use of." (*Indische Religionsgeschichte*, 101.) The tragedy is that they made no use of what in its gospel was most worth while. They had no eyes to see it. Buddhism itself had let it die.

What had been this "most worth while"?

To find it we must get at the back of what I have called the Pali tradition. Now a tradition is a venerable treasure. But, as in the day of Jesus, so also in the Pali, a tradition may get musty. It is "of the elders", whether we call them *presbuteroi* or *therā* (Sanskrit, *sthavirā*). There was a day when a man brought to men, not a tradition, but a New Word, largely to purge, to expand, to quicken that which had stiffened into a "tradition." "A new commandment give I unto you." This the tradition will fail to show us, so greatly has it cloaked the original mandate with sophisticated values.

We must seek beneath these, but like Faraday we must have a forecast of what we are to look for, a working hypothesis of what is the mark of a new gospel. What is that?

CHAPTER II

A WORKING HYPOTHESIS

I give thee to-day the boon of a more.—*Katha Upanishad.*
He taught a further than that.—*Theragāthā, Anuruddha.*

We are very willers of a More, whether it be a more in the things of the world about us, or in the things of the spirit. We are most truly our true self when we desire the spiritual More. With these desires religion is concerned. But religions are not usually valued and measured in these terms. We are bidden to see in them a teaching concerning, it may be, Deity, or concerning sin and evil, or about immortality, or worship, or devotion, or morals. Less clear is the bidding to see in a great religion a new value, a new measure of the very Man. They who bid us see this or that have, it may be, the many things in mind that have grown up with and over the first mandate. These things come to be held in worth as the first mandate. This is no longer discerned as a revelation to the Man of a new, a hitherto undeveloped More in himself; a More that he had been holding, at the time and place of the revelation, in a less worthy way about himself.

Yet it was the More of the good (*hu,su,eu*)

deed, word and thought in the man that Zarathustra lifted to a higher power when he so conceived Deity. It was the More-in-worth in man's very being that the Founder of Upanishadic teaching made patent. No less was there a More in the man revealed in the teaching both of Gotama the Sakyamuni and of Jesus. Both teachers taught a way by which the Man, in experiencing a More, could advance toward a realizing of the Most, the Highest. In Islam also we see a More in the concept of Deity as the man consummate.

Here are not many instances on which to base a hypothesis. Yet are none of the great world-religions excluded, none, that is, that we can call historical, none that have left records. It is true that the form of Buddhism which some call the teaching "of the elders", and others call Hīnayāna, is in itself enough to upset my hypothesis, since, by the formulas in which it is taught, it brings a Less rather than a More into the concept "man". But then that Buddhism is "the tradition of the elders", the Pali tradition, and that, as I have pointed out, took its present form no earlier than the third century B.C. We have to go three hundred years behind that. Writers are at fault when they call Hīnayāna "elementary" or "primitive" Buddhism. This statement my book has to make good. It is with the birth and early childhood of the great religions that I am concerned, with the first fifty years or so of their inception.

In them I see man seeking a Highest, a

Greatest, a Most, a Best; seeking to place himself in a position of advantage over against that Highest; seeking to secure a most favoured relation to that Highest; to secure in that Highest an Ally, the mightiest, the surest of allies. Over against the Highest he can conceive, man knows himself to be weak, a very child. But again, he feels himself to be a child, not only because of weakness and imperfection, but also because in some way, he knows not how, he is *like that* Highest, akin to That and not an alien. This bond draws him, as kinship with the beasts does not. He fears much and often in his quest, and yet the process of finding, that is, of going on to find, reduces fear. He comes to think of the Highest as "that from whom he no more shrinks away".[1] In willing ever to find, he comes to word his quest as becoming ever less unlike That to whom he is akin.

If this be granted as being at the heart of all religion truly so called, it follows, that when a spiritual Helper arises bringing a new "gospel" which we call inspired, his message will only appeal to his age and his world if it in some way forward the religious quest of that age and world. It must throw fresh light on that dimly felt kinship. It must tell of a More in it, whether the More be of man's nature, his life or his destiny, a More which he had not had eyes to see. It may be a More which the thoughtful Few had already seen, but the Helper's business is with the Many. It may be

[1] *Katha Up.*, 4, 5, etc.

something voiced already in the cult of this or that Many, but it has not yet, in the immortal phrase, been brought to men's business and bosoms. This More in, or before, or incumbent on, each man is what I hold should be looked for as a vital feature in a gospel just come to birth. This it is which ensures its hold on its age. And contrariwise, what I do not hold as truly belonging to the start of a gospel is, that the Messenger of it made any appeal to man to see in his nature, or his life, or his destiny, a Less, a Worse, a shrinkage, an abasement.

This is what I have ventured to call the hypothesis I would be guided by when trying to get at the back of any "tradition of the elders" to the original message. This it is that I have used to test the Pali tradition, the tradition of the monastic Sangha :—Congregation or Church—the growth of which is shown in the Pali Canon and Commentaries. And I have been brought to this crisis :—*either* my hypothesis is wrong, *or* we have not in that tradition the new message that the Sakyan missioners brought to India in the sixth century B.C.

Buddhism, in what is claimed by votaries and non-votaries alike as being its original teaching, is taught as being based on three aspects of man (as included in *sabba*m : everything), these being called the three Marks : Man is impermanent (or changing : *a-niccha*), ill (or suffering : *dukkha*), and not-a-self (or not-a-soul : *an-attā*). And further and equally central are four "reals" (or truths : *sacchāni*) :

the reality of ill; craving or strong desire (lit. thirst: *tanhā*) as the cause of ill; the stopping of craving as the stopping of ill; the way going to the stopping of craving.

It will be seen that everything here that is affirmed about Man is, with one exception, a negation. He is "ill", *i.e.* not well, or lives in conditions that are ill, and is ill because he strongly desires. To negate this or that of man is to strip something off him; it is the opposite of teaching a More in his nature. To say again that he is impermanent is true enough of his body, and of the mind-ways in which he uses it, but it is merely a reminder of the Less that he bears about in his body, and if carried further and held to be true of the very man or self or soul, it is indeed very awfully a Less that he is told about himself. Nor is there anything more positive affirmed about his destiny. There is indeed a hopeful, a positive sound about the "way" (usually rendered "path"), yet the formula of this fourth "truth" omits *positive* mention of a goal to the way, and makes it consist in eight dispositions of deed, effort and thought, reducing the religion to that extent, to a mere matter of ethical conduct.

What is this? the reader may say, and quote his Emerson: "Men talk of mere morality, which is as much as if one should say 'poor God, with nobody to help him'." I would explain, that my "mere" is no belittling the vital importance of moral conduct in any religion, least of all in Buddhism, but is merely to insist, that to teach a way with no reference

to the goal, the very *raison d'être* of a way, is to teach a way-in-the-less. So that even in this positive feature of the Way, Road or Path, traditional Buddhism seems to militate against the soundness of my hypothesis.

I may get readers who will say: We do not see in the Three Marks the meaning just as you give it. You have yourself been at pains, in your *Buddhist Psychology*,[1] to show, with the sanction of a distinguished (now deceased) Burmese monk, a more psychological meaning in the "ill" that is a feature in the mental "aggregate" (*khandha*) of feeling (*vedanā*), and a more religious or ethical meaning in the "ill" of the Three Marks. Again, we have heard an eminent Buddhist layman of Ceylon tell us at the Conferences arranged in connection with the Wembley Exhibition of 1924,[2] that what you call "ill" (*dukkha*) is "disharmony, is a continuous (and undesirable) vibration, and also, that what you call 'not a self' (or soul) is 'the state of non-independence'; that no group or material is absolute or independent of others". And further, that what you call "craving" (*tanhā*) "is the desire to possess, acquisitiveness, the energy that keeps the state of disharmony in being". Is it not both fair and wise to put yourself at the Buddhist point of view in discussing such very central topics?

I would reply: It would be so, were we here

[1] Published 1914; reprinted 1924. I hope to rewrite this book also. The monk was Ledi Sayadaw.

[2] *Religions of the Empire* (Duckworth, 1925), p. 155.

and now discussing the history of traditional terms in Buddhism. The points of view cited are deserving of attention and respect, and might be multiplied. I ascertained that the latter was the way in which the three marks are taught by a certain monk of high standing in Ceylon, the speaker, my friend Dr. de Silva, having learnt it from him, so that it is not just an independent layman's point of view. But I am not here merely tracing the history of the changing values in Buddhist countries in traditional terms. I shall have something to say about that later. But I seek to give the terms embodied in the formulas of the Pali tradition as we have them in the Pali Canon. And in that Canon there is nothing whatever resembling the definitions just given of *dukkha* or of *anattā*; nor is there any sign of difference discerned between a varying scope in the use of *dukkha*. The men who gave, who give, such qualifications, such new readings of canonical crudities, are just apologists for old-world ideas. The new world is humming about the walls of their monasteries, and they, though they would not admit it, feel the need of a St. Thomas's *Distinguo*, and succumb to the fascination of making adjustments—a need, a fascination unfelt in the old tradition itself.

The one thing they disregard is, that their distinctions and adjustments do not convert the old tradition of a doctrine of Man-in-the-Less to a broader, brighter, truer gospel of Man-in-the-More. They bring in no apology, for example, for calling *tanhā*, " acquisitive desire "

or "craving". But be it noted, that it is "right here" where the formula has its worst breakdown. For what, I would ask them, is the Wayfarer, Man of the Quest, without "acquisitive desire"? Is it not a shrivelled gospel to bring in desire, ay, acquisitive desire, as something that is the very wrecking of a man, instead of his one sure guarantee of ultimately gaining the Goal of the Way? He may plod along the Road ware of transience, of the ills of life, ware that he is not "He", or if it be preferred, is not independent of the other "he", plod along because he has been told to, by tradition, by Sangha, by Dhamma, by the Buddha. But let there be laid upon his mouth a coal from the altar of Desire, of Will, and lo! all is changed. Let us glance back at our Emerson: "Every man takes care that his neighbour shall not cheat him. But a day comes when he begins to care that he do not cheat his neighbour. Then all goes well. He has changed his market-cart into a chariot of the sun." For now he is willing, is desiring to acquire a More. His day, to quote again, is become "loaded, abundant, like the centuries". He wants, he wills, he desires, he lives who was dead, he is growing who was shrinking. His *tanhā*, his thirst, is not to be "stopped, for by it shall he fare to Way's End, and faring, he by it—in Chaucer's line—'shall meetë something for to fare the bet . . .'" "As panteth the hart after the water brooks, so panteth my soul for Thee, O God."

Nor would monk-apologists either discern or

admit that these formulas of a mandate in the Less are the natural, the necessary outcome of the original inspired gospel having been taken over and up into the outlook on life of the Monk. Monasticism had, for its votaries, stripped human life of nearly every human relation, those of the teacher-pupil and the friend excepted. Here was already a drastic pruning of St. Luke's "more manifold" (*pollaplasiona*) of full human life. It may be contended, that this was to foster and concentrate on the growth of a special kind of life, spiritual, religious. That was doubtless the object, but the cost was too great. The More that was sought in this way was hindered by the slashing of life down to a Less. For to justify the new vogue of the day, namely, that retirement from the world befitted not alone the elderly brahman, but also men in general of middle age and even of early manhood, it was needful to maintain a strenuous flag-wagging signalling that the world was "ill", and escape from it as far as possible the better way. And more: the next and any other worlds, wherein man still persisted, as man, could but end in other-world dying, in other-world rebirth, and thus ultimately was there thus no End of Ill. Here too then a fearful Less was in the monk-outlook.

The man who is spiritually growing is becoming a More as Man. But man as a Less desires to have less of men here, and no man hereafter. The last word in the Less, this waning out in the negative notion of nirvana, was the necessary Amen to the teaching.

This is the doctrine emphasized in the tradition of the Pali Canon. The layman no doubt is in it and he, it is true, is taught with less of the pruned mandate imparted to monks. But he is not nearly so much there as is the monk. He has even been cut out from the founder's first utterance as founder. That has been reduced to a message to monks. And he too is bidden so to train himself that he cling not to other worlds, let alone this.

If then this mainly monastic outlook of the Pali tradition be the pristine, the original Buddhism, not only of the third century B.C., but also of the sixth, my hypothesis falls to the ground. But my studies in both the Pali Canon and Commentaries, and also in the Indian religious literature acknowledged to be the nearest existing precursor of the former, have convinced me, that the kind of teaching in the Pali books which I have called showing man not a More, but a Less, in his nature, life and destiny, is not the original Buddhism. These studies have shown me, that we can discover fragments of an older gospel, a gospel which has, as to its central teaching, conformity with, acceptance of, that prior Indian literature, but which has in addition a widening, a deepening of the teaching in that literature, a gospel which, so far from showing man that he is a Less, or is destined as man to become a Less, shows him, in nature, in life, in destiny, to be a More, and a More which goes beyond that which was shown him in that prior Indian literature.

These fragments lie in the Pali Canon and Commentaries, and show, in language an idiom, in aim a quest, not in conformity with the language and aim pervading those works. A literature of a comprehensive nature and long history, such as that of a Canon of Scripture, will ever show leavings of older values and the incoming of newer values. If a passage, a phrase tells of values current in an admittedly older and adjacent literature,—if such a passage or phrase is in conflict with the drift and emphases of the literature in which it is found,—the natural conclusion is, that the passage or phrase has not been inserted later, but is of an older stratum. It is passages and phrases of this kind that we come across in Pali canonical literature, and which I have called " left-in's ". It is these that I have to show. But let us in the first place survey briefly the field in which the fragments lie.

CHAPTER III

THE PALI CANON AND COMMENTARIES

Readers of a little manual like this will scarcely be grateful if I try their patience by a detailed inquiry into the complicated, or rather, as Dr. E. J. Thomas better puts it, the "piecemeal way" in which the original documents, forming the title of this chapter, have been brought to light. The advanced familiarity shown by most English Christians with the text of the Christian Canon flourishes in company with an ignorance of the way in which the "Bible" has come into being and into circulation that is colossal. They are interested in text and exposition far more than in origins. Let it then here suffice if I repeat, that the Canon known as the Pali Ti-, or (Sanskrit) Tri-pi*t*aka is the only Buddhist Canon which has survived in what its exegetists contend is its entirety. To what extent there have been or are other Canons, drawn up as their Charter to the world by different sections of the Buddhist "Church", in Sanskrit, Tibetan or Chinese, we have as yet discovered only portions of them. That these portions are relatively later than the whole of the Tipi*t*aka, later, that is, in their present written form, appears from this: that they have the appear-

ance of having been from the first *written* compositions, while in the Pali Tipiṭaka most of the constituents bear traces of having been *orally* compiled Sayings (in verse or prose), and only subsequently committed to writing. I say most, since certain poems in the Tipiṭaka read as much like originally written compositions as any of those portions of other Canons, betraying thereby their later accession to the Canon.

Let it further suffice to repeat, that this one complete Canon has been preserved, not in India, the motherland of Buddhism, but in the earliest daughterlands of that faith, Ceylon Burma, Siam. And it was from our coming to add the two former to our dominions, that half a century later palm-leaf manuscripts, containing that Canon, scratched in neatly by hand, the "Indian ink" being rubbed in afterwards, began to find their way to this country. For the next quarter of a century the zeal of a Fausböll, a Childers, an Oldenberg, a Rhys Davids was let loose upon them. Fausböll published the text and Commentary in six volumes of the 551 Jātăkas or birth fables, Childers compiled a Pali Dictionary, Oldenberg edited and with Rhys Davids translated the first part of the Tipiṭaka, and all of them spent themselves yet further on editing or translating other portions. The lion's share has been achieved by the Pali Text Society, its title suggested by Richard Morris, of the Early English Text Society, whom Rhys Davids lured into his linguistic net. Morris died too soon, but a worthy successor arose in Edmund Hardy, he

too, alas ! being abruptly summoned hence in the midst of invaluable collaboration. But there have been, there are many other helpers, and the Pali Text Society, weathering war and economic crisis, still struggles on to fulfil in a few more years its task, the canonical texts completed, the commentarial texts on their way to completion, a new enlarged Dictionary published, and its translations of the more important works all but finished. Few pillars in the temple of the history of human ideas can claim a more honourable position than that due to these collaborators, every one of whom has accomplished the work, not in the salaried way of endowed profession, but as the by-product of leisure hours.

The contents of this Pali Tipiṭaka I will now very briefly examine.

Tipiṭaka means triple basket. A Buddhist would probably be as little able to tell why this noun was chosen as a Christian could say why his Canon is called " Testaments ". The word, as a thing to be spade-filled with earth or the like, is in the Canon itself, but also in the more secondary sense of a tradition, or repository of a tradition, in such a phrase as " proficiency in pitaka ", as *e.g.* not in itself an adequate religious guide. The term " triple-pitaka-man " also occurs once, but in a summary that is a later addition.

The Tipiṭaka's three parts are (1) the Vinaya, or body of monastic rules, together with the traditional episodes on account of which each rule was made. It is in three sections : the

Pātimokkha, or leading general rules of monastic life, with a Commentary on each; the two further divisions of rules. These are distinguished as Great (*mahā*) and Little (*chulla*) divisions, but it is not easy to say why, since, under the former, very minor details are grouped concerning food, dress and medicines, while under the latter occurs the important subject of schisms and dissensions. It is possible that the word "little" may have been at first suitable—in that the second section was begun as an appendix, and gradually added to, till as at present it was not much less lengthy as Sayings, or much less bulky as a book, than the major division. Thus the chapter last but two, on the admission and rules of and for nuns, will only have become necessary when women had been admitted to the Sakyan Order. Again, the last two chapters on the so-called First and Second Councils will naturally have been added after each of these events. Lastly, the "Accompaniment", or summary (Parivāra), of the whole work, will be yet later.

The whole work was edited in roman letter in five volumes, 1879–83, by Hermann Oldenberg, the expense being shared by the Government of India and the Royal Academy of Berlin. The first edition is exhausted, but the Pali Text Society has so far been able to reprint the first two volumes. The Pātimokkha rules (without Commentary) and the second twofold section were translated by Oldenberg and Rhys Davids, each working apart (and in their spare time) during 1881–5, and published by Max-Müller in the *Sacred Books of the East*. This is also out of print, but, if the Pali Text Society survives, a translator is ready to make a complete translation.

The Second Part of the Tipiṭaka is called the Sutta-Piṭaka. The word Sutta (Sanskrit: Sūtra) is of uncertain origin. Meaning literally what is sewn, hence possibly a connected talk, as something more than a mere text, *i.e.* mantra or affirmation, it has also been derived from the Sanskrit *sūkta* (*su-ukta*; in Pali *suvutta*): what is well-uttered, a word applied to Vedic hymns. It is highly probable, that in the first decade or two of the Sakyan mission, nothing was drawn up in fixed (oral) form save these "mere texts", the exposition being in every case left to the free wording of the individual teacher. Such texts came in time to be called *mātikā's*. This means a channel or course along which water flowing might be guided. A fragment of such a list survives in one of the books,[1] while a later more rigid and precise list survives at the head of the same work.[2] With the growth of the Order, the promotion of new men from being learners to teachers, and the increase of "texts", it would become advisable to buttress the "mātikās" each with some "authorized" exposition.

And here we have the rise of the Sutta. Or again, as the founder, doubtless also his earlier fellow-workers after his decease, waxed old in years, they would utter an "authoritative" mantra, and then depute the exertion of its exposition to a trusted and more vigorous understudy.

The reader can follow this if he consult the collection of Suttas called *Majjhima-Nikāya* in its English

[1] *Buddh. Psychol. Ethics*, § 1366, i ff.
[2] *Ibid.*, 2nd ed. only.

translation: *Further Dialogues*, vol. II, Nos. 133, 138, 141, or again the first collection called *Dīgha-Nikāya*, in *Dialogues of the Buddha*, III, p. 202, or again the third collection called *Samyutta*, *Kindred Sayings*, IV, p. 118. It is under such conditions that we may see the rise of the Sutta.

The variant "suttanta", lit. "sutta's end", was nothing different in kind, nor was it used with precision. Thus the Suttas of the first collection are each called by title a "suttanta", yet we find them cited in Commentaries as "sutta". Whatever was the origin of the parallel term "vedânta" in brahmanic culture, there was nothing in "suttanta" implying a climax or outcome of sutta-doctrine. Its use appears to have been a vogue with repeaters of the third and fourth collections more than with those of the first two. It may have conveyed the sense of chief or great suttas among Dīgha repeaters.

A term for scripture-passages, used once in the Asokan Edicts for suttas, is *pariyāya*. This occurs in the Suttas as meaning individual exposition of an opinion or belief, but it never acquired ecclesiastical placing as did "sutta" or "suttanta". It was a lay-term, *e.g.* "passage"—as we should say—of holy writ.

The Sutta-Piṭaka consists of five collections or Nikāyas. Besides the three mentioned above, there is the Fourth called *Anguttāra*, an ingenious portmanteau word conveying the sense that there is a going "beyond" (*uttara*) or further, in parts (*angāni*). As the exegetist Buddhaghosa explains: Its "9557 suttas . . . are arranged by way of an increase of the parts by one at a time". Thus Nipāta 1 deals with a one thing which is, or does so and so; Nipāta 2 with two things, up to Nipāta 11. Why the "furthers" broke down here with no apparent reason we shall never know. Had the *Anguttara* been a

cricket-chronicle, there would have been a finality about that "eleven". In Buddhism it is in no way a significant number. I incline to the belief, that the piling up of "parts" petered out here because of a change that had come over ecclesiastical values. What do I mean?

If there is in these four collections one thing that must strike at first sight, it is that, in the opening "parts" of the *Anguttara*, we have the beginnings of a table of summarizing of points or texts. In it we are, relatively speaking, at the beginning of the making of a "Bible". This is not the case when we consider the longer, more inclusive, more elaborated Suttas of the first two Collections, or the several efforts included in the third collection to make groups of metrical sayings, sayings on Cause and the like. By the time that the redactors, busy over their one more, whether they were at one settlement (*āvāsa*) or several, were getting to double figures, other redactors were engaged in the more ambitious task of planning more elaborate discourses such as are indicated by the titles in the first two collections: the Net of Brahma, the Fruits of Recluseship, the Discourse on Roots, Heirs of Dharma, etc.

But this is not all. These discourses are mainly concerned with ideas in terms of abstract names: morals, recluseship, causes and the like. They seek to find the man in terms *mainly of mind*. The Fourth Collection is on the whole mainly concerned *with the man himself*. It starts with the man and with the woman;

it goes on with the business of managing the mind as the instrument of the man. Further, it recognizes the self in the way it was recognized in Indian religion of the sixth century B.C. Its categories are continually putting, not the qualities to the front, so much as the three, four, five men who have the qualities. This is reflected in one book of the Third Piṭaka, which is largely borrowed from the Fourth Collection and entitled *Designations of the Man* (*Puggala-paññatti*). Now this prominence of the Man went quite out of vogue. We shall see into this later on. And the changed fashion would tend to lower the prestige of the Book of the First Compilations, making it to rank, not first, but last in the four Collections of discourses, and also to choke off such energy as might have brought the eleven parts up to the more auspicious number of twelve.

But I am not contending that the Dīgha Collection came altogether later to birth than the Fourth Collection. Its last two Suttantas are topics arranged in arithmetical progression no less than is the entire Fourth Collection. Both of them are traditionally the work of the leading disciple (who predeceased the Founder) Sāriputta. This does not vouch for their being verily composed by him; much later works are also set to his credit; but the two Suttantas bear traces of being very old stuff. And *they* end at the most auspicious of all numbers: the number ten. In the old world a "lucky" number meant much.

The Fifth Collection called Khuddăka, or

" having little items ", does not mean that its contents were of a minor, a less weighty character. Its contents open with three or four anthologies which give place to no works in the Tiptiaka for sanctity of status, such as the *Dhammapada*, the *Khuddakapātha*, the *Sutta-nipāta*, the *Thera-therī-gāthā*, the *Iti-vuttăka* and the *Udāna*. Later on, the Collection came to belie its name, for there were appended to it lengthy prose works :—the *Jātaka* and the *Patisambhidā-magga*—and the long poem of saints' legends or utterances called *Apadāna*.

I come to the third part of the triple canon : that called *Abhidhamma*. This word may be approximately rendered by " higher values ". To be engaged in *abhidhamma*-talk, in the Suttas, is to be conversing in religious, in godly converse, on matters infinitely worth while. Hereby would be engendered a pious rapture, adding to the beauty of the summer moonlit evening.[1] When the then growing vogue of the new study of mind laid its grip on the missioners, it became ever more their pre-occupation to be discussing, not so much *the man* in his spiritual nature and destiny, as the nature and significance, in him, of physical states (or phenomena), as distinguishable from mental states, and of the variety among the latter. An early beginning will have been made in this direction, the headings of such teaching, in what we now call psychological analysis, being probably what are called the *Mātikā's*, to which I have referred, and which,

[1] *Furth. Dial.*, i, No. 32.

in the First Piṭaka, are ranked together with and after "Vinaya and Dhamma". Between the second and the fourth century after the Founder's death the collections of these oral Mātikā's grew till, in Asoka's day, there were four of them.[1]

We then come upon a fifth collection, showing a departure as different as are, in the Vinaya, the two chapters on the Councils from the long preceding institutions of Rules. This is the *Kathā-vatthu*, lit. Bases (or matters) of Talk, and translated, in the Pali Text Society's Translation Series, as *Points of Controversy*. It is a book of debates, conducted according to a fixed academic method, namely, get your opponent to concede your own view of his premises, and he must then give in to your conclusion. The person refuted, that is, of course, the heretic, is never shown as disputing his opponent's way of using the premises on which the (heretical) assertion is based. Tradition makes out, that this set of debates was "uttered" at a council or conference, held in the reign of king Asoka, to purge the Order of monks, and to standardize the then very bulky mass of oral sayings. It is quite probable that the event is historically true, and that the first section of the *Points* may give approximately the substance of debates actually held. But the rest of the *Points* bear traces of being an accretion, added at intervals of an indefinite length.

There are two more works in the Abhi-

[1] *Abhidhamma-Pitaka*, books i–iv.

dhamma, which also bear traces of being added yet later, but not late enough to have been from the start written compositions. They will have been added in the second century B.C.

This ends our brief survey of the Tipiṭaka. We come to the Commentaries, called in Pali books, in the singular, the Talk on the Meanings: *Aṭṭha-kathā*. In these we see the fixing in literary form that which had been for centuries the more or less free, varied individual exposition of teachers, such as the Suttas themselves had been at one time. With no ecclesiastical hierarchy worth speaking of, with the growing diffusion of the Sakyan "church", with the inevitable manifold of values, wherein a new orthodoxy was developing, it was natural that uniformity by a fixed wording in the teaching should be earnestly sought. According to tradition, the *Aṭṭhakathā* was committed to writing in Ceylon during the first century B.C. But there survives nothing to tell when this took place in India, either of *Aṭṭhakathā* or of the *Piṭakas*.

That the *Aṭṭhakathā* (assuming the tradition to be true) was written down first, not in Pali, but in Singhalese, appears from the records concerning the man whose labours have given us the greater part of the Piṭaka exegesis: Buddhaghosa. It is claimed that he went from India to Ceylon, and there, at the Great Minster (Mahā-Vihāra), recast the *Aṭṭhakathā* from Singhalese into Pali. It is not clear how much he accomplished. It is not disputed that the Pali exegesis of the Vinaya and the

Four Collections is his work. But in the opening and closing verses of the exegesis on the Abhidhamma Piṭaka there are signs that another commentator "was requested" by Buddhaghosa to do the work, "begun" by him, and of the last five books no commentator is named. Again, of the Fifth Collection, the Commentary on most of the works is admittedly the work of another Indian scholar, Dhammapāla, who may or may not have recast into Pali as did Buddhaghosa, but who has a style of his own. Lastly, there is, in the lengthy Commentary on the *Dhammapada*, betrayal of a hand very different from either. The same may be said of that on the *Jātaka* verses. But Buddhaghosa claims emphatically that he wrote the Khuddakapātha Commentary.

That he did not so much translate as recast and edit his Singhalese matter is fairly evident from his pages. In these we find a curious mixture of the more sober episodal matter of the Suttas side by side with looser legendary gossip; great freedom in imputing to the Founder "what he was thinking about" to explain what he said; a good deal of the Hīnayāna nihilistic stuff so emphasized in his own book, the *Path of Purity*, and much word-paraphrasing and parsing, rendered advisable by the nature of his task. That in his nihilism he was repeating the values of his day and of Ceylon is shown by the works of his contemporary Buddhadatta, a monk whose exegeses are not of any Piṭaka work in particular. We get fairly nearly the time of their activity by

the records, linking their visits to Ceylon with the reign of one Mahānāma, round about the third decade of the fifth century A.D.

But the history of Buddhism is a terribly dark business, making the gleam thrown by the composite work entitled the *Milindapañha* : the Questioning of Milinda (*i.e.* of the Græco-Bactrian king Menander) a very boon. Menander's reign ended 90 B.C. And the book betrays both the spread of writing and, at its end, mentions three of the Four Collections (2, 3 and 4) as being *lañchakas* or scripts. The book made its way, doubtless in its serial parts, to Ceylon, and there underwent much editing, to make it consonant with the orthodox Buddhism of the island, a theory which the reader will find discussed in my *Milinda Questions*. As such it became a most useful book of reference for the explaining of much which, in the early days of the Pali tradition, it had not been felt needed explaining.

Of approximately the same date as this work may be two slender essays linked with the tradition of a school said to have been started at Avanti (a place uncharted but in North India) by one of the Sakyan disciples : Kacchāna (or Katyāyana). They are entitled respectively *Netti-pakarana* (the book of guidance) and *Petakopadesa* (Pitakan instruction). Of the former we have Dhammapāla's Commentary, and Buddhaghosa cites the latter, hence in Pali literature they fall between Tipitaka and these two writers. The *Milindapañha* does not mention them.

In addition to the Commentaries there is a number of sub-commentaries entitled Tīkās and Nissăyas) ; the two metrical chronicles of Ceylon entitled Dīpavamsa and Mahāvamsa, giving, with much legendary colour-

ing, a mixture of political and religious tradition; and other miscellaneous Pali works largely poetical. All of these I leave aside. The field of our digging is mainly the *Tipitaka*, but the Commentaries, the *Path of Purity* and the *Milindapañha* give useful guidance, in showing the drift of Buddhist opinion down the centuries.

I have given the reader a sketch of this literature of the Pali tradition in the briefest possible terms. But, to consider only the Canon, this was no work of a day or of a few men. It is the embodied conscience of a monastic succession, covering some three centuries at least, that is, from somewhere in the sixth century B.C. (I follow the earlier Eastern dates) to the latter half of the third century B.C. And always must it be remembered, that its *existence as scripture*, not oral only, begins at least a century after that.

This is perhaps not remembered as it should be. No scripture ever began as writing, one may say paradoxically; that is, nothing to which the name of "holy scripture" or "sacred books" is given. Yet even to-day histories of Buddhist thought and literature are produced, wherein the late appearance of the "book" in India, and the openings for change resulting from that lateness, are not even taken into consideration. Rhys Davids's *Buddhist India*[1] is a brilliant exception. Yet even he wrote that same year (1903): "the standard books they used when Buddhism arose" (namely, the Brāhmaṇas). Let me not take one ever sensi-

[1] Now, alas! out of print.

tive to historical perspective too literally. But I hold it regrettable, both that relatively modern words, such as "books" are for India, should be applied unreservedly to statements about an age when India was a bookless world, and also that India's reluctance to write, *and its results*, should reveal a blind spot in writers.

For the general reader this is misleading. He does not see the Founder of a world religion uttering his message with never a reporter at hand, nor disciples of the first or second generation either. The word "reporter" or "repeater" (*bhānaka*) is quite a late feature in Pali literature; it occurs for the first time in the *Milinda Questions*, nearly five hundred years after the Founder's day. I would have him use the word "Sayings" when he is speaking of his impressions of Indian literature. If he will do so, he will put himself at once at a juster point of view for considering this:—How far is it likely, that in a religious teaching handed down for a long time as Sayings, we have the very words (even if they be in a modified literary diction) in which the first teachers expressed their mandate to their age? How far will these Sayings have become modified, as all oral traditions do, as they pass from one man to another, not it may be from a quasi-automatic preacher to another, but when they are carried on by teachers of outstanding originality? How far will those early Sayings have come to clash with later values? How far will those later values have tended to replace them and be now held to be "funda-

mental doctrines"? Is not this a tendency in churches?

Into the question, how much, and how little, writing was used between the day of the birth of Buddhism and the writing down in entirety of the Pali scriptures this little book cannot give space to enter. On the one hand we have, in the rock-and-pillar-cut scripts of the Asokan Edicts, a clear proof of writing, novel, it may be, but nowhere stated to have been such, dating from the middle of the third century B.C. And, in the Vinaya Piṭaka, we find "writing" (*lekham*[1]) rejected as a calling for a lad as being "painful to the fingers". Prof. F. W. Thomas[2] quotes a work of uncertain date to show that writing was used at that time in public business, in letterwriting, in lawcourts. We should do well, however, to see here a relatively limited, very immature use of writing. For, on the other hand, there is, in just that Vinaya Piṭaka, a conclusive case made out by the translators for just the opposite state of things. They show that writing, as an instrument of literature, had not come into use when the Pali Canon was being compiled in its settled oral form, namely, in that third century B.C. "Had writing been so used, we should certainly have come across references to documents in some shape, and to implements for writing." For in the Vinaya, "every moveable thing, down to the smallest and least important domestic utensils, is in some way referred to and its use pointed out, while other articles not

[1] ? carving. [2] *Camb. Hist. India*, I, p. 483.

proper to monasteries are named and condemned. But nowhere do we find the least trace of any reference to MSS., much less to inks or pens or styles or leaves or any writing-materials." We do find allusion to the special steps to be taken to secure personal hearing of a Saying at a distance, if the repeater (or unofficial knower) of it is ill. But no letter is mentioned making or complying with the request, nor is a "copy" made, taken down at the bedside. Monks have to go, even in the rains, when "tours" were not allowed, have to listen, learn and remember.

We do find two references to writing, however, in the Vinaya. Encouragement to commit suicide, spoken or written, is condemned—"whoso cuts a scratching" is the Pali—and nuns, while keeping apart from worldly crafts, "may learn writing without blame". But both passages are, not in the Rules, but in the older commentary on these, included in the Canon, but when, no one knows.

We know that, in an ecclesiastical world, there is ever a tendency to maintain the old, the traditional, and refrain from innovation. And this makes it possible, that the Buddhist monastic centres came to adopt writing later than the lay-world. And again, the general lateness in India of writing may have been due to the lack of materials: beds of clay, swamps of papyrus reeds, the sea-loving date-palm. The bark of certain trees and metal plates however thin, which form the oldest Indian "books" we have, were poor substitutes, and the

oldest palm-leaf MSS. are but mediæval. Even when writing was deemed a desirable means of preservation of " holy writ ", namely at the Fourth, or as some would say, the Third Council in Kashmere under King Kanishka, we read, in Tibetan records, that sheets of copper were the writing medium, with stone chests as covers.

This was at an uncertain date in the first century A.D. At that date Greece had long been writing her books, let alone other earlier cultures. And the Hellenic tradition, in the person of Alexander the Great, had two centuries earlier begun to thrust her ideas upon India. When Bindusāra, the father of Asoka, asked Antiochos Sotēr, ruler of the *frustum* of Alexander's conquest in North-West India, to send him a teacher, that is, a live book, we may gather this : Had India then used writing " for literary purposes ", the request would have been for books. And since Antiochos will have known that India could only ask, not for books but for the speaker of the word, he replied in terms of the man as chattel : " We do not trade in men."

And we may be sure, that had there been no other obstacle in India to writing than the need to find suitable material, material would have been found, long before Greece began to make India feel, that in writing lay for her, not an insult to the living word, but a respectful and protective ally. Where man wills strongly, there he finds, there he creates. But there was an obstacle to writing anything more detailed than the notch in the tally as a memento,

or the visible symbol in the cut seal. When man's work was the reaching the very fellow-man in the message, then the one fit tool was the living word. Let it be remembered, that long before Asoka's day, the Man, and especially the Man as Speaker, had attained a height and dignity in India unknown elsewhere. In speech, the More in him that was divine could especially express itself. The word once style-cut or punched was dead, fossilized. For that matter, the statue too, the petrified man, is relatively late in India. The Buddha sitting, lying, standing, has nothing to do with an India so old as the day of the Founder. *In his day* the uttered word had a power we in our world of the book can hardly realize. In it the man conveyed his very self to the listener. In Vedic beliefs *Vāch*, speech, was poetically pictured as a divine being, sometimes personified as a river: "she who flows"; or as the terrestrial world, mind being the aerial world, breath the heavenly world, or again as the very gods, as the mother of men. In later sayings just previous to the birth of Buddhism, we read: "From the earth and from the fire the divine speech (*daivi vāg*) enters into him."

After his day the way was prepared for a reconciliation to the notion of an expanded use of writing by two factors, on which Greek impact supervened as a third. The first was the Brahman adoption of the silent cult known as *Yoga*, called also *Āyoga*, *Anuyoga*, or the effort by absorbed introversion of thought to seek nearness with the Divine Self, the "Kins-

man" within. With it the value in speech, as an external religious expression, wilted. The second was a cheapening of the divineness in the spoken word through the growth of the monastic vogue. The recluse as such hid himself from men more than he by speech gave himself to them. Faith in the virtue and efficacy of "Not-doing" was coming to constitute the religious life. And the credit and prestige of speech suffered accordingly. We get a hint of this new scepticism in the First Collection: "When you have three stages in personality, past, present, future, and you call them by different names, the names are merely expressions, ways of speech, designations in common use; we say them, but need not be misled by them."[1] We find this sentiment bearing centuries later a sinister harvest. They gave authority to the new teaching, that what the Founder said to the multitude had not the "highest meaning" his words implied for the wise. For instance, that when he said "a man", he meant nothing ultimately real.

And we get a much later echo of the cheapened word in the Tibetan Milrepa's lines:

Accustomed long to know the meaning of the wordless,
I have forgot the way to trace the source of words and phrases.

We come then to the time when, to attain both unity and persistence in their Sayings, Buddhists, it may be in India as well as in Ceylon, committed these to writing. But long

[1] *Dial.*, i, p. 263.

before that, delay in writing had entailed complications in unifying, in standardizing the verbal teaching.

It must be remembered, that the spiritual, social, ethical unrest in the valley of the Ganges from the sixth century B.C., largely perhaps the result of the mission of the unknown teacher of the Immanence accepted in the Upanishads, produced in the following centuries a mass of new religious utterances, Brahman, Jain, Sakyan and proto-Sānkhyan, calling for much new effort in the collective memory of a bookless society. I am not seeking to impose a limit to the capacity of the normal human power of memorizing. We need not go to India to find achievement of this kind. I have never read that an actor or a musician felt he or she had reached a crammed congested state of memory, making further memorizing impossible. I have heard an Englishman recite several whole plays at brief intervals, rivalling any achievement of Veda-chanting Brahman. And if we sought, we might find record of unlimited powers of memory in mediæval reciters, lay and religious.

But if modern reciters vary one from another over the same play, there is always a possibility of reference to the written word, or in music, to the notation. What if there were none such? What if the several versions as recited or played are the sole book? We read, even in Buddhist Commentaries, of Brahmans meeting together to revise so as to standardize their mantras. Yet the fact remains, that so far from there

being anything like consensus in versions of their scriptures, the number of Vedic variants amounts to 10,000.

That is mainly a case of metric scriptures; take the case of the prose Suttas (these are mainly prose): here we have, I repeat, a mode of teaching where at first, for an indefinite time, the text only, or outline only—our old books would have called it "the argument"—was handed on in fixed form, the exposition being left to the free address of the exponent. What a hotbed of opportunities for changing is not here the case! It is true there might be, in all duly ordained and trained monks, a way of wording the exposition which had been taught them by their seniors as approved, by which the range of diversity might be restricted. But the really original wording:—had the seniors really got it when, beyond perhaps a "text", so much free play had also been theirs to use as they thought best?

I would stress the last phrase, for it has been laid to my charge, albeit not by a scholar, that in deeming we have in the Buddhist Suttas in their present Pali recensions, a body of emphasized teaching which the Founders of Buddhism would scarcely recognize as their own, I am accusing the succession of Sangha teachers of forging, either orally or scripturally. There is from first to last no question of forging, by which I mean, altering an utterance into a *known* untruth, so as the better to express what one wishes others to believe. Truth, in this connection, will mean historic truth:—"is this

the teaching uttered by our Founders, or is it not ? " And historic truth is a relatively new value even with ourselves, much more in India. The teacher was out solely to edify, to impress ; and to do this, he expounded as he had come to think best. Incapable of deliberate deception, he might unwittingly be historically a liar. " Historians ", said a sagacious man, " have never made sufficient allowance for the deliberate lying of witnesses incapable of deception." [1] Values in one age may be disvalues in another.

The one great difficulty, in an age of difficult communication and no writing, was to get standardization in teaching. Even with writing it took us a long time to smooth out our dialectical differences of Mercian, Wessex and Northumbrian English, and get our scriptures in a " standard English ". But there was also the matter of selection among words, phrases and longer passages differing in different recensions. The same difficulties beset the Buddhist Sangha, when the need of revision became urgent. And the results of their well-meant and devoted labours have left their scriptures with not a few inconsistencies, a great deal of fairly obvious patchwork, and not a little equally obvious editorial handling of contents. One feature, pointing unmistakably to a number of differing versions, is the great number of parallel Suttas, with the same text, but with various expositions of it. Another, still more significant for our digging, is that whereas certain doctrines are strongly emphasized, there

[1] F. E. Pollock, *To My Grandson.*

are, as it were, " left-in " certain sayings, which militate against those emphases, which take us back to the religious ideals in the literature judged to be earlier, and with which the commentarial exegeses, reduced much later to Pali writing, are in sharp opposition.

Here then is the field in which I have to show fragments which I deem (in the teeth of most writings on Buddhism) to be what survives of the original teaching of the Sakyan missioners, bringing their new word to India three hundred years at least before the Pali tradition was taking its final scriptural shape.

CHAPTER IV

SOME FRAGMENTS

If I am right in calling certain sayings "fragments embedded in a main structure", the structure, namely, of the teachings emphasized in the Pali scriptures, I must show that those sayings reveal a teaching which is, not only not so emphasized, but which is more or less opposed to those emphases. And again, if I would show any such fragments as belonging to a teaching, which is at once on a line with the teaching of its day, and at the same time an expansion of that teaching, I must show that these fragments bear in them that "gift of a More" about the man, which is for me the acid test of a true "gospel".

I have briefly sketched what the teachings which are emphasized in the Pali scriptures look like, whether we picture them as field or as structure to be scrutinized. These are (1) a Way, Road or Path, usually listed as "eightfold", placed at the head of the Charter, then consigned, in an added formula, to the fourth place in a list of "real things" usually translated as "truths". There are also (2) Three Marks, true of every man, because true of "everything" (*sabba*m), namely, that he is

transient, impermanent or changing, that he is ill, or in conditions to be so called; that he is not-a-self. There is (3) a *summum bonum* called *nirvana*, or the " blowing out " or " going out " of all known or conceivable conditions of individual life. There is lastly but not least (4) the threefold category: *sīla*, or morals, *samādhi*, or introverted meditation, and *paññā*, or holding in worth the Four Truths. This is the main structure. The bases of these are three, often, but not in the scriptures, called the Three Jewels: Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha. They are to be fairly equated with what would in Christianity be called Christ, the Bible, the Church. The " structure " is what they are said to have taught. Of these three the first is revered, not as a living working presence, but as a memory and an inspiration, a memory of one who was wise, all-knowing and compassionate, but the compassionateness outweighs the other two attributes. These we may call the " main structure ".

The intrusive " fragments " which we come upon may be here limited to seven groups. They belong to a teaching about

(1) the self;
(2) the sense of right, or what ought to be;
(3) man as a being who is becoming, not mere being;
(4) man as willer, chooser;
(5) the judgment at the end of an earth-life;
(6) the aim of the kind of *samādhi*, or introverted meditation known as *jhāna* or musing;

(7) the object of *sīla*, morals, as the positive welfare of the fellowman.

In (1), a teaching is revealed to which the trend of emphasis in the scriptures is found to be in growing hostility, till the commentarial exegesis reveals a climax exceeding, but growing out of, that canonical hostility.

As to (2), the scriptures show a secondary meaning relatively external and formulated, as contrasted with the hidden source or well-spring, latent in the word " sense " (of right) : the " first intention " of the word *dharma*.

As to (3), the word " becoming " (*bhava*) is usually found to be depreciated in value, categorized as evil and vilified.

As to (4), the only allusion to it in the central formulas is " to give the dog a bad name and hang him ". " Will " appears only as evil desire ; the will to the better, by which alone man grows better, finds no wording in formula.

As to (5), this all-important feature in a religion appears in two varying versions, but stands in lonely isolation, none of the Sayings referring to it, much less bringing it into central importance.

As to (6), an aim of *jhāna* " crops up ", we may say, in a few contexts, an aim to which the much-repeated formulas about *jhāna* make no reference.

As to (7), whereas the much-repeated moral code makes unemphasized reference, if any, to the moral doer, and none, in the moral benefit to the fellowman, we find two contexts where

the welfare of the latter is taught as the object of the moral act.

I have now to make good these seven assertions.

1. *Fragments about the 'self'*

In these we find nothing of a not-self assumed in the man, as is stated in the Third Mark. We find "the self", not only taken for granted, but referred to in lofty terms as a More in the man than either the body, the mind-ways, or the "just himself". We find "self" called a great self co-existing with a little self. We find self valued as witness, judge, upbraider, protector, and end or bourn of self. We find a warning, that neither body nor mind be valued as being the self, and logically so, for else would man be in body, or in mind, just what he would choose to be, and not limited by both as he actually is. And, so far from being denied or explained away, we find the seeking for, ay, the great longing for the (great) self commended.

The reader can consult each of these passages in translations; in one case, at present, in a work no longer on the market.[1] I give the fragments in most of the contexts:

1. "Here is a man who has made-become (or made-to-grow) his actions, morals, mind, wisdom, who is not a less, who is a great self (or soul), who dwells in the ideal." The opposite kind of man is called 'a little self' (*paritt'âtumo*).[2]

[1] *Vinaya Texts*, I–III; *S.B.E. XIII, XVII, XX.*

[2] *Gradual Sayings* (IVth. Nikāya), i, p. 227, *n.* 7, 228.

2. "Nowhere can any cover up his sin.
The self in thee, man! knows what's true or false.
Indeed, my friend, thou scorn'st the noble self,
Thinking to hide the evil self in thee
From self who witnessed it.

Thus he who has the self
As master, let him walk with heed."

Thus making self predominant, he abandons evil, cultivates goodness, . . . keeps himself in perfect purity. This is called "dominance of self!" [1]

3. Vakkăli a disciple is ill and the Master, visiting him, makes inquiry: "Tell me, Vakkali, does the self reproach you in the matter of conduct?" [2] Again: "In one of troubled mind, the self upbraids the self," [3] so in other Suttas.

4. "The self is protector of the self; who else could the protector be?" [4]

5. "The self the end (the bourn) is of the self." [5]

6. "So he to whom the self is dear,
Who longeth for the great self . . ." [6]

7. "The visible shape is not the self . . . the

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 132.

[2] *Kindred Sayings*, iii, 103 (the translation is very free; the Pali is identical with the phrase in the next citation.

[3] *Grad. Sayings*, i, 52.

[4] *Dhammapada*, ver. 160, 380.

[5] *Ibid.*, ver. 380.

[6] *Kindred Sayings*, i, 176; *Grad. Sayings*, ii, 21, 22. Cf. with the footnotes in this the rendering in the former work.

mind is not the self. If either were the self, he would not be limited; it might be possible for you to say as to either: Let for me the body . . . let for me the mind be thus or thus. But inasmuch as neither is the self, this is not possible."[1]

8. My next is a parable, the wealth of which in the Suttas is so notable a feature. Less well has it been noted, how the very parables may be shown to supply among them instances of the older teaching, while the majority are no less clearly enforcements of later monasticism.

Faggots in the Jeta Wood, wherein stood a gift settlement of huts, later, a large monastery, are being collected for kindling-wood. The Founder, we read, says to his disciples: "Just as if, almsmen, a man should gather, burn, or do what he please with all the grass, branches and stalks in this Jeta Wood: pray would you say 'this man is gathering, burning us, doing what he pleases with us?' 'Surely not, sir.' 'Why so?' 'Because, sir, that is not the self, nor of the nature of the self.' 'Even so, almsmen, the body is not of you . . . nor the mind. Put it away (from your ideas of the self). Putting it away will be for your welfare and happiness.'"[2]

Now it may be objected that this figure and its lesson is no fragment of things buried, but a teaching of the superstructure: *anattā*. I admit, it is twisted to bear that meaning to-day. But

[1] *Vinaya Texts*, I, p. 100.
[2] *Kindred Sayings*, iii, 32.

only, I submit, at the cost of being intelligible. As it is told above, I used, when I read it, even in days when I accepted the "not-self" as genuine old Buddhism, to come up against the defective ending with a jolt. But supply the ending, which, in my opinion, has been dropped by the "*anatt*-orial" editor, and read it thus: "Put away from (your idea of) you that the faggots are you, who are as is the Wood to the faggots", surely then does the real lesson become plain. It may be said: There is here no greater lacuna than when, in the Second Utterance (No. 7 above) the Teacher, while contrasting body and mind with the self, did not assert the reality of the latter. Well, but in that day this was quite superfluous and uncalled for. And a parable is different from a Mantra. The latter affirms something; the former tries to explain something. Explanation in it is called for.

9. The next is anything but a slighted fragment; it is often cited. I put it under my "fragments", because the true original idea in the passage is a neglected misunderstood survival. It is recorded as one of the last exhortations of the dying Founder, but it is also quoted in *four other contexts*.

"Live as they who have the self for a lamp, the self for a refuge, as they who have *dharma* for a lamp, *dharma* for a refuge, and none other."[1]

The translation invariably runs: "Be ye a lamp unto yourselves, etc." But this is not

[1] *Dial.*, ii, p. 108.

the religious meaning such a sentence would have had in the sixth century B.C., however plausible a rendering it may be for Ceylon later, or for Europe now. I return to this presently. As usually translated, the religious meaning of the word *attadīpā*: "men of the self-as-lamp", is quite lost to view; as read by one who has eyes to see, it shines like the gleam of quartz in a roughcast of plaster.

10. The last citation on this subject I place, for reasons which will be obvious to the reader, opposite the Upanishadic teaching to which it presents a parallel, and of which it may be an echo:

"In this city of Brahma . . . that is the self, free from evils, ageless, sorrowless . . . whose desire is the real, whose conception is the real. That should be searched out, that assuredly is what one should desire to understand." [1]

"This self assuredly indeed is Lord, is Becoming . . . him assuredly one should desire to know; he should be searched for." [2]

The Founder, his mission scarcely begun, is asked by some men and women of his class, whether he can inform them about a female thief? The answer runs: "What think you, gentlemen? Which is better for you: that you should be seeking after a woman, or that you should be seeking after the self?"

They grant that the latter is best, and are bidden to sit down, while he "teaches them dharma". The text, alas! gives nothing further on the quest chosen, but only a little set piece repeated in the case of many conversions.[3]

See footnotes 1, 2 and 3 on facing page.

It will be noted, that both Upanishad and Vinaya injunctions are concerning the same object: (the) self. But whereas translators of the *former* all agree to place the object in the singular, the original translators of the *latter*, the Vinaya: Oldenberg and Rhys Davids, render this word by "yourselves". I have not come across any other renderings of the Vinaya passage save my own, and that has always been, not yourselves or your souls, but "the self".[4] It has always seemed to me illogical and inconsistent to render one and the same context in the Indian way, when found in the Upanishads, and in the European way, or at best in the secular, the non-religious way of Ceylon, when it is found in the Pali.

The English reader of these lines may not know, that in Upanishad, and Piṭaka, the word

[1] Chāndogya Upanishad 8, i, 1.

[2] Maitri Upanishad, 6, 8. These renderings are Dr. R. E. Hume's. Deussen's verbs here are *erforschen, suchen zu erkennen*. Max Müller's are: "deserves to be sought for, to be understood", and "to be thought after, to be sought after". Tatya's edition has "is worthy of search, should be inquired after". All render the object of search by either the Ātman, das Selbst, die Seele, the Self. I think that "to learn" or "come to know" had been a juster word than "to understand, to know". We need a word for an advance, an attaining, not for a static state. The Sanskrit verbs are *Tad anvestavya*m (the Pali parallel here is *gaveseyyātha*), *tad vijijñāsitavya*m. The Pali for the object of search is *attāna*m, self or soul.

[3] *Vinaya Texts*, I, p. 117.

[4] S. Radhakrishnan also renders it so (*Hibbert Journal*, April, 1934).

" self " never has a pronoun appended to it as in our idiom. He will never meet with the compounds " myself ", " ourselves ", " yourself ", " himself ". He must supply them, if need be, in translating. Hence the rendering of just *attāna*m by " yourselves " is at once an assumption and a Europeanization of a phrase that is characteristically Indian. And more: *attā* is a word which, when Buddhism began, had a peculiar and lofty religious meaning, a meaning which is not adequately shown in calling the object to be sought after either " yourselves " or " your souls ". The object of the search, for an Indian teacher of that day, was to be learning to realize, that the man himself, and not " temples made by hands ", was the " city of Brahma ", the shrine of Deity. " That," said the Upanishadic teachers, " that art *thou* ! "

And hence the force of the injunction in the cited episode becomes clear to us: It is as if Gotama were saying to the inquiry: " It is not for me to tell you where to catch your thief. It is for me to tell you where to find the highest object of man's quest, and that is the very self, the very man." If we recollect, that for ancient India " man " (*purusha*, *purisa*) was often used for both " soul " and God, we can see the implicit word-play here, in the antithesis: " woman(-thief) " and " man ", the Self. And *we must forget our Bible*, with its warning as to the useless gain of the whole world compared with the loss " of his own soul ". It is a true saying, but we have to

remember that the Jew did not see in the soul all that the Indian had come to see.

If we will use, for self or soul, the word "spirit", and in "spirit" feel the implication of "Holy Spirit" as ever near, we may then get nearer to this injunction of "seek the self". In religious idiom it did not fall short of "were it not better that you should be seeking after God?" I imagine it is through failing to know or, if knowing, to be mindful of, the Immanence then accepted by the religious world of north Indian culture, that this striking "fragment" has been either mistranslated, or passed over, and even passed by with a sneer.

"Fragment" the episode certainly is; we never find the Founder recorded as repeating it, nor is the "quest" of the self ever shown in any Sutta as the religious duty of man. Yet it comes straight from the heart of the approved Brahman teaching of the day of the birth of Buddhism. And it strikes the very note I call for in a genuine gospel:—it holds before men a More in their nature, and a More in their life. For here was no mere reminder of what man actually *is*, in which lay perhaps the main drift of Upanishadic teaching. It was a call to be *coming to know in the very act* of seeking, a call to seek *to become* That Who he potentially is. In the fine words of Hosea, he was to come to "know in following on to know". In that brief surviving question—its survival is a heavenly marvel!—we see in a flash the New Word brought by Gotama as in tune with the best teaching of his day.

But let us turn to fragment 7: This, unlike my last fragment, is so far from having been overlooked or contemned, that it has been given the editorial name of the *An-atta-lakkhana-Sutta*, *i.e.* the discourse on the not-self-marks, or perhaps better, on the marks of the not-self. And again, whereas the Sutta itself is only once, and that only approximately, reproduced,[1] a formula, containing a more detailed account of this "fragment", that is, of the first part, occurs in many Suttas, under the title of "opinion as to (what is) the person".[2] Nevertheless the first part, cited under 7, is, in its difference from the opinion-formula, very definitely the fragment of an older teaching, a teaching which had become lost when the formula was drawn up. What do I mean?

If the fragment be read, with modern Buddhist or European use of "self" as guide, the warning may seem obscure. How, if I the "self" am truly just body, can I "be" the fine healthy young body I may wish to be? "I" have no power to create either body or mind. But *if he recollects*, that for India of that day, "self" or soul meant, not merely the human spirit, but the Holy Spirit, Deity, he may then see, that were the "spirit", that is, the God-in-man, actually body, the body would be almighty, able to make itself what it would. As it is, the God-in-man is not body, but *works through the body*, and body is a very limited instrument. Beethoven himself could not give

[1] *Further Dial.*, i, p. 166.

[2] *Sakkāya-ditthi*, *e.g. Further Dial.*, i, p. 214.

us the Ninth Symphony on a shepherd's pipe. See then, my men, the text is saying, that you do not blunder by seeing the That, Who you inherently are, in what is only your instrument, fitted just for your life on earth. If, in surveying a staff, I tell employee X, employee Y: "You are not the chief", this does not imply that the chief is a non-entity. Yet this, because of the later trend of Buddhist teaching, is precisely what the Buddhist infers from this mantra. Years ago I told myself: But what a funny way of teaching the self as being real. But it was never meant to teach that; there was then no need to do so.[1] The teaching was a warning not to merge the unquestioned Self in his instruments.

Now this belief of the self as God-in-man had faded out in the growth of the Pali tradition. It was merely a permanent "man-ness" that was being expunged from what had come to be held as a correct notion of body and mind.

Going again backwards, fragment 5 is also a piece of the accepted Brahman teaching of the sixth century B.C. It is an echo of the saying in two early Upanishads: "To become one for whom Brahma (=Self,=God) is all: this is for him the highest bourn (*paramā gati*) . . . the Man: this is the course, this the goal beyond (*para gati*), there is nothing higher."[2]

[1] I have recently seen this fundamental premise of sixth-cent. B.C. India treated as the "peculiar doctrine" of a later sect, "that the individual is something more than the sum of his constituent parts!"

[2] *Brhad-U.* 4, 3, 32; *Katha-U.* 3, 11.

Such lines in the *Dhammapada* show how very early an effort in Buddhist composing much of it is, for very obviously the sentiment is hostile to the trend of later Buddhist thought. It is true that in the saint or "worthy one" (arahan) lay the "goal" of human endeavour for that trend. But the saint would never have later been worded as a Self.

Fragments under 2 and 3 and 4 clearly reveal, in the notion "self", the belief in a some one worthy to instruct, to protect and to preside over a some one believed to be the wiser in placing himself under that other "some one." Here too the very words and phrases in the Pali reflect the current teaching of Immanence. Thus we find in No. 4 an echo of Kaushītaki's saying: "He is world-protector . . . world-sovereign . . . lord of all. He is for me the self:—*this* one should know; for me the self:—*this* one should know." [1]

Again, we have in No. 2 a parallel to the Saying in the White Mule Upanishad:

> . . . the inner self of all,
> The overseer of karma, in all abiding,
> The Witness . . .

And in this and the Maitri Upanishad, both possibly contemporaneous with the birth-period of Buddhism, we see the tendency appearing to speak of the one self as both a greater and a less.

Finally No. 9: here we are on ground better known to Buddhists, and the injunction has found commendation among Hīnayāna Buddh-

[1] *Kaush.* 3, 8.

ists as showing self-reliance, self-confidence—in the Western sense of the terms—to be essential to Buddhist teaching. Such distorted Buddhism commends itself also to the Agnostic and the Rationalist.

For me it is neither Buddhism nor is it religious. It is a doctrine of Man in the Less. Neither Gotama nor any religion worthy of the name would thrust the orphaned man back, for his salvation, on his actual, present, unaided self. This is as if a swimmer should cast his baby brother into deep water and bid him swim ashore. In Gotama's day when the religious man was said to be "lovingly-desiring (or willing) the self (*ātmakāma*)", the willed object was the God-self, the man's potential self, not his own God-divorced actual ego. And we find this compound lingering on in the Pali Suttas. "Disturb not the recluses," says a grove-warder to Gotama, "they are *attakāmā*."[1] Again: "by one who has loving desire for the self, who longs for the great self"; and "since every man has loving desire for the self":—in these phrases no egoism is meant, but devotion to the Divine indwelling ideal, then worded as "the self".

When "self" is used in antithesis to "another (man)", then indeed the religious implication ceases to be effective; the term is no longer religious; it is social, moral. Man is over against his fellowman, in service or disservice.

[1] *Vinaya Texts*, II, 309 (the transl. is quite misleading); *Further Dial.*, i, p. 149 (this transl. is a shade less misleading).

So also when body and mind come into consideration: compounds with the "self" as prefix may refer to these. But in religious considerations, the predominant religious culture of the day should not be so lost sight of as it is. Never will the reader understand the original Buddhism if he imagines the first Buddhists of the sixth century B.C. teaching religion in terms of either the late Pali tradition, or of Western ideals.

Much more must he put aside our own modern worsening of the term "self", who see in the word usually our worse self, our egoistic bias. The Indian, Brahman or Buddhist, never thought of the self as I have read in a French work: *ce moi haïssable* (this hateful Me). The word, at that day and there, had been given a great more-value. And the New Word of Buddhism gave it an even greater value: the innate power in every man, in every self, to evolve from his actual into his potential self, to grow from manhood into that Godhead Who was latent yet working in him.

2. *Fragments on the Sense of Right*

"Sense of right" is *dharma* (Pali: *dhamma*). This word has, in the history of Buddhist thought, undergone much elaboration, more so than in Brahmanic, *i.e.* so-called Vedântic thought. Mentioned, in singular or plural, only ten times in the Three Vedas, it is given no special consideration, historical or other, in a standard work like Oldenberg's *Religion des Veda*. Yet there came a time when India

deified the term, and this indicates a long evolution in value. At the birth of Buddhism there is no sign that the word was grouped with the two others: *artha*, *môksha*, a group defining the perfect system of instruction which the great epic *Mahābhārata* is defined as being, in its opening stanzas:—"duty, profit, salvation (lit. release)."

Neither of course was *dharma* then defined, as it came to be, in terms of a formulated body of doctrine, whether we call this the Dharma-Sūtras of Sanskrit, or are referring to the Sutta-Piṭaka, or the Tipiṭaka itself. In that sixth century *dharma* meant, first and mainly, the sense in man of what he ought to do or abstain from doing, next, "religion" or religious procedure as the man's giving expression to that sense. *Dharma* covers both "duty" and "religion". As the former, we find it in both Upanishads and Suttas in injunctions to "walk according to *dharma* (*dhamma*)". As the latter, it is found chiefly in the Suttas, and means the burden of a message that we should call religious. "Sit down and I will teach you dhamma." And again, when Gotama gives instructions to his missioners, he is recorded as equating *dharma* with a word which meant "the religious (lit. the God-) life: teach dhamma: declare the holy life!"[1]

But already in the Suttas we find *dhamma* as "taught doctrine" fixed in nine *anga's* or forms: —"that they should learn dhamma: sutta,

[1] *Vinaya Texts*, I, p. 112; *Kindred Sayings*, i, p. 132. Cf. *Dial.*, iii, p. 36.

poems, catechism, jātaka, etc." A work of externalization, of stiffening in set form has been going on. In the Commentaries we find a maturer attempt to explain the connotation, rather than the denotation of the word, thus: *dhamma* is in the three Pi*t*akas a fourfold division of matter-to-be-learnt (*pariyatti*); *dhamma* is condition (or cause); *dhamma* is virtue (*guna*); *dhamma* is phenomenon (lit: nonbeing-nonsoulness, *i.e.* quality, not entity). With these scholastic efforts this new book is no longer concerned. The matter I wish to rub in here as elsewhere—it does not yet receive due attention—is the evolution, Buddhist and non-Buddhist, in the meaning of this most important word.

It is noteworthy that no attention, in Pi*t*akas or modern books, is paid to the fragment I now give. It occurs in the Third and the Fourth Collections in a practically identical recension :—

1. Gotama, immediately after an alleged crisis in which tradition imputes to him the winning of complete enlightenment (*abhi-sambôdhi*), is said to be meditating on what, in the formula: morals, mental training and release, he has won, and which has left him depending on no teacher. "What if I were to live obedient to, honouring revering this *dharma* which by me has been completely understood (*abhi-sambuddho*)?" Approval comes at once in a vision of a deva, of the worthier brahmaworld (not the next world), who says, that to do that were to follow the example of all wise men, past, present and to come: "Wherefore in

sooth by one lovingly desiring the self, by one longing for the great self, very *dharma* is to be revered according to the teaching of the wise." [1]

It is possible, by reading, for *atta-*, *attha:* welfare (desiring welfare) and for *mahā'atta*, *mahanta*, " greatness " to weaken any reference to Immanence, but I follow what was then the Indian way. Nor do I find that " longing for greatness " fits the context.

Now the tradition, placing this resolve of Gotama before he had uttered a word of " doctrine ", compels us to see in *dhamma*, either the best religious teaching of his day, *or* an ideal he had come to realize as *his* message, *or* the older meaning of *dharma* as duty or sense of right. I hold the last is right: a solution which is practically at one with the first. The second I reject, because he, shortly after, is shown as practically rejecting the twofold message he had willed to give.

But my decision does not mean for me, that I judge he decided his message was to be a matter of moral teaching only; that he meant, he revered " duty ". There is more to it than that. If, the verse says, a man love the self, let him worship that in him which he knows as sense of right, or the feeling he ought to do, or not to do. Here is nothing less than seeing, in what we now call " conscience ", a Divine, an ideal " Self " working within us; that which our great playwright calls: " Ay, conscience! that Deitie within my bosom " (*Tempest*), or

[1] *Kindred Sayings*, i, p. 176; *Gradual Sayings*, ii, 20.

what Sir Thomas Browne called "the man within, angry with me", or what Goethe called:

> Der Gott der mir im Busen wohnt,
> Der kann mein Inneres bewegen.[1]

And it is just here that we see, not the rejection of the Indian cult of the Self, as God-in-man, but the taking up of it into a new, a stronger, a truer cult, namely, that of Deity and man as not statically, but dynamically conceived. It is the seeing the centre of man's nature as will, and not as mind. In place of the knowing, the realizing, as taught in the Upanishads, we see here the substitution of "willing to become". The stress on Self had done its work; henceforth the man of India was bidden to stress that inner growth, that urge by which alone he could win to actuality of his potential self.

This *dharma* it will have been, and no oral body of Sayings, that the dying Founder named as his successor.[2] "Heed ultimately not what men say, (nor what their codified teachings say)! Heed the inner Monitor, the still small voice!" Take That as your leader.

I would not wrongly impute to all Buddhists that code-meaning, "Bible-meaning", of *dhamma* as being all that it means for them. For the

[1] *Faust.*

[2] *Dial.*, ii, p. 171. Read literally it is: "That Dharma which by me has been taught, declared, he for you, by my passing on, is teacher." The text has the insertion "Dharma and Vinaya", but the singular *so* ("he" or "that") betrays the gloss. In *Further Dial.* Ānanda later on tells an inquirer that "Dharma is our arbiter" (*patisarana*): (*Furth. Dial.*, ii, p. 9). He does not mention Vinaya.

thoughtful, *dhamma* means rather an attempt to word a world-cosmos, wherein cause-and-effect grinds its way, a cosmodicy rather than a theodicy, an infinite mechanism started none knows when, or how, or to what end. This is for me the outlook of the private soldier going into action, encountering a fate he must face, with what result he knows not. With this Less in it, that it omits the soldier's knowledge, or at least faith, that superior officers have a plan of action in which he plays a part, a willed scheme, in which success largely depends on the co-operation of his will with their will. The "cosmic" *dhamma* is a modern expansion of the term. I am concerned with original meanings.

2. I am not able to bring forward even a "fragment" showing any intentional shifting of stress from "self" to "dharma" in the Suttas. We do not expect to find such retrospective purviews in ancient scripture. But I can show two fragments, in which the protective comradeship ascribed to the higher divine self of Upanishad and Dhammapada is felt as a fit figure for *dharma*. The verse beginning:

> For self in sooth protector is of self . . .

finds endorsement in a poem of the Monks' Anthology thus:

> Well doth dharma protect him in sooth who dharma follows.
> Happiness bringeth along in its train dharma well practised.
> This shall be his reward by whom dharma's well practised;
> Never goeth to misery he who doth dharma follow.

For dharma and what's not dharma have not like results ;
Not-dharma leads to baleful, dharma to happy doom.
Hence let a man put forward desire as to dharma,
Delighting in finding in that so good a Wayfarer.
Persisting in dharma, disciples of Best of Wayfarers
Venturing come to the best and the highest of refuges.
(*Dhammika*, ver. 303–5)

3. Now take a Sutta already cited showing the self as " witness " and judge : this is the Saying of the Three Mandates or Masters : the self, the world or fellowman-in-the-worlds, and " dharma ". Under the third head we see " dharma " thus worded : " . . . the wise know *dharma* in the very self (*paccattam*). Here I have a Fellow-Student, ever knowing, ever seeing. If I, who have gone under a ' dharma ' and discipline so well taught, should live in sloth and carelessness, this would not be suitable for me " . . . and as before the man vows to gird up his loins with strenuous will, " walking according to dharma ".[1]

[1] *Gradual Sayings*, i, 132 f. The grammar about the Fellowstudent is a mixed singular and plural, so much more usual was it to be mindful of the fellowmonk than of the Dweller within. But the previous Mandate has dealt with the censor in the fellowman ; the context requires the singular, the comradeship of the Holy Spirit. Hence I venture to read thus : *Atthi kho pana me sabrahmacārī jānam passam viharanto*, in the sentence : " Now I have . . . ever seeing."

CHAPTER V

MORE FRAGMENTS

3. *Fragments on Becoming*

I CALL the sayings I am about to quote "fragments", because, whereas they have perhaps not been so much overlooked and ignored in emphases, both Piṭakan and modern, as are some, they have been bereft of their point by being considered in connection with another aspect of the teaching. Under this other aspect they are well-nigh buried. What was that aspect?

It seems fairly evident that, when the Sakyan mission of Gotama and his men began, the idea of a uniformity in mind-procedure, which we now call causation, was occupying thoughtful men. I say "mind-procedure", for there is no evidence that interest was being felt in physical or cosmic procedure, in "natural law". The new interest was concentrated on the mind. I say not, that interest in man as exercising mind in self-expression was new. We have only to read the ritual Sayings called *Brāhmanas* —Sayings older than the Upanishads—to see that. The new thought lay in considering mind as a "thing" no less rateable and analysable than was the body. The mind was in a way a

parallel, shall we say? organism, or complex to that of the body. It was to body as sword to sheath, as plant-stem to sheathing leaves.[1] The man, or self or spirit, user of sword and sheath, was not rateable or analysable. He was *sui generis*. Not so his self-expression in mind-ways.

We are in fact witnessing the rise of Indian psychology, and the founder of it is nothing more than a name: Kapila. His teaching was coming to be known as *sānkhya* (in Pali *sankhā* and *patisankhāna*), a comprehensive term that may mean "name", "number", "scrutiny", but which involved the exercise later known as *vibhatti*, *vibhajjana*, *i.e.* analysis.[2] Sānkhya proper, as amounting to a "system" more or less philosophical, is of much later date. In this sixth century we are witnessing the growth of what I can only justly call proto-Sānkhya: a distinction that has been sadly to seek in certain writers on Buddhism. In this proto-Sānkhya we see mind considered as something distinct from the very "man". It said of man: "since there must be an experiencer, the man (*purusho*, *i.e.* soul, or self) exists." It said of the mind, "I am not (it); (it's) not mine, not I". And it set on foot an analysing of these instruments of the experiencer into a list of functions.

Kapila was certainly earlier than Gotama's day. But in that day some other, some nameless man had conceived the ways of this finer mind-body of the man as proceeding, not by

[1] *Dial.*, i, p. 88.

[2] Cf. *The Bhagavad Gītā*, by Franklin Edgerton, p. 66.

chance, not by a stationary "being", but in an orderly movement. Namely, that a feeling, a wish, a thought served, as cause, to result in a mental effect, no less than nutriment, solid or liquid, resulted in a bodily effect. Who this man was we do not know. I am not without hope we may yet run him to earth. But in Buddhism the credit due to him has devolved upon the Founder of Buddhism. In the record (invented we know not by which disciples, for the Founder was alone) telling of enlightenment coming to him, he is made to think in terms of cause and effect. But he is not shown as taking causation as such to be a gospel fit to teach the Many. He *is* shown, soon after, as having planned such a gospel, but as rejecting it as lacking in appealing force.[1] He is none the less said to have won to his side his two chief disciples as being an expert teacher in causation. But the record is too inconsequent to be literally accepted. The two men were seeking the Upanishadic goal of salvation called *amrta* (Pali: *amata*); not-dying, or immortality, and no clue is shown linking their quest with anything to be guaranteed by a doctrine of causation.[2]

It is very possible, that the interest in causation (in the inner world of man) shown throughout the Suttas may be due, not only to the first men of Sakya having welcomed it as an aid in

[1] He is also, later, shown as trying its appeal with an "educated" man, and "drawing a blank". See *Further Dial.*, ii, p. 17.

[2] *Vinaya Texts*, I, pp. 144 ff.

their own ideal, but also in the unnamed originator of mentality-as-causal having come into their ranks. But under the influence of that other great current vogue, the growth of monasticism, the teaching of causation became a quite one-sided factor, greatly helping to turn the first teaching into that doctrine of the Less which it became. Namely, monasticism threw its weight into this distorted picture of cause and effect: "anything that is caused is a thing that may have the cause withdrawn; stop the cause and you stop the effect." In life, in the worlds as you know, or learn of them, you experience ill: the effect. Stop life, stop living in a world, and you stop ill.

That your very progress in the Better, in the Way in Welfaring is equally a setting on foot of beneficent causes which *should on no account be stopped*:—here is a teaching of "the More" which we nowhere find put into terms of causation. Two formulas were the result of this current interest. The one, wide, general, world-true, may well have been the Founder's own: "Given this, that comes to be; from the uprising of this that arises; this not given, that does not come to be; from the stopping of this that is stopped." The other is the onesided application of this to the one subject of "ill", but it has practically ejected the other more truly scientific statement; it stands for what causation has meant for Buddhism, and is known by the title *Paticcha-samuppāda*: "coming-to-pass by way of". "Because of ignorance, actions (or plans); because of plans awareness;

because of awareness name and shape ; because of name and shape sense-organs ; because of sense-organs contact ; because of contact feeling (or experience) ; because of experience craving ; because of craving fuel (or grasping),[1] because of fuel becoming ; because of becoming birth ; because of birth, old age (or decay), dying, grief, mourning, pain, sorrow and despair. Such is the arising of this entire mass of ill."

It is within a section in the Third Collection, consisting of 93 Suttas concerned with "Causal basis (*nidāna*), mainly in terms of this longer formula, that we come upon two Sayings that I call fragments. I call them that because the very pregnant teaching in them is (*a*) smothered in this formula, (*b*) is nowhere emphasized as doctrine. Here they are.

1. This occurs in two recensions : "Everything exists :—this is one issue. Nothing exists : —this is the second issue. Not approaching either issue the Wayfarer teaches religion by the Middle." Then follows the formula. Thus for Sutta 17. In Sutta 48 there is no use of the word "issue", but the alternatives are the same, with the addition of two more : "Everything is unity . . . is plurality", whereupon the Sutta ends as does the preceding one.

Now that the Founder of a world-gospel made his replies to questions put to him in terms which fall back on a ready-made formula is a thing too grotesquely impossible for a reasonable person to hold for a moment. The

[1] This term (*upādāna*), lit. "taking up into", is used for both the English words.

formula has obviously been inserted, at a time when it had come to serve as a symbol for a certain customary way used by monks in bringing home their own monastic conclusions. And this will have largely been, as the monastic vogue grew, that the world, that life, that man was in a state of danger and ultimate misery. In the Commentators' time it was customary to say the one or the other was like a revolving wheel, a wheel of *bhava*. What is that ?

Bhava is " Being " as resolved into process, that is, into becoming, becoming better or worse, Being as dynamic, not as static. Now there had been in the Upanishads a great effort in teaching, to resolve man as *being* this or that into man as *becoming* this or that. We have only to compare the Upanishadic texts with those of earlier literature to realize what a marked effort this had been. It had faltered, partly, it may be, because the becoming of material things gave warning of a sequel of decay, and a leaven of materialism lent weight to this in the teaching of spiritual things ; partly, it may be, because Immanence was coming to find, in the exercise of spiritual introversion called Yoga, something less hazardous than the teaching that man could realize nearness with the Self by a potential transformation in becoming That Who he was.

But the seed of that teaching of Becoming sown in the Brahman schools was bearing fruit ; the world of the founders of Buddhism was ready to hear a gospel of Becoming brought out to the homes of the Many.

But later there supervened a like faltering in Buddhism itself, a like fear in decay inherent in things growing.[1] And monasticism, in its view of life and of worlds as "ill", fostered this teaching in the Less. It was helped, too, by a curious accident of language. It was not in Indian idiom, or at least in Pali idiom, to speak of "life" in the plural as we can; for some reason too it was unusual to speak of "world" in the plural. It was usual *e.g.* to speak of a world "with" devas and men and devils, or of the world as "a thousandfold".[2] In a formula referring to "former lives" the word used is "former dwellings". The sequence in the formula using "births" is a gloss. But apparently the word *bhava*: "becoming" lent itself to plural use, and so we get both lives and worlds spoken of as "becomings".

Hence there came a worsening in the value of the fine word "becoming" (or, as I wish *we* could say, *werden*). Whether *bhava* meant growth in general, or whether it meant just "lives", "worlds", this latter meaning, from the standpoint of a pessimistic monasticism, gradually cheapened the worth in the other, the general, meaning of "coming to be". *Bhava* came to mean just that phase in any material form of life which is followed by decay. And "lives" in any "worlds" were taken to be just those two successive phases, *and nothing more.*

[1] *Points of Controversy*, pp. 56 f.

[2] *Loko sa-devako, samārako sabrahmako*, and *sahassadhatuloko*. Cf. below, p. 111.

Now the cause-formula both worded man's life as a "becoming-in-ill", and it also had the term itself: *bhava*, as one link in many. I suggest, then, that this is what took place in the later editing of our context:—the *original* Saying contained the *only possible alternative* to "man is", "man is not", namely, "man is becoming". But the meaning in "becoming" having become doubtful, ambiguous, and the formula, showing how "becoming(s)" led to ill, *having come into use*, the formula was inserted in place of the single term. Learners might thus the better see, that, while "man is becoming" was true, man was, as such, in a process of "ill", "of sorrow, yea, lamentation and despair".

2. Fragment 2 is very like 1 in context and similarity of treatment. "Is the man who does the deed (*a*) the same as the man who is hereafter recompensed, or (*b*) is he another, (*i.e.* a different man after surviving death)? He is neither the same nor is he another . . ." and then follows the dreary formula of the becoming of ill.

Here too there can have been originally but the one reply, not in set-piece terms, but just "he will have become".

3. This fragment forms a suggestive comment on the foregoing. In the early Suttas of the Fourth Collection, we read of Gotama's cousin Ānanda asking him, "What is this that is being said: becoming, becoming? What is this?"[1]

[1] *Gradual Sayings*, i, p. 203.

This shows us that the subject was new, if not for a Brahman teacher, at least for a provincial nobleman. The reply is a most curious mixture of old teaching touched up by the monk-editor : " In becoming, man is as a seed planted now in this world, now in that, needing for his growth the watering of will."

Here " will ", for which there was no good word, is called by the " bad name " of craving, and " man " is the word *viññāna*, which *came to mean* just mind, but which, at the birth of Buddhism, was used for the " man ", whenever the context referred to his surviving death.[1] At the same time there is no outspoken detraction of " becoming " (or of " life " or " world ") as such. We are still in the early days in this precious fragment. Left in, it has only suffered a twist or two. The reader needs to contrast it with the lewd abuse of *bhava* on a different page,[2] and the listing of it under this and that evil thing.[3]

And let him note this : had the subject of *bhava*, whether as man's attribute, or as " life ", or as " world ", not been at one time a very prominent feature in the early Buddhist teaching, nothing of the fierce zest in denouncing it everywhere in the Suttas would have been called for.

4. Fragment 4 is in the Third Piṭaka, in the book of Debates mentioned above. It lies

[1] See my *Outlines of Buddhism*, pp. 59 f. ; *Indian Religion and Survival*, p. 66.

[2] *Gradual Sayings*, i, p. 31 (an obvious addition).

[3] Cf. *e.g. Buddhist Psychological Ethics*, §§ 1096, 1113, 1151 ; *Kindred Sayings*, i, 49. *Bhava* is often translated by " rebirth " and, more wrongly, by " existence ".

across the page[1] like a fallen meteorite, so does it, or should it, strike us as a survival in a world where new values have been filling the pages. The orthodox debater asks the sudden question :

" Depending on what does man persist ? (Answer, by the teacher of the man's reality :) Depending on *bhava* man persists."

The debater then gets the latter to admit that *bhava* is a transient state liable to be followed by its reverse. This is conceded :—a fatal slip, since it confounds things immaterial with the way of material things. The debater follows up by contending that the man (*i.e.* the spirit or soul) is thereby included. " Nay, not so ! " is the protest, but it is made just too late. But we shall never know whether we have here a weak conservative teacher protesting, or an editor, " incapable of deception ",[2] but out to make his own point of view forcible and impressive at whatever cost, *eliminating* a more logical protest.

I would add, that the Commentary slips over this vital point, as for him no longer of importance, and merely says : here *bhava* means *upapatti*, that is, survival-in-another-world. This bare comment is useful, as showing how, in a scholastic age, " becoming " has come to mean, not so much a general attribute of a More in man, as the concrete view of " a new life " in " another world ".

5. The fifth fragment consists in one word,

[1] *Points of Controversy*, p. 56. [2] Above, p. 65.

but one occurring many times and throughout with approval. This is the word *bhabba* (= *bhavya*), the "participle of necessity" of the verb "to become", and meaning literally "bound to become". It is virtually a new contribution made by the Pali sayings to Indian literature, its Sanskrit usage (*bhavya*) being mainly found in later works, not of this era. The man who must, who ought to, who will "become" in the Suttas is somewhat parallel to the English-Christian idiom of a man who is "saved".[1] And the frequent occurrence points to a time when "becoming" was the very gospel of the early Buddhists. It is true that translators invariably content themselves with the rendering "capable of", "fit for"; and often it were hard to get any other way that was not clumsy. Thus in my own effort:

> *incapable is he of hiding that;*
> *uttered is incapacity of man-who-sees!* [2]

lit. he is bound-to-be one not hiding that (namely, an evil deed). But taken as attribute of a true Sakyan (early Buddhist), it will have had a community-meaning stronger, more characteristic than "capable", a term, it may be, by which "the faithful" were spoken of.

The literal meaning comes out well in the parable, in four Suttas, of the Hen: "Let her not worry about the issue of the eggs she is sitting tightly on, making-become; they are bound to become (*bhabba*), to become safely

[1] Or has "assurance of salvation".
[2] *Khuddakapātha* (S. Bks., Bud. VII, p. 149).

hatched." So are you bound to become . . . if you strive heedfully.[1]

Fragment 6 is a word of unique occurrence, but very significant. It hints at "becoming" as itself a teaching or doctrine, since there is nowhere any early *record* of original Buddhism as having been such. In a now well-known Sutta, the Founder, when asked what are the true credentials of any new teacher, names features in his talk as being, in themselves, inadequate, and that the crucial test of it lies in its effects on conduct. Among the features he includes "what conforms with becoming", a compound unintelligible in its context of different methods of teaching, unless we see in Becoming one of such.[2]

There is in six of the Asokan Edicts a compound which goes some way to bear out this recognition of Becoming as an ideal in religious teaching: the term *bhava-shudhi*. This, differing from other translators, I see, not as "purity of soul," or "of mind", but as "salvation in (or of, or by) becoming". To render *bhava* by "soul" or "mind" is opposed to all usual renderings. They will have had only *bhāva* in mind, which is usually rendered by state or being. But it equally means becoming. We are up against the difficulty of words virtually and all but, in form, the same in Sanskrit, or Pali, to be rendered by widely

[1] *Further Dial.*, i, 73, 257, etc.

[2] *Gradual Sayings*, i, p. 172 (for the first time rightly translated).

unlike terms in English.[1] The static and the dynamic, contrasted in "state" (or being) and "becoming" is, in the Indian *bhăva*, much closer. But whereas Asoka is perpetually urging "becoming" as "growth", as a moral More, in his Edicts, he is not interested in bidding folk be as they are. Hence it is nearer the spirit of his lessons to see, in *bhăva*, "becoming".

7. We have not only these two fragments, merely one word each, to reveal (*a*) that the teaching was of Becoming, (*b*) that the consummation, or that salvation was by Becoming, we have one more fragment, this time a sentence, pointing to both process of Becoming and its consummation. It is recorded as one of the last utterances of the Founder:

"Whoever, Ānanda, either now or when I have passed away, shall live having the self as a lamp, as a refuge and no other, having *dharma* as a lamp, as a refuge and no other, they shall become that highest in the undying—whoever are willing to train. . . ." [2]

"Become that highest in the undying: *t'amat'agge bhavissanti*:—it is a bold thing to render this so; not because the Commentary, here and in the third Collection, sees only

[1] *Bhava, bhāva*: "becoming, state". *Werden, Sein*:—so in Böthlingk-Roth Dictionary, art. *bhāva*.

[2] *Dial.*, ii, p. 109. The rendering of *bhavissanti* by "shall reach" is another instance of the perversity of translators in evading the true word. But the mistake lay also in not seeing that the "highest" (*-agge*) is a Magadhese nominative, not a Pali accusative. See also *Kindred Sayings*, v, 133.

"gloom" in *tama-t-* :—this only shows how utterly the Upanishadic tradition had been wiped out in Ceylon, if not earlier—but because as yet no one else takes this rendering. Nevertheless it was the quest of *amata* that is said to have brought Sāriputta to hear of Gotama. The prayer of the pious in their day was to "become the immortal, to become the Highest (Brahma)." It was the Self who as the inner controller (*antaryāmin*), that is as *dharma*, was at once their Aim and their Guide. And with the majority of the first disciples being Brahmans, it was inevitable that the movement would start with these holiest ideals on their lips.

8. This fragment is at once a hypothetical interpretation and one which is, if Buddhism began as a teaching of Becoming or Growth, a testimony of the first importance. It is as follows :—

Gotama,[1] having yielded to the inspiration to spend himself in bringing a new word in religion to his fellowmen, reviews what he had decided to teach and, deeming it of no appeal to them, creatures as they were of habit, was hesitating and heavyladen in spirit. To him appears in vision a deva, who says : "Teach religion, sir ! Teach religion, wellfarer ! there are beings who have little dust in their eyes ; from not hearing religion they are perishing ; learners of religion will become." Gotama confesses why he was hesitating, and that "if

[1] *Vinaya Texts*, I, pp. 84 ff. ; *Kindred Sayings*, i, pp. 171 ff.

men would not learn ", when he taught them, " it would vex, it would hurt me ". The deva is insistent. And then Gotama bethinks him of how men are like waterlilies in a pool :—some " growing " only below the surface, some level with it, some rising above it ; all are at different stages of growth. His hesitation goes and he consents, the deva thereupon vanishes, saying : " I have made opportunity for religion to be taught."

There is nothing *in actual words* to show that what he saw he realized as a new light and a better way of teaching. He did not, it is true, set out with his rejected subjects : renunciation in life and causation. His first " sermon ", or mandate to his first helpers, does not mention these, busy though monk-editors have been on it. But neither is there, in his response, a word about any other mandate, about growth or becoming. We are left with the vision of the lotuses, imagined or actual, and with the deva's words, which no one renders as I venture now to give them.

The rendering of the last sentence by Oldenberg (who translated this portion—I have my husband's memorandum) is : " there will be people who can understand it." And I regret to say I followed this model in my *Gotama the Man* and in my *Sakya*. It was the further study of the feeling out after Becoming in the Upanishads and its expansion by these fragments, that led me to what is, I hold, a truer rendering. Namely, I think we have in the verb here,[1] not " understand " so much as

[1] *Aññātāro*, from *ājān-*.

" learn ", or " come to know ".[1] And further, I dare to hold—in face of the fact, that, in Pali at least, " to become " does not occur in the sense of " grow ", *when no object is given, which, or who one becomes*—that the verb here does mean " to become ", and not simply " there will be ", *viz.* learners.

I leave this to the reader with two reminders. First, *if* the mandate psychically given was to teach a gospel of growth or becoming, then the simile of the lilies or lotuses *falls into place.* It is their various stages of " growth " which is the whole point. If we say " some will understand ", the simile is superfluous; the simile of the more or less " dusty eyes " suffices. Secondly, the reader may not know, that perishing (or worsening) and growth is an *antithesis frequently used in the Suttas.* Thus: with *this* sort of conduct, perishing will come to pass (become); with *that* sort, growth will come to pass.[2] The deva's message speaks of " perishing "; they who know their Suttas will expect " growth " to be contrasted with this.

9. Let me try to drive home this vital concern with the New, the Becoming, the " Coming to know " with a single compound term, only developed, I believe, or at least only vocal, in the beginning of the Third Piṭaka. I refer to a list of human " faculties " (*indriya's*), 22 in

[1] *Connaître*, not *savoir*; *erkennen*, not *wissen.* Cf. p. 77.

[2] Cf. *Dial.*, ii, pp. 79 ff. " Prosper " is *vuddhi* = growth, or increase. Cf. *Gradual Sayings*, iii, 63, etc.

number, ending with 3 about learning or knowing. The first of the three is " the faculty of ' I shall come to know the unknown ' (or ' learn the not learnt ') ". It is anticipated in the Fourth Collection of Suttas, where Sāriputta commends the man who is thinking about what he has yet to learn.[1] And again in that Collection, where a monk is reflecting: " I am recovered from that illness; it may possibly attack me again; well! I will provide for that and put forth energy to attain the unattained, to master the unmastered, to realize the unrealized." I place it as a fragment, not because it echoes an earlier cult, but because it is never, in Abhidhamma or Commentary, followed up or enlarged upon. Yet how notable an analysis of faculties, to have found expression of just this! How true of human nature is the consciousness it expresses! It might go equally well into the next group, so does it suggest the effort, among others, to supply the want of a word for " will ".

These fragments may not go far enough to convince the general reader, that in them lies the original gospel of Buddhism. He will need first to read earlier Upanishads, and see how (checking the weak renderings by the text) they show him on the one hand a teaching of Immanence, " Deity is *thou*' ", heady, irrational as it stands, on the other *a growing feeling*, that " thou " hast to become That Who thou art. Next, he will need to read lots of Suttas (check-

[1] *Gradual Sayings*, iii, p. 131 (the term is not rightly rendered).

ing these by the text, unless he read the Pali Text Society's latest translations), and note how, coupled with a dread or evasion of *bhava*, there constantly occur reminders of the worth in *bhāveti, bhāvanā*, that is, not in just "becoming", but in "making become". This is the causative form of the verb "to become", and the religious life is very largely worded as this "making become". The Way or Road or Path is taught, not as a Way of Becoming, as I believe it originally was, but as a thing that is to be "made-become". Thus Gotama is made to say (in the First Utterance): that as long as by him the Way was not made become, so long vision, light, knowledge did not arise in him. The Fourth Collection is especially vibrant with this "making become". It would seem, as if the word *in this form*—a form which goes far to make good the lack of a word for "will"—could not refer to lives or worlds, and *hence* did not come in for the opprobrium showered on the word "becoming".

I am not alone, I need hardly say, in linking the word "becoming" with Buddhism. But that its very gospel was one of Becoming I see no one, save only Edmond Holmes,[1] affirming. The only use of it by other writers is in just the sense of mere change and impermanence. Thus Sir S. Radhakrishnan, recently echoing the formulated way of the Pali tradition:[2] "All is transient . . . Everything is a becoming, a passing away." Neither he, nor those who,

[1] *Creed of Buddha; Headquarters of Reality.*
[2] *Hibbert Journal*, April, 1934.

with less excuse than he, have studied the Pali tradition at first hand, have come to see, that in the roots of "Buddhism" we are up against something bigger than "mere change". Rhys Davids and Oldenberg perch now and then on the alternatives "being, becoming", and then flutter off butterfly-fashion. The latter, in a last word on "beginnings of Buddhism",[1] credits, not Buddhism but proto-Sānkhya with the placing "man as becoming" beside "man as being", and credits Buddhism only with an echoing of this. But then Oldenberg's historical sense seems to fail him when he treats of Buddhism. Almost it appears, in his works, as a ready-made box of thought-tricks.

Not so do I see that religion, long-drawn out in time. For me these *fragments* about "becoming", taken with other fragments, amount to an inexpugnable Somewhat which I cannot fit into the *formulas* listed above (p. 67). You cannot teach a gospel which accepts a current Immanence of God-in-Man, which insists, that Man, the self, must become actually That Who he is potentially, and at the same time identify your "becoming" with "mere change". You cannot combine this mere change with a teaching that your Man, eternally adolescent, spirit, self, soul, is he-who-becomes. Either Becoming is mere change, or, as growth, it is Everything. For in growth lies the very guarantee of the man's ultimate consummation: Become ye perfect as God, the God in you, is perfect.

[1] Published 1915.

4. *Man as Willer, Chooser*

I have shown, under the First Group of Fragments, that the claim made in popular expositions of Buddhism, for man as self-dependent, self-reliant, self-confiding in the matter of religious and moral welfare, falls to the ground when the word "self" is understood in the Indian way, especially in the old-world Indian way, and not in the way in which Ceylon has understood it, the way which is that of this Western idiom. Buddhism did not start by seeing man as an orphan cast on his own resources. The fragments on "the Self" and all that was attributed to him should make that clear.

We should strengthen this correction by the fact, that, in the Piṭakas, man is ever shown as being guided by "the tathāgata", whether it be in the way of salvation, or in desirable views and conduct in general, or whether it be in rules and advice for monks. Nowhere, we may say, is he left to himself to choose, save where he is shown referring to "the Self" or to Dharma, as in the cited Sutta of the Three Mandates. And in these he is orphaned least of all; he is committing himself to the highest of parents.

Everywhere we find the man taken by the hand and led. Everywhere it is the "Exalted One" or the Sangha who is prescribing; or at least the former is shown making himself model and guide in one, as in the forthcoming fragment. Readers of the Suttas may say: But in the

Lists enjoined in the record of the Founder's last words, known as the Things belonging to Wisdom, or Enlightenment,[1] we see the cultivation of introspection, effort and right life left to the individual. And he is often shown willing, eager in such self-cultivation. I reply: Yes, but they show him very definitely just what and how he was to cultivate. *Nothing is left to his own initiative.* (It is true there was that initiative. More of it presently.)

1. Let us come to the fragment. It is the oft-quoted First Utterance, miscalled "sermon". It will, in its original form, have been more of the nature of an outline, a scheme, a chart, on which the first disciples agreed to base their mission. The latter half of it is a gloss, wherein the Founder's experience is alone dealt with, and the man to be taught is left out. It will have been added, with the growth of the Buddha-cult. By this cult the two first Pitakas were largely recast so as to magnify the nature and office of the then worshipped Founder. And as to the first half, perhaps no sentences in the scriptures have been so monk-handled as have been these precious lines. Let the reader consider them in their present form and honestly say, whether (*a*) he can see in them, as such, a world-gospel, or (*b*) a call to man's self-reliance.

"These two ends,[2] almsmen, are not to be followed by one-who-has-left-the-world. Which

[1] *Dial.*, ii, pp. 127 f. "Things" (*dhammā*) are rendered "truths", which is too free. Cf. *Kindred Sayings*, v, Introduction, pp. v f.

[2] *Ibid.*, v, 356; *Vinaya Texts*, I, p. 94 (S.B.E. XV).

two ? That which is clinging addiction to the will-to-welfare, low, pagan, of the average man, ignoble, not belonging to the Good, and that which is addiction to the tormenting of the self, ill, ignoble, not belonging to the Good. Now by the Wayfarer not having gone up to either of these ends, a middle course has been thoroughly understood, making vision, making knowledge, which conduces to calm after toil, to thorough knowledge, to understanding, to nirvana. And what is that middle course which has been thoroughly understood, etc. . . . ? Just this noble eightfold way, namely, right view, right purpose, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right endeavour, right mindfulness, right concentration. This that middle course, which, etc. . . . nirvana.

" But this now, almsmen, is the ' ill '-noble truth : both birth and old age and disease and dying, and yoking with things not dear, and disyoking from things dear, and that he gets what he is not wanting, are ' ill ' : this too is ' ill ' : the five groups of fuel.[1] But this now, almsmen, is the origin of ' ill '-noble truth : that which is craving, rebecoming-ish, accompanied by pleasure and passion, finding delight here and there, namely, craving for will to sensuous welfare, craving for becoming, craving for prosperity. But this now, almsmen, is the ending of ' ill '-noble truth : the fading out and ending of just that craving, giving up, surrender, release, not using. But now this, almsmen, is the course going to ending of ' ill '-noble truth : just this noble eightfold way, namely, right

[1] Usually rendered clinging (to existence), grasping, attachment. *Upādāna*, lit., " taking-on-to ", is also in a secondary intention " fuel ". The " five groups " = body and mind.

view, etc. (*as in preceding*). At this ' ill '-noble truth, vision arose in me of things not heard before, knowledge arose, wisdom arose, Veda-wit arose, light arose. But that now this ' ill '-noble truth must be completely known, having been completely known by me, vision arose in me, . . . light arose. (Again) at this ' origin of ill '-noble truth vision arose in me of things not heard before . . . light arose. But that now this ' origin of ill '-noble truth must be got rid of, having been got rid of by me, vision arose in me . . . light arose. (Again) at this ' ending of ill '-noble truth vision of . . . light arose. But that now this ' ending of ill '-noble truth must be realized by me, having been realized by me, vision of . . . light arose. (Again) at this ' course going to ending of ill '-noble truth vision arose in me . . . light arose. But that now this ' course going to ending of ill '-noble truth must be made to become, having been by me made to become, vision arose in me . . . light arose. Now so long, almsmen, as for me concerning these four noble truths knowledge and insight as it really had come to be, thus thrice rehearsed, twelvefold-schemed, was not made clear, so long I admitted I was not thoroughly awakened to supreme understanding as to the world with devas, with demons, with brahma-devas, as to (this) generation of recluses and brahmans, with devas and men. But when once that knowledge and insight had become clear in the way aforesaid, then I admitted I was thoroughly awakened to supreme understanding concerning the world . . . concerning (this) generation of recluses and brahmans with devas and men. But then knowledge and vision in me arose thus : unshakeable (is) for me release of purpose ! This is the last birth ! There is now no more rebecoming."

I have elsewhere shown in detail[1] where I see here evidence of editorial handling : the

[1] *Manual of Buddhism*, Chap. VI. We have " not belonging to the Good " (*an-attha*), but in what *does* belong, " the Good " is left out.

goal of the Good altered to four substitutes for it; the diagnosis (as it has been called) of "ill" throwing emphasis on "ill" rather than on way or goal; the whole being addressed not to the man to be helped, but just the species called monk, or he who has left, or gone forth (*pabbajita*).

Note this too: that in the description given of "ill" the editors have not penetrated to the real nature of religious ill, that is, to "evil" or "sin" at all. We read of "getting what he is not wanting". But of not getting what he wants there is nothing. Now in religion man is greatly "wanting", seeking, aspiring, "thirsting after" the Highest, but hampered by a limited body and mind, he does not yet "get". "Evil", "sin" are names for the ways in which he fails to get. It is this blind spot in the later editing that makes the "first truth" elaborated out of the Mantra so irreligious. Here I am concerned mainly with the appeal in it, the almost smothered appeal, to man's will, to man's choice.

First, there is the problem of life presented as wayfaring, with the wayfarer's recurring need of selecting a better, a best way among alternatives. We saw this method followed in matters of world-view, of view as to man's nature.[1] Here we get it in the matter of conduct. This fortunately made it unnecessary to drag in the Causation-chain. We have also the man himself called by a name, "tathāgata", which will have sprung from the central figure

[1] Under *Fragments on Becoming*, 1 and 2.

of the Road or Way. More literally translated, it is the Thus-going, or the Truth-going, and here and there it is still used for the religious man in general, as is also the companion term Well-farer (*sugata*). But through the Buddha-cult both terms came to be mainly applied, the former almost wholly, to the "Buddha". Hence the whole point of the charter as an appeal to Everyman is all but lost. He is not so much to mark how he is called upon to exercise his "will to welfare" and choose as he fares; he is told how completely the Exalted One had done it. The force of a good example needs no championing, but my point holds, that any appeal to man's self-reliance, to man's own choice, is hereby wilted. He is not called to be willer, chooser, in the Way he must fare in to win his life's true goal; he is just told that a wonder-being came to find it, and how.

As a fragment of original teaching then, the First Utterance is, so to speak, broken up and reshaped, and we can only approach its original mandate, if even then we may do that, by resetting our pieces, disentangled from their editorial cement of formulas and cult-term and emphasis. Let us see in *tathāgata* just a way-farer; let us use for way's goal (or "Good") just *attha*, not four terms which are but preparatory to the final winning (nirvana was originally not the goal, but just a cathartic discipline in saintship)[1]; let us see in the *original* of the

[1] On changed value in *attha* (necessitating the replacing of it) see below, p. 186. On nirvana, cf. *Kindred Sayings*, iv, pp. 170, 177.

four " noble truths " about " ill " just a comment on a valuing of life in the negative of " well ", where if evil desire is condemned, good desire was no less commended ; and finally let us see in the Way, not an inadequate eightfold category of thought, word and deed, but something greater even than that ; something which is a figure, a symbol of a progress, an advance through the whole of life (not of earth only), the growth, the coming to be, the becoming in the very man.

What is left ? Everyman, the Wayfarer, choosing (that is, willing) the Via Media in the life of a willed Becoming : not the way of will's impulses, not the way of over-hampered will, but the Way of the will that is duly regulated ; the wayfaring that takes the bitter with the sweet, converting the one and the other to a stimulus of will on the one hand and to a nobler wiser use of will on the other ; the Way with the Goal (*attha*) kept in view. Surely the very core is left, is here.

2. I am using the word " will " when it does not once occur in the Pali. I have for some thirty-seven years [1] been pointing out, that in Buddhism we have a New Word, too new for the words that were at hand. Namely, that it was essentially a call to man's will, none the less that no such word was ready, and that monasticism damned the will by emphasizing only evil desire. One formula which

[1] From 1897 : " Will in Buddhism." Congress of Orientalists, Paris ; *J.R.A.S.*, Jan., 1898.

atones for most of the others is the category of the four right efforts: a fine discipline in will.[1] More about effort presently. There had been two fine terms for will, but the one (*kāma*) was depreciated into sensual desire, the other (*kratu*) had, I know not why, become obsolete. Thus in an old Upanishad: "Man is made only of will; as is his will such is his resolve (*kratu*); as is his resolve so does he act."[2] There was a third word: *vasa*: this was neither obsolete nor worsened, but never is it emphasized, as is *tanhā*, where a teaching is needed, about "will". I shall come back to it presently. There was a word for resolve, purpose, intent, and it is one of the "eightfold" of the Way (*sankappa*). It has not the strength of our "will" or of the older *kāma*. But it is very noteworthy, that in one Chinese version of the First Utterance, the Way is said to be just a word which has been retranslated as *sankalpa*, with none of the other seven:—the Way of Purpose.[3]

The chief ways in which early Buddhism sought to make good shifts for a felt need were (1) in its use of that form "make become", mentioned above, (2) in a wealth of words to hand for effort, energy, endeavour. A man praised in the Suttas is one who has "set-

[1] Cf. *Kindred Sayings*, v, p. 219. The all but entire absence of Suttas on these *make the formula itself almost a fragment.*

[2] *Brhadāraṅyaka*, 4, 4, 5.

[3] See Gunabhadra's *Samyutta*, *Taisho Tripitaka*, Tokyo, 1924, vol. II, p. 103. I owe the reference to Mr. A. J. Edmunds.

energy-on-foot ",[1] or is putting forth " vigour ", both being terms for *viriya* (Sanskrit : *vīryya* : lit. " strong-man-ity "). A list of such words in the Third Piṭaka makes a fairly good second to the wealth of words used in defining " wisdom ".

This brings me to another allied term : *ārabbha-dhātu*, lit. datum of having started, *i.e.* initiative. Here is a Sutta about this, which, in that it is never cited, is entirely overlooked, let alone emphasized, may rightly come into my " fragments ".

A Brahman (of all men ! and unnamed) gives it as his opinion, that " there is no self-agency, no other-man-agency ". (Gotama :) " Never, Brahman, have I seen or heard of such an avowal, such a view. Pray, how can one step forward, how can one step back, yet say as you say ? What think you ? is there such a thing as ' initiative ' ? " " Yes, sir." " That being so, are men known to initiate ? " " Yes, sir." " Well, since there is initiative and men are known to initiate, this is among men self-agency, other-man-agency." [2]

This is followed, with the usual amplitude of refrain, by citing other limb-movements, with the same inference.

Here is a very live wire of teaching. Here is a very doctrine of will, of choice, such as I see buried in the First Utterance. When this was uttered, absence of an opposed teaching made it unnecessary to bring in the stress, the emphasis on the act considered as a fresh

[1] *Āraddha-viriyo.* [2] *Gradual Sayings*, iii, pp. 237 f.

departure of the actor, the deed as initiated by a doer. In so far as this Sutta is as authentic as the First Utterance, this testing the reality of the self, the agent, by the will-in-making-the start is a notable testimony to what was in that Utterance *left implicit.*

That it is a genuine survival I believe, for this reason: it does not belong to the later trend of Buddhist teaching. In view of that trend, there is no wonder it was passed over. Its survival is a thing to be thankful for.

3. I return to that word *vasa.* Meaning literally " to be eager ", " to desire ", it acquired the secondary meaning of " power over ". And it occurs repeatedly in Pali idiom in association with the man and his mind. There is for instance a parable in the Suttas thrice imputed to Sāriputta, the leading disciple (and a Brahman), by which he illustrates the desirability of mental control.

" The man who brings the mind under control, and goes not under the power of the mind, he is fit to add to the beauty of this moonlit night. Just as a raja, with many suits in his wardrobe, would pick out one he wanted for morning wear, another for midday wear, another for evening wear, putting on a suitable suit,[1] so is that man." [2]

Noticeable here is the poverty of will-terms. There is no effort made to say, as we should say, " the man who thinks as he wills ", or who

[1] The pun is not in the Pali!
[2] *Further Dial.*, i, No. 32, etc.

" chooses, selects " what he wills to wear. The English translator has " selected " ; the Pali only says : " would don what he wants ".

Now I have so far failed to see any writer noticing this parable. No one could say that the user of it denied the reality of the self or soul. It is peculiarly Sāriputta's parable. And Sāriputta is credited, in words ascribed to the Founder, as having taught as the latter himself did. Moreover, he was conversing with leading colleagues, not talking in popular terms to the Many. Yet the parable *cuts the ground from under the feet of the anattā doctrine*, as that doctrine was understood in Pali books. The *attā*, the man disposing of, choosing, selecting, is the main reality.

No, it belongs to the older teaching. It belongs to my fragments, and I place it here.

4. If I were here to cite, as I have done elsewhere, many Sutta-phrases urgent and vibrating with a very cult of energy to be advancing in the way of the best life, it might be said, that these were not the neglected fragments I am out to adduce. The objection would be right ; readers can now read all such in translations ; I give only the most notable passages. It is only when we place these calls to an unworded will, to a will worded as effort or as desire, beside the outstanding emphasis laid on the need to suppress will-as-craving, that they are reduced *relatively* to the status of fragments, or at best of so much secondary teaching.

I will only add one aspect of will-in-becoming

(which for me is the very heart of original Buddhism) which is so much overlooked, that two passages dwelling on it take on a fragmentary value over against the rest. This is the expression of the teaching as (*a*) a More, a New, (*b*) a Further, a Beyond.

In the Fourth Collection is a unique Saying about "the man" under the invented name of "Seeker": "Gavēsin":—The Master has smiled. Ānanda asks him why? A story follows. There is no need to raise it to a memory of the past. The joy of the Quest, the Way of a More were enough to elicit the smile. The Seeker is a man of influence over his fellows, who is not content with maintaining in conduct the same, the way of habit. He protests: "This is but a matter of levels; well then, I'm for the More." And stage by stage he sets an example in a Better in conduct, using the same refrain. I do not quote the stages, since, through monkish editing, they have become reduced to steps in the narrow ladder of progress in a monk's life, matters of bodily discipline, and the story was obviously for any and every man. But the name given to the typical man-of-the-will-to become, and his refrain in seeking the More, are quite out of the Sutta-rut and will have come from a teacher of the New, of the More.

5. Let us see this more directly taught in the Second Collection, in a Sutta I have yet to see cited by any writer on Buddhism. In the Thirty-ninth Sutta of this Collection, Gotama

is seen addressing disciples, it may be not long after his Order of missioners had decided to become religieux, or what I, for lack of that good word, call monks. There is a newness about the settling into their vocational name *samăně* suggesting this.

" People know you as being ' monks '. If you are asked : ' Monks ! what's that ? ' admit that you are, but say to yourselves : ' We will take up and practise those things which make the monk ; thus will our profession become real, our pledge a thing that has become.[1] And our use of the thing we need to live by will become fruitful and profitable, and our leaving the world will become not sterile, but fertile and full of result.' You should train yourselves thus. Now what are those things ? Train yourselves to be conscientious and discreet. You may then think : ' We've done that. So far is enough ; enough has been done. We've won what we sought as monks. There's nothing further to be done.' I declare to you ! I protest to you ! See there be no decay, no falling off in your quest while anything further remains to be done. What further remains to be done ? Train yourselves saying : ' Very pure will we become in conduct of deed, word and thought. We will neither exalt the self, nor despise the other man.' Then you may say : ' We've done this as well. So far is enough. . . .' "

The Sutta proceeds as before, with the vehehement rejoinder and with further stages gained.

[1] *Bhūta*, the past participle of " to become ", used as equivalent to " fact ", or " true ".

And as before the stages are such as are appropriate to the cloistered life. But that, for my purposes, is a detail, though a lamentable detail. That which is not a detail is the view of life as a progress in a More, in a Better, in a Becoming. As to the last, the reader will *not find this word mentioned once* in the only complete translation of the Second Collection.[1] But such is the cussedness, or is it the blindness, of translators. Not seeing the vital significance, at his date, of Gotama's relating his teaching to that of his day, they do not grasp what the word and the fact of "becoming" meant then. And, it being rather forcible than elegant to speak of "becoming" in English, rather than "being" (we having long ago dropped our word for the equivalent of the Teutonic *werden*), they almost invariably evade it. The translation I give has "becoming" wherever it occurs in the Pali (*bhū-*, *bhav-*), that is, *five times*.

6. Another fragment endorsing the foregoing. Perhaps more than any other morsel it gives the gist of the original gospel. Monks here too are being taught, this time of five things met with in life: before them lie age, illness, dying, partings, the sowing what one has reaped hereafter.

"And while he contemplates these thoughts, the Way comes into being,[2] and that Way he follows, makes become, makes More; fetters

[1] *Further Dial.*, i, No. 39. Translated for the Pali Text Society by Lord Chalmers.

[2] *Jāyati. Gradual Sayings*, iii, 61.

are got rid of, bias is put an end to. . . ." And summing up in verse the Sutta concludes:

"Now am I bound to become one turning no more back;
I shall become a Further-Farer in the life divine."

If every scrap of Buddhist scriptures save that couplet were destroyed, we should still have in them a precious heritage. The very heart of the religion, of religion, is in it.

7. "Further-farer" however is not all that can be claimed for the work of will here unnamed but implicit. Will lies at the very start of the "life divine" in one more fragment, a fragment because never does it reappear in its impressive force. Gotama is asked by "Wanderers" what is his religion, wherein, trained by him, disciples find comfort and acknowledge as "will the start of the divine life".[1]

The same remarkable phrase occurs earlier in the First Collection.[2] The governor of the next world, Sakka, or Indra, is made to say, in a eulogy of Gotama: "And crossed by that Bhagavan has been the sea of doubt; gone by for him is all question of the how and why; accomplished for him is every purpose, the will [is for him] source of the divine life."

In neither of these passages does the translation (made in 1920 and 1909, both by myself) agree, either mutually or with the present rendering. The phrase is in fact something of a puzzle, even to the Commentator; his exegesis

[1] *Dial.*, iii, p. 36. [2] *Ibid.*, ii, p. 262.

is: "become the ultimate support, the eightfold way". Now *ajjhâsaya*, here rendered "will", is, like other mind-terms, both static and dynamic.[1] We can only blend the two in words like "purpose", "resolve". But since we often use "will" and "mind" as largely identical, *e.g.* "I have a mind to [do it]", and since we have here the dynamic term "divine *chariya*", *i.e.* conduct or life, I see fitter to give the word its full will-force, even though, like other terms we noticed, it is but a makeshift for "will", a word not known in India save in makeshifts. *Without* this will-word: *ajjhâsaya*, the compound term[2] occurs often in the Suttas. That they are here so linked is for me very significant. It is only in willing that man becomes; and the "divine life" is just a voluntary becoming better. In the *ādi-* in both passages, we have the matter brought down to the bedrock, the wherewithal in Becoming. We have the "initiative" we spoke of above. And that, we saw, is the self, the man *as willing* (p. 116).

8. Incidentally we may see how the want of a word for "will" has hindered writers from seeing how Gotama was, in what was virtually a gospel of will, standing out against the scepticism of his day. The most noted sceptic was Makkhăli Gosāla of the Ājīvakas, and his main thesis is quoted as amounting to this, that our

[1] Cf. *Critical Pali. Dict. ajjhâsaya.* I regret I leaned, in translating, too much on well-meant but ignorant exegesis.

[2] *Ādi-brahmachariya.*

attainments do not depend on effort or action (*i.e.* will), or inherent force. No human energy or power is effective. Each is the victim of his specific nature. Ajita of the Hair-garment taught much the same, in a strongly pessimistic vein. In opposing these, Gotama is made to appear as emphatically a believer in "action" (*kamma-vāda*), in effectuation (*kiriya-vāda*). *We* should have said, he was a believer in will, in initiative.[1]

There is a saying, ascribed to him in a special way,[2] endorsing what I mean. He, when he has heard his men's divers opinions on what *in the man* would enhance the moonlit evening, is made to say: "It is when a man vows he will not quit, no matter under what strain, till he have by man's strength, man's energy, man's forthfaring, won what he set about to win."

Herein is he shown a very Apostle of Will, as if he knew to what heights in the mystery of life becoming would be revealed as growth in man's will.

[1] I need not add how this defect in language obscures the question of "free will". It is only in connection with those sceptics, and in terms, not of will, but of action, that we come near to a problem which has bulked so largely in Christian discussion.

[2] *Furth. Dial.*, i, No. 32; *Gradual Sayings*, i, 45, and *Kindred Sayings*, ii, 24, give the fuller better wording.

CHAPTER VI

YET MORE FRAGMENTS

5 *and* 6. *Man in other Worlds; Jhāna*

THESE two groups of fragments are mutually connected and cannot rightly be understood apart. In spite of the fact that the whole of ceremonial religion played no part in original Buddhism, the teaching covers yet so wide a field in the religious thought and life of man, that we may easily consider this and that in it too disconnectedly. This has been the case with these two subjects. As an historical fact they are closely connected.

It belongs to that expansion which we can see the first Buddhists making in the religion of their day, to see, between man as he is and man as he is in potency, between the " That " and the " art Thou " of Immanence, a long Way of the Becoming That, long stages of a More to be won. But not in this world only; in many lives, in much world-revisiting, and always in the fellowship, not of devils or gods, but of men. The very word used for " god " had come to be applied to the worthier men of earth who had gone before. We may translate deva in Pali, by " god " or

by "angel",[1] but in neither word shall we grip the truth that comes out in the contexts, and that is that, in the Pitakas, the life of man constitutes a birthright to three worlds and a "Beyond": *tat-uttarim*'; that those three were in some way interpresent or co-present for the man "who had eyes to see, ears to hear; that all three were accessible here and now for the man or woman blest with what we call psychic gifts; that the inmates of the second and third worlds, as well as of earth, were fellowmen and women at "a higher power of life"; and finally, that these worthier ones, so far from being indifferent or consciously alien to men of earth, were morally, religiously interested in them and in their wayfaring difficulties.

This is far too much overlooked by writers on Buddhism. The tendency has been to consign all references to denizens of other worlds visiting, or being visited by, the first Buddhists to "mythological embroidery", and to wave it aside as the ignorant well-meaning piety of recorders. Even pious Buddhist "Fundamentalists" see no call to believe it in a literal sense.[2]

[1] Mr. F. L. Woodward, in *Some Sayings of Buddha*, has the, I believe, philologically correct rendering "shining ones." Cf. Luke xxiv. 4. Dr. A. K. Coomaraswamy pleads for the word "angel"—*A New Approach to the Vedas*, 1933.

[2] A native scholar has recently published this curious inversion of historic truth, in India: that "Buddha set himself to attack the current belief in" intuitional messages of God transmitted through the divine man "by analysis of the apparent and by denying the existence of soul or self". What libels do not men heap on that name "Buddha"!

The attitude is scarcely scientific, as science is very, very slowly coming to recognize, but I am here holding only a brief for the *due and serious recognition* of this very prominent feature in the first two Piṭakas. Deva-visiting is the subject of a great number of Suttas and of Vinaya episodes, but I have no intention of swelling my "fragments" to include them all. I will limit myself to two genuine groups of fragments, with this reflection on the matter :—that if the Aftermen had not, in their monastic pessimism, looked upon and away from life in other worlds as "ill", and therefore not to be looked forward to and inquired into, Buddhism would have become the world's great Spiritualistic religion.

A man was held, in early Buddhism, to be as personally responsible, for deeds done here, to judicial powers in another world as he was, for social misdemeanours on earth, held responsible to an earthly judge, whether he was a king, a noble, or a Sangha of monks. But in course of time this ceased to be the belief. It came to be held, and is now held, that his reaping hereafter is of the nature of an automatic resultant, a somehow composite effect of his deeds, such as we hear called karma, or action, and its fruit (*kamma-phala, kamma-vipāka*). In the first edition of this book I ignorantly supported this belief . . . let the confession *peccavi!* absolve me from quoting myself. I did not then know the Piṭakas in the somewhat better way I know them now. I followed other scholars in citing certain ill-fitting similes from the *Milinda Questions*, a much later book, when this question

of personal responsibility had weakened, and inconvenient Suttas were either not known, or kept on the shelf.

Let me here again warn the reader about that Milinda-trap, into which unhistorical writers invariably fall. The Buddhist monk-apologist is shown, in it, trying to explain away man's personal responsibility for his deeds by ingenious material analogies which were, a few centuries earlier, *not felt to be needed.* Let him never be content with the Milinda apologies for Piṭaka teaching!

1. Here is the older Sutta belief showing the man as both surviving and as fully responsible to his fellowman. I condense the one account. The other is presumably later, because it brings in two more features.

"There are these three deva-messengers . . . Some one acts amiss in deed, word and thought. When the body breaks up after dying, he rises up in a woeful way, warders haling him before the Yama as one who unfilial, without respect for the worthy and holy things, or for the head of the family, deserves punishment. Him the Yama admonishes: 'See here, man! Did you not see manifest among men our first . . . our second, our third messenger?' 'No, sir.' 'Did you not see an aged man or woman, a sick man or woman, a woman or man dead?' 'I did see, sir.' 'See here, man! to you ware and mindful did not this occur: I shall be even as they. Come! I will do the good in deed, word and thought?' 'I did not, sir, I will have been

careless.' 'See here, man! according to your carelessness will they do to you. For lo! these deeds were done neither by mother, nor by father, nor by brother, by sister, by friend or colleague or kinsmen, but by you, yea, by you were these deeds done. It is you who now experience the results thereof.'" [1]

No other scripture save the Zoroastrian sees so impressively an adjudication at once close after dying and assigning personal responsibility. In the latter feature it comes near to the record ascribed to Jesus, with its deeply interesting testimony to a higher criterion of conduct:—not merely moral rectitude, but the warding care of the brother-man:—"I was a hungered and ye fed me not. . . ." But how does it not, no less than the Jesus-word, show the need for an ethics which is not of this world only, but intermondial! How rational does not such an inter-world morality appear, when once personal survival of death is conceded, in which the worthy who have gone on before see to it, that the new comers from earth go not free among them with hands morally foul!

2. As to "responsibility", we find no fit word for this in either older or later Pali. The best that the *Milinda* can do is to say "he is not freed from (the result of) his deeds".[2] And the Piṭakas haven't even that. But the unworded

[1] *Gradual Sayings*, i, pp. 121 f.; *Further Dial.*, ii, No. 130.

[2] Text, p. 46. Cf. my *Milinda Questions*, and *Indian Religion and Survival*, pp. 72 f.

relation of man as responsible, somehow, to someone, was occupying men's minds when and before the Suttas were compiled. The "some one" was never the Deity of the theistic faiths. The teaching of Immanence had supervened to check this belief, which we find emerging in the Vedas, especially in relation to the deva Varuna, who judges them whom Yama brings.[1] The real judge became the "Deitie within my bosom", the Self. The judge in the hereafter became the fellowman, for life in other worlds had come to be conceived as worthier and pleasanter *communal* living than the communal life of earth.

The fragment I here quote testifies to this concern with what we call responsibility. And I call it a fragment, because of its irruptive happening in a talk of question and answer in the Second and Third Collections. Irruptive rather because of the way it is introduced and "turned down", as presenting a contrast with other questions. The Founder himself is said to be the interlocutor. I hazard the guess that, long after his day, a pundit monk will, as in many other Suttas, have collected a number of miscellaneous Sayings and lent them the authority and sanction of the all-powerful name. It is quite good scholastic catechism, but as the actual response a gifted, inspired individual, the author of a New Word, would make to one or more individual questioners, it is impossible, unthinkable. In the catechism, suddenly, we come across this:

"Then a certain almsman thought to himself: 'So, sir, you would say: "Neither body nor

[1] M. Bloomfield, *Religion of the Veda*, p. 251.

mind is the self. Then what sort of self will deeds done without self affect ? " ' " [1]

To this unspoken query the teacher, his psychic power of thought-reading discerning it, makes this spoken answer : " It may be, monks, that some fool, ignorant and full of evil desires, may put some such question . . ." (the unspoken words are given. " But you, trained by me in causal sequence, what do you say to this :— Is body permanent or impermanent ? . . ." Then follows a little set catechism often found in the Suttas,[2] and in a way repeating the Second Utterance, namely, that the Self (the God-in-man) cannot be identified with body or mind, since neither shows divine power.

I have had the temerity [3] to see in the question, to which this readymade but relatively late formula has been appended, a traditional Saying (originally spoken, not by a sceptical listener to a Buddhist teacher, but by early Buddhist teachers *to* sceptics, who were throwing doubt on the very man as surviving and as personally responsible). The little " sir ",[4] which all translators : Neu-

[1] *Further Dial.*, ii, No. 109 ; *Kindred Sayings*, iii, p. 88.

[2] Answer : " Impermanent, sir." " That which is impermanent, is it pleasant or painful ? " " Painful, sir." " But that which is impermanent, painful, changeable, is it right to regard it thus : This is of me ; this am I ; this is for me the Self ? " " No, sir." "Wherefore the well-taught disciple repelled by body and mind, loses lust for these, is set free, knows he is freed, knows that birth has waned out, the life is lived, the to be done is done, no hereafter of these conditions."

[3] In *Festgabe* to W. Geiger, 1932.

[4] *Bho !* The only other case I know is *Gradual Sayings*, iv, p. 236.

mann, Chalmers and I, have quite groundlessly omitted, is, so far as I have found, hardly ever brought into an unspoken self-questioning. And it helped to suggest to me, that we have here not only a fragment, but one that has lost its way and been dislocated. If we will detach it, and place it in the mouth of men who taught that Sutta of the Yama tribunal (No. 1 above), it falls into place. In that Sutta, the " self " survives and is held personally responsible :—" is affected " by his deeds :—" If you, sir, say there is no self-agency, who is it who will hereafter be called to account for deeds which no ' self ' has done ? "

3. As to what I said, under 1, of the need in religion, in any religion deserving the name, of an intermondial ethics, the question may arise : Did Buddhism at any time, seeing that it never inculcated the need of prayer, or of sacraments, do anything towards building up such an inter-world ethics ?

Yes ; that it brought not earth only but deva-worlds into such an ethical relation was made emphatic from the start. The evidence of this is not overlooked, nevertheless no use is ever made of it. I refer to the Mission-charter of the *Vinaya*, which is quoted by Buddhists perhaps oftener than any " text ". In this we read : [1]

. . . " Walk a walking for the welfare of the many, for the happiness of the many, out of compassion for the world, for the good, the welfare, the happiness of devas and men."

[1] *Vinaya Texts*, I, p. 112 ; *Kindred Sayings*, i, p. 132.

Remember here[1] that "world" (*loka*) then included "worlds". We find the two terms, devas, men, linked in other contexts, especially that devas are to be taught as well as men. But, much quoted though the text be, I bring it into the fragments because the reference to devas has long ceased to form an integral part of Buddhist teaching.

The goodwill shown in the Mission-charter towards devas is also shown, in the Suttas, as reciprocated by devas. The injunction, given to the Helper prior to his earthlife, to be reborn on earth to help men, by a deva in a worthier world, occurs, it is true, in a Commentary only, although it is a Commentary apocryphally included in the Sutta-Piṭaka: the Introduction to the Jātaka Book.[2] But in the First Collection we have, in several Suttas,[3] the devas reckoning their community as morally enriched by the advent of good men deceasing from earth, although, again, it is only in the Jātaka Commentary that the Governor of the next world is shown frequently hastening to the help of good men needing help on earth.

4. But it was not devas only to whom, by the advent of the worthy of earth, came moral enrichment. It was the latter, too, who were bidden to feel a joyous stimulant at the news of how this and that departed one had attained to the "suchness" (*tathatta*) of happy devas. In a Sutta

[1] See above, p. 95.

[2] *Buddhist Birth Stories* (Broadway Translations), p. 146.

[3] *Dial.*, ii, pp. 242 ff.; 260 ff., etc.

of the Second Collection (No. 68) Gotama is found asking his kinsman Anuruddha and other disciples : " How now ? are you in love with the God-life (*Brahmachariya*) ? " " We surely are." " Excellent ! Very suitable you should be. What, think you, was my purpose in revealing to you the where and how of those of us who have departed ? " " Tell us ! " " Not for notoriety, not for gifts, not for fame, but that some, having heard me, might with a lofty knowledge and gladness bring along the mind up to their state (suchness), and that this might in the long run become their welfare and happiness."

And this from the man whom many suppose (Piṭaka editors too) to have told men so to live that they might not be reborn !

Few among my " fragments " so bowl over the Piṭakan emphases as does this one.

6. *Jhāna*

But in this matter of building up such an interworld ethics, early Buddhism showed more than a sentimental, more than a theoretic interest. It instituted a practice for developing the capacity of man to get access to his otherworld fellows. No ethical relations could healthily thrive where there was no firsthand knowledge. The worlds had to be to some extent charted before intercourse became practicable. This knowledge was sought in cultivating what was then known as *dhyāna* : the withdrawn yet alert attitude of the person we now call clairvoyant, clairaudient. The word is already grouped in the Upanishads under the genus

samādhi, the nearest word to which is "concentration", but the practice nowhere appears to have been developed as we find it in the Suttas. The word *dhyāna* (Pali: *jhāna*) means brooding or musing, as distinct from active consecutive thinking or meditation; it is a state of receptiveness, a mental waiting for what may be given, without effort to determine this in any way: a sort of "Speak, Lord, for thy servant heareth" attitude. I am not saying that gifted psychics needed any special practice, any concentrated disposing of themselves; but to increase the number of men and women who might possibly develop such gifts, the practice would undoubtedly help.

To this end a formula was elaborated, with the object of gradually eliminating the modes of attending to objects of external interest, the disturbing "vibrations" of feeling and all intellectual preoccupation. In this process the *aim* was said to be a state of poised introspection.[1] This was not in order to raise the subconscious to the threshold of consciousness. That were modern talk; of that we find nothing. The early Buddhists had the sounder conviction, that what they might get was not evolved from within, but given from without. And psychics know how, save in exceptional states, what they receive *seems* largely "within".

[1] *Bud. Psych. Ethics*, § 165; *Dial.*, i, p. 86, etc. "Mindfulness, self-possession, introspection" are so many attempts to render the word *sati*, which in Buddhist idiom was not just "memory" (*Sansk. smrti*). "Ecstasy," "rapture," for *jhāna* do not fit.

That this more inward receptivity was due to a companion-instrument often called the subtle body, known to early literature of both East and West, is curiously enough entirely absent from the Piṭakas or (so far as I know them) the Commentaries, and I have not yet found even a fragment to show any survival of such a view. That this mate of the body, passive during waking hours, active during deep sleep, finds mention, or at least implication in the Upanishads is well known, and will have been recognized by the Brahman disciples of Gotama, but whereas it would have strengthened the cultivation of interworld ethics, it must at some time and for some reason have been utterly dropped.

And more, the original *purpose* of *dhyāna* or musing, namely, psychic development, came to be shrunken to that of a training in detachment from the world, and to be entirely ignored as yet by both Buddhists and writers on Buddhism. I never discerned it myself, till a better knowledge of the Piṭakas and Commentaries revealed it to me some seven years ago. Since then I have repeatedly published such evidence as seemed to me conclusive, evidence which went to show that, in the Jhāna formula, we have not an original scheme, but one drawn up when monastic ideals had turned away from desiring intercourse with other worlds, and when the idea of solitude and seclusion as such was given an artificial value. But so far this evidence has not even received criticism. I therefore give it once more, as so many "fragments".

(1) "How does a monk become one who has

access to devas ? Here a monk . . . enters into first *jhāna* . . . second *jhāna*, etc." (the usual formula is given).[1]

(2) Gotama is asked : " When is a purely happy world made present ? (Answer) As long as a man in fourth jhāna has attained to converse with those devas who are living in a happy world, is present with them, talks with them." [2]

(3) Moggallāna, a chief disciple, resolves to aid his leader's teaching by his own psychical access to the next world, thereby ascertaining, from any devas he can find enjoying a pleasant life, to what, in their earthlife, they judged that such a reward was due, so that the folk he taught might thereby be encouraged to follow virtue. He " enters into jhāna ", and what he experiences constitutes the little poems in the Vimānavatthu of the Second Pitaka.[3]

(4) In the two sections of the Third Collection of Suttas called Devas and Sons of Devas, we find a recurrent appreciation and enjoining of *jhāna*.[4]

(5) In the chapter on *jhāna*, in the first book of the third Pitaka, the exercise opens with the words :

" At what time he makes a way become for access to the world of Sight (*i.e.* Brahma-world), he . . . enters on *jhāna*." [5]

" Access " here did not mean " survival

[1] *Gradual Sayings*, ii, p. 192.
[2] *Further Dial.*, ii, p. 20.
[3] Commentary on the work (not translated).
[4] *Kindred Sayings*, i, *e.g.* pp. 66 ff.
[5] *Bud. Psych. Ethics*, § 160.

into " ; the Commentary makes that clear ; the contexts also.

(6) There are in the Suttas five psychic states often listed (a moral sixth state, not connected with these, which are twice listed as " five ", was added) : levitation and kindred feats, " deva-hearing ", recollection of past " dwellings " (lives), thoughtreading, deva-sight. These are often preceded by the *jhāna* formula, thus establishing a connection between those and this as being a *preparation*.[1]

As to this I give here what is for me, and perhaps for me alone, a fragment. It is a parable from the Second Collection, and it is for me a fragment, because, while it is used to bear a monastic application, it occurs in a context, which can only rightly bear the application to the object and use of those five psychic gifts.

Gotama is said to ask a novice who had tried his 'prentice hand at teaching a young noble : " Whence should Jāyasena, born and bred in the pursuit of worldly and sensuous desires, know and see and realize that which can only be known and seen and realized by coming out of it all ? (*so far I have condensed. Answer :*) " 'Tis like two friends walking hand in hand into the country till, coming to a crag, one climbs up, the other stays down below and calls : ' What see you up there ? ' And he hears : ' I see up here a lovely garden, a lovely wood, a lovely landscape, a lovely lake.' He answers : ' But that's impossible ! ' Whereupon he above comes down, takes the other by the arm and makes him

[1] *E.g. Further Dial.*, i, pp. 14 f. ; 177 ; 250, etc.

climb up. Giving him a minute to get his wind he asks : ' Now, friend (*samma*), what see you up here ? ' And the other : ' I see up here a lovely garden . . .' and all the rest. ' *The crag blocked my view.*' "[1]

This parable is followed by another describing the training by which a wild elephant is brought to be a model of submissiveness to his groom and royal master—a much more comfortable simile for monasticism. But then comes the application (of both similes) to Jhāna training, whereby those psychic gifts may be developed, the chief utility in which was the winning the view over the student's birthright of the worlds, his worlds. No one as yet but the present writer would concede that, in this application, ignored in modern Buddhism, the parable of the View is a fragment, testifying to a lost gospel.

7. *The Nature of the Moral Life*

If we compare (early) Upanishad teaching with that in the Suttas on the moral life, we can hardly fail to be struck with the relative coolness, the relatively slight attention paid in the Upanishads to its religious importance. Let me not be misunderstood : this is a matter of, I repeat, relative insistence. And though the insistence is relatively slight, the teaching is good. The teacher bids the students—in one Upanishad only—" become one who has mother as divine, father . . . teacher . . . guest as divine ; walk according to dharma ", be " not negligent of truth ", " a giver in faith and sympathy (to Brahmans) ".

[1] *Further Dial.*, ii, No. 125.

And there is very little more. But as to the Suttas, they not only teem with moral exhortation, but the end and reward hereafter (as well as on earth) of the moral life is never lost to view. This comes also into the Upanishads, but it is relatively very seldom.

And yet, in spite of this earnest preoccupation in the Pali scriptures, I have to call just a " fragment " the rare passage, the relatively neglected passage in the Suttas, in which morality is *lifted to a higher plane* than a mere not hurting the other man. Such occurs only two or three times :

(1) " Having laid aside onslaught on creatures, averse from that, he lives having laid aside the rod, the sword, lives ashamed (to hurt), endued with kindness, friendly and compassionate to all breathing living things. Having put away taking-the-not-given (theft), averse from that, he lives taking, expecting (only) the given, with a self become pure. . . .

" Having put away lying speech, averse from that, he lives a truthspeaker, a truth-linker, man of facts, who gives reasons, not a deceiver of men." [1]

The good man is further said to avoid words stirring up divisions, to say such as promote harmony, to speak gently, courteously, sincerely, cordially, words appealing to the Many, to avoid gossip and chatter, to utter speech in season, true, about salvation and *dharma* and discipline, deserving to be remembered.

The terse formula, known later as the " Five

[1] *Dial.*, i, p. 4.

Sīlas", just avers aversion from violence, theft, sex-offence, lying and strong drink. *Sīla* is "habit", "moral habit" by secondary use. The drink-*sīla*, omitted from the great Sīla-Section of the First Collection, was probably found a necessary addition upon an inrush into the Order of men of slender moral qualifications (of which we hear often). The "Five Sīlas" are to-day raised to serve as a very sacrament for the laity, five other Sīlas against luxurious living being held as binding only on monks. Nevertheless the Third Sīla on sex is a virtual injunction to celibacy, betraying its monkish purpose.[1]

What is more noteworthy is the omission from the Five of filial and parental duties (these find their way into two or three Suttas), and the absence of any effort in Buddhist tradition to incorporate the nobler ethical wording *into any formula*. In the negative wording of moral codes, other creeds, it may be said, sin with them. And in a country like India, where the negative way of the word so often thrusts out the stronger positive way, it is greatly to the credit of early Buddhism that those fine positive expressions should have been worded at all.

(2) But the real expansion effected in the nature of the Moral Life by Buddhism was not in the parental, the filial, the conjugal relations; monasticism would tend to make little of and largely overlook these; the expansion was in the cult of human sodality as amity. By this I mean neither friendship as a relation whereby man "sticketh closer than a brother";—

[1] *Minor Anthologies*, I (S.B. Buddhists, VII), p. 141.

David-Jonathans are lacking in the Piṭakas—neither do I mean anything so spiritually profound as the Indian *bhakti*, or the Christian "love" (or "charity"). I mean a sentiment of benevolence toward men which is called now "amity" (*mettā*; *mitto* is friend), and now "compassion" (*anukampā*; sym-vibration). Neither term had been taken up into the heart of religion prior to Buddhism. A glance at Veda and Upanishad Concordances suffices to establish that. The parallel term "kindness" (*dayā*, *dayadva*) just peeps into the latter literature with a hint of Persian derivation.[1]

This sentiment is in the Suttas generally commended in and for itself. But it also appears in a formula with three great allies, together known as the formula of the Four God-abidings. And it appears in such a way as to suggest, that it was not of the original mandate of the first Buddhists, but was taken over from another source, apparently from a company of missioners headed by a Brahman teacher, whose name has been let die. Here also I have brought together some evidence,[2] more slender than that for the *jhāna* hypothesis, but have as yet not won acceptance. There is no call to put the formula under "fragments", for Buddhism has taken up this adopted babe into its heart (at least in Hīnayāna). Yet even here the point of the exercises prescribed in the formula has been lost.

The point is, that a man, abounding in benevolence, should, by what we call telepathy, but

[1] *Brhadāraṅyaka Up.*, v, 2. [2] *Sakya*, pp. 216 ff.

what ought to be called televolition, "will" another, whom he sees abounding in the opposite sentiment, or stinting amity, to be filled with his own amity. And the same will-exercise should be practised with the sentiment of "pity", of "benevolent joy", and of "poise" or moral stability. I have used the word "will, willing", but, no strong word expressing this being at hand, the Pali term is the also strong and picturesque phrase "suffuse with thought accompanied by amity, etc." It is purely a labour of love and goodwill between "me and thee"; it is essentially a personal ethical relation between very man and very man. But the later values, tending more to dwell on *ideas about* the man, and less on the man, have converted the personal factor into universalized sentiments to be radiated out to all beings. This is doubtless beneficent for the radiator, but no direct good for the irradiated can come from it. Man would indeed need to be actual Deity to effect that.

That the tradition of "the man willing the man" survived is shown in the most famous Hīnayāna work of our era: Buddhaghosa's *Path of Purity*, chap. 9, which can now be read in translation.[1] The evidence for the teaching as being, at some point of time in early Buddhism, annexed, whether by mutual sympathy, or through the earlier death of its teacher and an influx of his disciples into Gotama's Order, is, I have admitted, slender. The annexation is suggested by the, for

[1] Pali Text Soc. ed., by Prof. P. Maung Tin of Rangoon University.

me, important appearance of the televolitional formula *as an intrusion*, and a fairly late one in the Suttas. Thus in the First Collection, First Section, wherein twelve Suttas set forth a scheme of teaching based explicitly on *sīla*, or Morals, the Four God-abidings only appear suddenly *in the thirteenth*, just at the end of the Section, and not at the end of each of the twelve Suttas, an end which is always according to plan.

Again, missioners come and ask the Gotama men, whether their doctrine of the Formula in question is the same as they teach, point for point, or not ?

Next, the Formula is not given highest, or nirvana-training rank in the Abhidhamma-Pitaka. Nor is it included in the Lists of essential things said to have been enjoined by the Founder just before his death. Neither, as to that, are the Four Truths. Both omissions seem significant. Moreover, the omission from those " essential things " is endorsed by a corresponding omission from the sub-groups of Suttas in the Third Collection, which deal separately with each of those Lists. The Sutta about the " missioners " mentioned just above has been placed in the sub-group dealing with seven desirable qualities, only one of which, the seventh, is in the four God-abidings, namely, the fourth : poise. There seems to be no cluster of Suttas in any of the Collections dealing with that wonderful, that lofty ethics of moral televolition.

Once more, the ideal associated with the Four God-abidings is that of rebirth in the Brahma world, which was not the highest Hīnayāna ideal.

It belongs to the Brahmanic ideal, and suggests, that we have here a mission set on foot by a Brahman.[1] Not of the Schools, since the Upanishads know nothing about the Four.

That they were annexed is for me a very laudable act; I have only classed them among my "fragments" because of their "patchy" appearance, the absence of any acknowledgment of their founder and the semi-honourable position assigned them. Modern "Southern" Buddhism has highly worthed the four exercises; but if Western exponents, like Spence Hardy and then Oldenberg, have been supercilious over the four, as benevolent universal sentimentalizing, usurping undue preoccupation with thinking in place of doing, modern Buddhism has perhaps itself to thank for this. It has lost sight of the exercises having been not so much meditations as strenuous work of will.

(3) My last fragment represents that which is a lost opportunity, but not among early Buddhists only; it was equally lost by Brahman teachers.

There is perhaps no nobler basis for moral life than that which was suggested by the Upanishadic teacher Yājñavalkya, namely, that each other man, *i.e.* self (equally each woman, each child), is dear, is precious to the man, *i.e.* to "myself", *because of the Divine Self Who each is.* It finds an echo in the words ascribed to

[1] *Further Dial.*, ii, p. 108. (The rendering "humble" is not so correct for *hīna* as "low" or "inferior" had been.) Cf. also my *Outlines of Buddhism*, p. 34.

Jesus : " that they all may be one, even as thou, father, art in me and I in thee, that they may also be in us ".[1] Thus seen, each fellowman becomes an object of reverence, of tender care, such as the better among us feel for the child, for any woman's child. But the lovely teaching is never pressed home, as we would like to have seen it in the Upanishads. Still less is there a vestige of it in the Suttas. No tenderness surrounds those Upanishadic echoes which are among our fragments under the first group on the " Self ".

But there is just a fragment ascribed to Gotama, when in converse with his friend, the king of his country, Kosala, and the queen Mallikā. They tell him of the way in which they have touched on the Brahman teaching of the precious Self, and agreed that none was so dear as the " self ". If we see in this term " myself ", " my life ", " my honour ", " my welfare ", they come out of it without much credit. The Commentary makes out the king as hoping to hear : " Nay, sire, surely it's you who are to me the dearest ", especially as he had raised her from humble estate. It has evidently no memory whatever (in Ceylon, remember !) of the old teaching of Immanence, or what it logically involved. But Gotama's comment is recorded metrically as follows :—

The whole wide world we traverse with our thought,
And nothing find to man more dear than self.
Since aye so dear the self to others is,
Let the self-lover harm no other man.[2]

[1] John xvii. 21. [2] *Kindred Sayings*, i, p. 102.

"Not harm" (*na himse*)! It is the weak Indian wording of the so-called doctrine (mainly of the Jains) of *ahimsā*, stating the benevolent warding of beings:—beasts, men, devas,—in negative terms. Yet even then it goes further than the Upanishads; it does not stay over sentiment; it insists that this should blossom into conduct, into action, into life. Too brief, too almost forgotten is the record, yet in it we may see the expansion in Buddhist teaching of the teaching which it found. But it was only a felt-after, a suggested expansion. The development of the sinister *anattā* teaching barred the way in Buddhism to building upon this "admirable basis for a very lofty type of morality". In the Bhagavad-Gītā we find that basis admitted, but we do not even there find any real ethical superstructure, albeit the apologist would fain see one. "He who . . . looking alike on everything sees the Self abiding in all beings and all beings in the Self . . . who worships me as dwelling in all beings . . ." [1] this is all! No inference, no corollary follows. That one who injures others really attacks the Self-in-one's-self: this is generously imputed to the author of the poem,[2] but we have to read it into the text. Brahmanic India no less than Buddhist India threw away here a sublime opportunity, the former with far less excuse than the latter.

[1] VI, pp. 29, 31.
[2] Franklin Edgerton's *Bhagavad-Gītā*.

CHAPTER VII

THE MESSAGE OF THE FRAGMENTS

I am not claiming that this basketful of fragments could not be made fuller. Nor that to construct the original building from them is easier than to rebuild Troy. I do claim, that they suggest, strongly suggest a submerged religious teaching, with which the values, appearing in formulas now held central in Hīnayāna Buddhism, are, more or less, in conflict. I claim also, that they reveal an acceptance of certain central points in the Indian teaching when Buddhism began, together with an expansion of that teaching. I claim, that in what they reveal they leave no doubt that, in its beginning, Buddhism was more definitely "a religion" than it now is. The question now sometimes raised: Is it a religion? could not, in these fragments, arise. They leave it in no doubt.

This last claim I hope more fully to discuss at this book's end. Here I will only sum up that which these fragments reveal to me.

They reveal, not a denial, but an acceptance of what *in Western idiom* is termed God and the soul.

They reveal a preoccupation with the view that the soul, in Indian idiom the "man",

is essentially " one who is becoming ". That is, not merely changing, but " going on to what he was not before ". In this becoming, worsening is possible, but it is not, as with the body, as with material becoming, inevitable ; it is a becoming of soul, of the very man.

They reveal a forward view of something More about the man, not a something less; they have nothing to say, Indian though they are, of a " not this, not that ".

They reveal a new view in that More, till then not made vocal to the Many :—the will in man as the power in him that makes for salvation, more than does the mind of him. As exercising mind he remains contemplative. As exercising will he moves, he advances, he *becomes*. " He," I repeat. " Mind " loses the man in ideas about the man. Will more closely implies willer. Will does not exercise will. No fit word for will do the fragments reveal, but everywhere is revealed a gospel of effort, energy, endeavour, outcome of will.

They reveal a great preoccupation with the nearness, the worth, the intervention of the man of other worlds, opening up an interworld ethics.

They reveal a relatively new and worthier note in the relation between man and man on earth, the relation of caring for, of warding, of reverence.

Finally, they throw some light on certain terms as having undergone change in values, between the birth of Buddhism and the compiling of the Piṭakas in Pali : terms for the Goal, for Becoming, for the Self.

Taken together, they reveal a definite teaching of a More about the man, about his nature, life, destiny. And herein they are for me a New Word about the soul, the man, brought by a man to men.

What of the man, what of the men who brought the New Word ? Let us turn to them.

CHAPTER VIII

THE FIRST SAKYAN TEACHERS

1. *The Founder*

THE cult of " the Buddha ", which grew during the third and following centuries after the beginnings of the " Buddhist " movement, effected this result: the inspired founder to whom that title came to be given was made, in virtue of his reputation, to absorb the worth, the originality, the more or less able co-operation of the men and women who, almost as much as he, set the new mandate on its feet, making it supply what will then have been a positive religious demand —a demand felt, if not expressed in words. But I am convinced that, during the first generation of mission work, there was practically nothing of the posthumous reverence and quasi-adoration of succeeding generations. There will have been a loyal rallying round a man able by his personality to lead and to win confidence. The earliest recorded " official " titles of him are just *bhagavan*, a current word of respect, and *satthar*, the teacher. It is only as so called that he is referred to in the chronicles of the first two " councils ", one hundred years apart in time. The name *buddha* occurs only in verses of a Sutta which has been incorporated in

the account of the Second Council from the Fourth Collection (*Gradual Sayings*, ii, pp. 61–3), and is thus a citation of something already recorded elsewhere.[1] It is almost incredible, that, had the founder been known, when the councils took place, as "the Buddha", he should not have been officially referred to by that title.

This submergence of the first missioners in the glamour of the leader is a serious historical loss. Some light about them can be gathered by sifting the Suttas, and, did my present limits permit, I would here give such grain as can thereby be winnowed. There is no evidence that a wish to impose himself and his teaching on his little community was characteristic of Gotama. There is evidence that he was appreciative of the merits in, and the standpoints of, others. The records make him admit, "I should, had you asked me, answered you as did she (or he)", especially "she". His appreciation of another missioner's gospel, and annexation of it, I have shown. He may even have welcomed too warmly the attempt to teach a "gospel of causation", with the result that it has largely swallowed his own gospel. (He is himself shown as trying to teach religion by "causation", and its falling flat.)[2] That he was manifestly

[1] This does not demand a very early compilation of this part of the Fourth Collection. It only means that, when the oral record of the Council was *finally edited*, perhaps in writing, editors were then capable of making those selections from a known Thesaurus. The appellative, symbolic of the Way: Tathāgata is almost confined to the prose Suttas. Cf. above, p. 112.

[2] *Further Dial.*, ii, p. 17.

an appreciator of what Brahmans were holding in worth, apart from misplaced worth in birth and ritual, is shown by the high appreciation many of them showed him.[1] But the fact remains, that his first co-workers, unless we except his cousin Ānanda, his personal attendant during the last third of his life, are little more than names, and that the two themes annexed in his teaching: causation (in mental process) and the four "televolitions", were first taught by unknown men.

Our loss amounts to this, that, unless we read our Piṭakas more than superficially, we get records of a world religion started by one outstanding man and a group of dummies. The one exception is that other cousin, Devadatta, who went far to wreck the Sakyan community by usurping leadership, and who so far founded a rival community that Chinese travellers, nine centuries later, found it surviving.[2] At the opposite extreme is the devoted Ānanda, loving indeed his great kinsman, but in no way shown as winning such a reciprocated love as to make him deserve the ill-given title of "beloved disciple"[3]. No work by or about Buddhists known to me makes clear in what way the disciple best meriting this

[1] See p. 27.

[2] "There are also companies of the followers of Devadatta still existing. They regularly make offerings to the three previous Buddhas, but not to Sakyamuni Buddha."—*The Travels of Fa-Hien*, by Jas. Legge, p. 62.

[3] I rather fear my husband started (or at least endorsed) this groundless statement.

title, Sāriputta, abetted his friend and leader by " turning the wheel of dharma as I turn it ".[1] One other friend from whom we might have learnt much is that disciple, mysteriously named in the Council records " the man of old ": Purāna, who, contending he had the teaching from the Leader himself, refused to take part in the Council—surely a somewhat dubious testimony to the loyalty of its organizers.[2] Gavampāti, another early co-worker, also excused himself from attending—this we have on the authority of Chinese records only.[3] Of the other old survivors, there were only Kacchāna, Anuruddha (another cousin) and Kassapa, and these three had deliberately withdrawn from Gotama's society at Sāvatthī, the first having founded his own " school " in a remote place, Avanti, the second preferring the society of two or three monk-chums, the third having refused Gotama's plea that he would stay with him, preferring the hardships of camping.[4]

There are no records of any refreshing companionship coming to Gotama from any woman-disciple, such as modern culture might have afforded him. There were a few, as cited in Vinaya and Anthology, who were capable of such high friendship, and known by him as being so. But doubtless the low worth ascribed to women in general, and to the sonless woman in particular, would have too much endangered the

[1] *Further Dial.*, ii, p. 82, and elsewhere.
[2] *Vin. Texts*, III, p. 380 f.
[3] *Le Concile de Rājagaha*, J. Przyluski.
[4] *Kindred Sayings*, ii, p. 136.

life of his community to make such converse possible. As the guest of the lay patroness in her home it was different, and in the generous and wise Visākhā we see one capable of worthy co-operation, and converse with whom may have been a restful enjoyment. That the two talks with her are virtually monologues by him is a misfortune (his attendant monk will have noted only what his Leader said); but she too has got all but submerged.

Let us turn then to the "Merger". That he became such was not due to a superhumanity distinguishing him from his birth. Legend has done its best to show he was so distinguished, but it is a blanket that cannot wholly cover the bed. The man-of-earth peeps out between the cracks. But legend was ministering to the human need to find a substitute for That from Whom monastic Buddhism had turned away. There had come the need to show "Buddha kin of the sun" as a superman from and before his birth, condescending to be born as the son of the raja, or landowning laird Suddhōdănă, whose estate lay in the hills of Nepal or somewhat eastward of it.

The legends (a few are in the Piṭakas, most of them are in later works) show the young Gotama in two mutually contending groups. In one he is the strong accomplished athlete and warrior, outdoing his peers at warrior-craft: archery, horsemanship, muscular power, even writing! an accomplishment then undreamt of in India, let alone in a nobleman. In the other, he is depicted as reared in an extravagantly effem-

inate way, sheltered in this mansion at that season, waited on by women only, and ignorant of the facts of illness, old age, death. Both groups cannot possibly be even plausible when taken together. The second legend is told in the Piṭakas also about one of the first disciples, Yasa by name.[1] It is possible it may, in Indian legend, be associated with some other hero or saint. I know not. But I think it is time, and worth while, that a word should be put in in defence of raja Suddhodana, not to mention of Yasa's father, or for that matter of their two sons. Parents in legends do incredibly silly things, but herein it may well be that legends are libellous.

Very dim and past finding out is the birth and growth of a legend. But it does not seem a thing too far-fetched to surmise, that a legend which is pure invention may have been engendered to help explain another legend, in which lies a grain of fact. Thus we have, told in the "Suttanta of the Great Legend",[2] how Siddhattha Gotama, on his drives, witnesses his ryots here and there afflicted one by old age, one by illness, one by bereavement, and how he falls a-pondering over their troubles, over these troubles as common to mankind—evidently no new thing to him; common "to the world" is his thought, and whether there might be "a way out"? This story of a young squire visiting among his own folk and inquiring into their well and ill being, albeit *in the telling* it is

[1] *Vin. Texts*, I, p. 102; cf. *Gradual Sayings*, i, p. 128.
[2] *Dial.*, ii, No. 14.

made incredibly silly, is very plausible when told of any man in authority, both now as well as then. Especially is it plausible in a man having in him the growing will to ward his fellowmen. But posterity attached an amazing importance to these drives. Out of the three normal ills of any man's life it elaborated the prose-poem of those three messengers, sent by watchers in the next world to remind man of the need of using the opportunity to live well while good health allowed him, and not to fritter away his time.[1] The drives and what they showed became in a way symbols of moral opportunities, moral urgency.

But to make them more impressive, it became a tradition to tell of them as if Siddhattha were new to the sight of life's ills. Hence possibly the auxiliary legend *explaining the novelty* they were to him. Hence then the libel on poor Suddhodana that he brought up his son so absurdly.

And not on Suddhodana only. Buddhists have never seemed to see, that, in the following legend of the son's leaving home to take up the homeless wealthless life of a " mendicant " missioner, in order that he might find that way out for the world from old age, illness, death, they are gravely maligning the son. Man has ever sought in religion no mere refuge from life's normal ills. He has sought, he seeks *so much more*. These are but the handicaps of a limited body and mind, and man has ever judged, that these alone were not he. It has been the safety,

[1] Cf. above, p. 128. The *tribunal* is not late stuff.

the health, the Becoming utterly well of the very centre of him, of that who perishes not with the body, that he has sought a More, even a Most. And young Gotama, I repeat,[1] "himself in a great Becoming, did not bide bending over the crutch, the sickbed, the grave. He wayfared further".

I have been tempted to put forward a surmise, that the preoccupation with this threefold life-handicap, which mankind usually takes in its stride more or less resignedly, may have been due to recent memories of some visitation: famine, pestilence, war, when men are not resigned, but cry out at the way in which the bearable processes of nature have been rendered unbearable. India knew well all those forms—but we can only surmise, and come further.

But the monastic colouring in the legend of his leaving home has been busy transforming a very natural healthy quest of knowledge, whereby he might become a more efficient successor to his father, into a "great renunciation".[2] It may well have been too far for him to have been sent as a lad to a centre of Brahman academic culture, such as Taxilā was, such as Nālandā later became, when the safe peace of Taxilā was broken by invasions. But for grown men there may well have been a custom of making a tour of centres where known teachers taught, like our own mediæval students' tours to Paris, Oxford and so on. Such men may have been

[1] *Outlines of Buddhism*, pp. 40 f.

[2] The word *mahábhinishkramana* may also mean "great-super-going-out-from".

they who were known as *paribbājaka's*—my husband gave them the name of Wanderers—men who had not professionally left the world, but who had left home awhile in quest of what we now call culture. It is as such that I see Gotama leaving Kapilavatthu; it is as such that I see him studying Jhāna now under Āḷāra Kālāma, now under Uddaka Rāmaputta, now under the new community of Jains (called Niga*nth*as, Sansk. Nirgra*nth*as), experimenting in *tapas*, or bodily austerities. The Piṭakas give no clear account of the places he visited, so much are his "Wanderjahre" become in them pure legend. But that he gave a trial to their cathartic austerities is both *implied* in the Vinaya record,[1] and is described with much exaggerating relish in the Second Collection.[2]

In this and another Sutta of this Collection [3] conversations with Jains are located at Vesālī, which the Commentary makes the headquarters of the Jain community. And since the late poem of Gotama's "renunciation", the *Lalita-Vistāra*, makes Vesālī one of his points of call, we may see in his going there in quest of light and learning something probably true. Vesālī was apparently a leading centre in North India in many ways. The metropolis of the oligarchy of the Licchavi rajas, a liberal-minded meeting-place of religious movement, a market of merchandise, it must have been a very revelation to the laird of the rustic hill-country. It was a very fateful experience for him, since it was

[1] *Vin. Texts*, I, p. 92.
[2] *Further Dial.*, i, pp.174 f. [3] *Ibid.*, preceding Sutta.

at Vesālī—we know not as yet why—that his own recognition of the reality of the very man, soul, self, took firm root, and three hundred years later rallied in his followers to its defence, when challenged by the newer teaching of the Not-soul, or *Anattā*. It was to Vesālī that he tottered, an octogenarian, to pay a last visit; it was of Vesālī alone that he turned on leaving to take a last look, a gesture perpetuated, by those who will have escorted him from the town, in a "cairn" called the Cairn or *Thūpa* of the Last Look.

According to the Piṭaka Sutta,[1] the matter at issue in Gotama's austerities was whether body was to master mind or the reverse, or whether both were to be "schooled". Implicit in his Second Utterance is the conclusion, that both are but instruments of a third: the self or very man, who alone is, or should be master. The Jain would agree with him. The Pali account, distracted by its later decadence from this common conclusion, gives an obscure version of the matter. But it is to be hoped that, when Jains become genuinely awake in *historical* research, they will compare Pali Sutta and Commentary with their own also sadly obscured tradition, and discover, if it be now possible, to what extent Vesālī was the real mother of both these great reform movements of the sixth century B.C.

Before, or after the austerity experiment, we find Gotama the disciple successively of the teachers just mentioned. The record of what and how they trained men in "jhāna" has been too much repainted in terms of later formula, of oblivion as to the early object of "jhāna" (given above), to be of value. Save in this only:

[1] *Further Dial.*, i, pp. 174 f.

his procedure may reveal to us something dominating his will when he left home. If then his quest was, as is stated, "a way out" for his people, for people in general, from life's normal troubles, in particular those of the body, *what is so likely* to have guided him as the desire to develop such "psychic" power as he may already have found that he possessed? For by using such power he might learn from men beyond the veil, to what extent there was need to be fearful as to the unseen, as to the next step, and as to how best to prepare for it here? Read in this way, his recourse to masters of "jhāna" was the most natural act he could have set about. Yet I have not come across one writer, Buddhist or non-Buddhist, who connects his aspirations with his jhāna-study in this way.

One recent writer, H. Beckh,[1] sees in Gotama's action here the will to study that which was coming to be known as Yoga.[2] Yoga or introversive effort to win nearness with the divine Self within, was a movement growing among Brahmans who were dissatisfied with those among their teachers who stressed the need of man, not so much to "be" immanent Deity as to "become" That. The term, begun we know not just when or through whom, meant not "union", but "effort" (compare our "yoke"). It is a very bee in Beckh's bonnet to see early Buddhism "as Yoga and nothing else". Now Yoga first of all assumed that Deity was in man, and man in Deity. Herein the assumption is, I believe, equally true for original Buddhism.

[1] *Buddhismus*, I, p. 50. [2] Cf. above, p. 61.

But between the two there was all the difference in the world as to the "nearing". In Yoga this could be effected, by the right methods, here and now. In Buddhism this was only to be effected along a long, long Way of right effort in living, and in many lives. It is conceivable, that when Buddhism gave up first the God in man, then the very man himself as real, editors would have suppressed the word Yoga and the word *yogin*, or student in Yoga. For the former word is all but absent from the Piṭakas,[1] the latter is entirely absent. But, given the different outlook between the two movements, I find not a single "fragment" to adduce, betraying a prescribed Yoga in the records. Nor, in any reference known to me, is the practice linked with those two teachers. Sānkhya indeed is so linked,[2] but that is opposed, as a complementary culture, in the Upanishads and Mahābhārata to Yoga, in the Piṭakas to Jhāna, which is there called "making-become".[3] No, it was an immature assumption, which, I am content to see, the author has carried no further, but which I should have preferred to see him correct. My own view, that Gotama, in "jhāna", was as soon as possible seeking to further his benevolent longing by getting further light whence we should reasonably seek it, is at least logical.

[1] In *Dhammapada*, ver. 209, is an Upanishadic fragment using the term. Cf., too, ver. 282. In the Suttas and Abhidhamma the noun *yoga* is used in a worsened meaning of "fetter" (*samyōjăna*) and "bond".

[2] In the *Buddhacharita*.

[3] *Gradual Sayings*, i, pp. 47 f.

He sought to make use of such avenues as were then open to such a desire.

There emerges now the legend of the tree, and the crisis undergone beneath it, of a conflict with carnal temptation, or " the hosts " of evil, under the headship of a being called Māra, or Nămŭchi. There is no record that Gotama ever confirmed such an experience as true, any more than there is any confirmation made of a like experience by Jesus. Neither of these elect men was likely to have been worsened in such a conflict ; probably therefore neither scene will have really taken place. The Pi*t*akas are silent about it. In the case of Gotama, doubt is said to have been succeeded by the breaking in of " knowledge, vision, light ", subsequently referred to as his having " become thoroughly awake " or enlightened : the primary and secondary meaning of the word *abhi-sambuddha* (from *budh-*, to wake, to know). But what is it—to get past these " words about " —what is it that caused in him these present and after-effects ?

Amid much in the history of Buddhism that is tragic, here is perhaps the focus of the tragedy. In the three Pi*t*aka accounts, the only one put into the founder's mouth differs from the others. Edited into a wordy refrain of twenty-five lines of prose, it is thus condensed by the English translator : [1]

" Subject in myself to birth . . . decay . . . disease . . . death . . . sorrow . . . and corruption, and seeing peril in what is subject thereto, I sought after the consummate peace,

[1] Lord Chalmers, *Further Dial.*, i, p. 117.

nirvana, which knows neither birth nor decay nor disease nor death nor sorrow nor corruption : this I pursued and this I won ; and there arose within me the conviction, the insight, that now my deliverance was unshakeable, that this was my last birth, that now there was no rebecoming."

That in the Vinaya gives the account as a thing remembered in peaceful meditation a week later. It is only in the Great Legend Sutta [1] that we get the man shown as questioning himself and answering :

" What now being present is decay and dying also present ? What conditions decay and dying ? Then to him from causally considering there became through wisdom the crisis : [2] Where birth is, there is decay and dying ; birth is the condition of decay and dying."

And so on through the formula which has been already given, known as the " Arising because of " (*Paticcha-samuppāda*). A noteworthy feature of this version is, that the worry over " a way out ", elsewhere put into his mouth before he left home, is here made immediately to precede this " way out ". I think this should be noted by the reader, since it categorically shows that the Dīgha-compilers were content to see, in the tree-crisis, and the answer there arrived at, a reply to that worry over merely bodily troubles which had obsessed him at home. They do not credit him with having got further

[1] *Dial.*, ii, pp. 24 f.

[2] *Abhisamaya*, lit. special season. Secondary meaning is enlightenment.

to genuinely religious needs. They deepen thereby the tragedy that here lies bared for us in this curious shrunken notion of what the need and the nature of a world gospel was supposed to have amounted to for this great son of India, this very Son of Man. Nothing that is of the essence of that gospel is there : neither in what it tried to convey to his day, nor in what the best among his aftermen made of it. No word of the Way is there. No word of man's becoming is there. No word of the worlds is there. No word on the very man is there. No word on amity is there. No word on the will, the choice in man is there. It is just a series, ingenious for its day, on vital, on mental process in man whereby ill is said to arise, and of how ill may be stopped, but not by the construction of a process wherein the will builds up the spiritual becoming of man, till with the forward view there shines afar the possible, the coming " well " crowning his life. It is arrest ; it is turning back : it is a brooding on " ill ".

" What say you ? Can a man who clings to ill, has gone over to ill, so cleaves to ill, that he regards ill as ' of me ', regards me as ' ill ', regards the self for me is ill—can he either of himself thoroughly understand ill or live casting out ill ? He could not." [1]

Surely we have here a word that this man is more likely to have said, but one which he cannot well have said, if we are to hold this causal, this one-sided application of causal succession hung like a snake-wreath about his shoulders, as

[1] *Further Dial.*, i, p. 166.

a truly worded "enlightenment". Nothing, alas! is left us which might throw light on the dimmed picture. It is not till we come to the succeeding days of doubt and hesitation, that a feeble ray of light shines out from that vision, when he saw and heard, described above,—shines out from the water-lilies at all stages of growth, of becoming. But it was from that hour, that we see him, doubt and hesitation gone, going back to his fellow-students and proposing they should teach the man as choosing to become, the man as figured by the Way, the Road of wayfaring in the worlds, towards the Thing Sought.

As he goes back—from Uruvelā to Benares, according to the record—he is accosted by a religieux, possibly of the Jains,[1] Ŭpăkă. Of him we hear later in the Commentary on the "Sisters" Anthology.[2] The radiant countenance of the inspired mandated Gotama provokes inquiry, in a stock form of words: "who is your new teacher?" in which the much later power of the "guru" is forecast. The reply is in bombastic terms, that none is now needed. If we will but see a human Gotama where is now a monks' quasi-deity, we shall know that he would just then be surcharged, not with a sense of his own worth and dignity, but with the message surging up in him. The only possible alternative were silence and the "I will lay my hand upon my mouth" of Job. It is far more likely, that he tested, on this man, the message

[1] *Vin. Texts*, I, p. 90. He uses the Jain term *jina*, "conqueror".

[2] *Psalms of the Sisters* (P.T.S. ed.); Chāpā.

of the Wayfarer choosing the Way, as a rehearsal of what he was about to propose as his charter.

Upaka's final comment is curiously suggestive and I give it a second time. It is the one word *bhaveyya* ! in the dialectical form : *huveyya* ! or *hupeyya* ! If the message were really given in terms of the Way as a Becoming (or growth as of the lilies), the man's comment falls into place as an echo of the chief, the central word of that message : " Huveyya " : one may become ! or " man may become ! " or should, or must become—the word may mean any of these potential forms. That the dialectical form has been preserved is mysterious, for it is very unusual. I have had the temerity to suggest,[1] that later editors, manhandling as they did these early scenes to get rid of terms they had come to hold undesirable, corrupt, ambiguous, chief among these being the word *bhavya*, and *bhava*, would retain the patois word, the better to conceal these two forms grown obnoxious. I do not expect agreement, but I remain impenitent. There is no evidence whatever to whose recording we owe the patchy and unsatisfactory record. The reader must choose between a passive assent to what we have, unworthy as it is of what such a man would say, or to attempt, as I have done, to read between the lines. But let him, in reflecting, add my streak of suggestion, linking up the words heard in the scene of hesitation with the group of men Gotama was thereafter hastening to rejoin.

2. *The Co-workers*

This group is always referred to as of five, in the term *pañca-vaggiya*, and called *bhikkhū* : lit. almsmen, begging friars, so to speak. In the number " five " I see less an exact memory, more, " a number to conjure with ", so to say.

[1] *Manual of Buddhism*, pp. 134 f.

It was the unit of the Indian village community ; it was, as is known, a lucky number ; [1] there may have been more than five ; there may possibly have been a woman or two ; as Wanderers these are attested to. And that these " five " were Wandering students, not " *bhikkhus* ", *i.e.* not world-quitters, is very probable. We must remember that we are digging in the records made by " bhikkhu's " very much out to show, to both their own and indirectly the lay world, that the whole undertaking was by monks, and mainly for monks. The legends make Gotama shave off his hair and don miraculously supplied " robes " as soon as he has left home. No less, his first friends, his first " converts ", had to be shown as not of the laity.

One saddening result of this is, that in the five we get the group shown as *converts to something new*, and as subsequently no better than dummies (with perhaps one exception on one occasion). That the five were former companions is admitted. They had practised *tapas* with him, and had been " very helpful " to him.[2] In the teeth of a worthless exegesis, edited in days of Buddha-cult, which sees, in this, petty bodily services, I would suggest, as far more likely, that the help consisted in earnest discussion between them all, all bent on religious service, as to how best to shape the message of their mission ; and that, they not venturing, not judging fit to make this the expanding of the faltering Brahman teaching :—that man is not so

[1] Cf. the *Pali Dictionary*, Pali Text Soc., art. *pañca*.
[2] *Vin. Texts*, I, p. 90 ; *Further Dial.*, i, p. 121.

much " being " the Highest, as " becoming " the Highest, namely, by willing the best life here and hereafter,—Gotama then decided to go into seclusion, from them at least, and, not so much to beat out his choice unaided, as to listen in *jhāna* for advice from friends in the Unseen.

If we accept this, we then come to see, that (*a*) the vision will have been nothing unique, but an endorsement and a mandate to persevere and not hesitate in what had been already discussed and, in *jhāna*, already advised ; (*b*) the rejoining of the friends by the man of the shining face was to sanction, by what he had seen and heard, the message they had hesitated to choose, and to popularize it by the wording of it in the symbol of the Road or Way.

Access to the Unseen, when it has proved ever to yield wise and worthy counsels, will always be resorted to by the wise and worthy recipient. When this is accepted, students of these scriptures will cease to thrust aside such recorded items. They will see how much then falls into place. Thus, Gotama, his mind made up, decides he will first tell his teachers in *jhāna* of his experience—how natural ! *they* would best understand. But he hears psychically that Ālāra, and then that Uddaka had just passed away. It is significant, that already, in the Commentary, the deva uttering these messages is not held to be " conclusive ", and the " Buddha's world-vision " is dragged in. Omniscience was then ascribed to him and had to be kept in view. Elsewhere, when he admits he had learnt " because a deva told me ", we find (the insertion) :

" and I knew it of myself ".[1] The ways of the glossing editor are (or should be) often obvious.

That Gotama, from his start, needed co-workers has been oddly passed over. Once more the Buddha-cult has been busy. We find the quiet but coercive summons of Jesus, " Follow me and I will make you fishers of men," very reasonable, yet have failed to supply a sīmilar need in Gotama's case, when he set about rejoining teachers or friends. But we are dealing with events five to six hundred years older ; with records kept oral for centuries, adapted for oral transmission, readapted for scriptural transmission. And further : these first men will have taught in its original form the message as first agreed upon, a message which, as I have shown, fell largely into discredit with the growth of the monastic outlook. It may well be, therefore, not that those five were ineffective where the fisher-folk of Nazareth and others were effective, but that what those said has come to be suppressed, and so they pass off the scene dumb, unhelpful !

That they were so cannot be true. This I say, not because I would accept the pious estimate that " at that time " the new community included 61 " saints " (*arahans*).[2] Advance may at first have been very slow indeed. But advance there was ; somehow the fire-worshipping sect of the Kassapa brothers, hailing it may be from Persia,[3] came in, winning the patronage of the king of the country, namely,

[1] In *Dial.*, iii, p. 17 ; ii, p. 252, and other contexts.
[2] *Vin. Texts*, I, p. 112.
[3] *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 207.

Bimbisāra of Magadha, and then advance may have become assured. The influx of capable men like Sāriputta, psychically gifted men like Moggallāna, is placed *after this*. The influx of the Sakyans from Kapilavatthu: Anuruddha, Mahānāma, Devadatta (gifted and at first loyal), Ānanda and others was much later still. When other leading disciples such as Kotthita, Kacchāna, Punna, the Panthakas, Mahā-Kassapa, Chunda, Revăta (both were brothers of Sāriputta) and Kappĭna came in, we know not at all. Some testimony to the merits, the work, the words of these men remain in the scriptures as written. Partly submerged though even these are in the person and authority of the Founder, so that often they are shown as if mere boy-pupils listening to him, some testimony to their independent worth has survived. But what of those first "five"? In their word, no less than in that of their inspired leader, must have resided the strong leverage that started the New Word which never ceased till, through this branch, that adaptation, it had spread into a world-religion. Yet of them, we find only three or four faint echoes. One, Añyā Kondañya, Brahman, commended for his swift assent to the new charter, is shown as living away from the rest (presumably incapacitated by old age) and visiting his former leader with every mark of devotion.[1] Another, Vappa, has one utterance, one stanza, in the Anthology of the "Elders", and appears, apparently as a seceder, in Suttas.[2]

[1] *Kindred Sayings*, i, p. 246.
[2] *Gradual Sayings*, ii, pp. 207 f.

One more, Assaji, acts as mediary bringing in Sāriputta, but is shown stammering over, not the charter of the Way, but a doctrine of causation—a muddle which is probably no fault of Assaji's, but an edited patchwork about *two* teachers, as I have elsewhere tried to show.[1] Assaji we also see ill and abed visited by Gotama, with, alas! no word in the talk to revive memories precious to both. This is all! And like the forsaken wood-deva we say:

> *To-day regret and discontent are mine!*
> *Where are those Gotama-disciples gone?* [2]

Needed they must have been by Gotama to "set his Dharma-Wheel a-rolling". Nor would their best efforts have sufficed, had they been just men of average good will. Not so easily is a great gospel started. Without, I repeat,[3] a gift of healing *abnormally on the increase*, there would have been no Christian gospels to compose, in a later generation. I conceive a similar abnormal growth in will-power, or synergy, in that other small area, where Gotama and his few men (and women?) were reared and where they worked. It was men with such a gift of will to whom Gotama and his helpers were drawn and who were drawn to them. That we know so little of them is our misfortune. We would give much for just one saying on what in world-help the causal process meant for Assaji by Assaji. We read that a poet's description of the veteran Añyā Kondañya was *dalha-*

[1] *Sakya*, p. 125. [2] *Kindred Sayings*, i, p. 253.
[3] *Sakya*, p. 131.

viriya: strong in energy.[1] They may have differed in method, in emphasis, but we can feel sure, from the bases of the world-cult laid by them, that very strong, very active will, working mainly as will to help, must have linked them closely with their leader, and that it was men like them whom he sent, not long after, as missioners on tour, to tell men and devas of the new word in the "God-life".

The little group usually referred to as about the Leader is never made to include any of those five. Nor are the members always identical. They are usually about ten: here is such a list: The Leader is made to find his men indulging in too long slumbers and calls: "Where is Sāriputta, where is Moggallāna, Kassapa, Kacchāna, Kotthita, Chunda, Kappina, Anuruddha, Revata, Ānanda? Where have these seniors gone?"[2] On the occasion of the moonlit evening cited above, page 117, there are only named Nos. 1, 2, 3, 8, 9 and 10. In a Sutta of the *Udāna*,[3] we have also Devadatta and Rāhula in attendance. In time some of these seniors are found each with his own disciples: Sāriputta, Kassapa, Kappina, and eventually Kassapa. He and Kacchāna seem to have gone to dwell apart from the centre of the community—probably not when this was at the Bamboo Grove given by Bimbisāra, but when the centre was transferred to Sāvatthī, the capital of Kosala—founding to some extent independent schools.

What time it took to effect these shiftings we

[1] *Kindred Sayings*, i, 246; *Pss. Brethren*, ver. 1247.
[2] *Gradual Sayings*, iii, p. 215. [3] I, p. 5.

cannot know; it never occurs to the compilers of the Vinaya to date the progress of these, or any events, not even from the date of the movement's birth. Thus we cannot tell when the little "club" decided (*a*) to enrol itself as an Order of mendicant monks (and not as just Wanderers), (*b*) to begin a regular system of "tours" (*chārika*), suspended only during the rainy season. It is possible that (*a*) was not found advisable till, with increase in membership, (*b*) became both possible and advisable. The living on alms would necessitate their keeping fairly scattered; the Rules and Suttas, *e.g.*, allude to the difficulty of getting these in times of scarcity, local or otherwise. All was probably much more of an adventure in the new than we usually imagine it to have been. We may not realize that the Sakyan mission is the *first recorded corporate effort* of itinerant religious teaching that we find. I am not saying that the Jains may not have preceded it by a few years; the Pali Commentaries hint at "Nigan*th*as" inviting debate without the gate of villages. Nor am I saying that the solitary teacher may not a long way back have been itinerant. But in the Vinaya we are certainly in a little world of touring, of settlements, *i.e.* of huts or caves to be halted at, where separate accommodation was given to those who as *jhāna*-men wished to be apart, and where to spend "the rains" was a matter of as much importance as is for us the where to spend our summer holidays.

Such a migrant life would not make easy the inclusion of nuns, and it is not impossible that

the rebuff recorded as shown to women volunteers may have been originally due to this difficulty. It is well known that the reason given, imputed to Gotama, is quite inconsistent with what such a man could possibly have given. Thrice rejecting their petition, he then gives way, as no " all-wise " man would have done, saying that the Order was now so far worsened that " burglars had been suffered to enter ", that " blight would settle on the corn ". So smudgy is here the active hand of the monk-editor ! So blind had he become to the fact that, in a religion worthy of the name, there is " neither male nor female, neither bond nor free, neither Jew nor Gentile " ; that a genuine " gospel " is no message for (*a*) the monk, (*b*) the laity—as some of East and West would see in original Buddhism —but in that it is for the very Man, the soul, the spirit, it is for woman no less than for her male counterpart. A great religion does not *begin* as a " dual message ", or as one for males or monks only.

But I suspect we have in this scurvy tradition a mix-up of perhaps an earlier and a later attempt by women to enter the Order : the one before the day of many fixed settlements or expanded *vihāras*, when separate men's and women's quarters became feasible, and the other, when Gotama's stepmother, become a widow, brought a company of women and entered the Order an honoured and welcome member. Here, again, the apparent absence of prompt, systematic registering has played us a sorry trick ; we have memories handed down, then entered into

a larger compilation, coloured with the later values, the prejudices of a worthy, industrious but very average-minded monk.

From that interesting, in its way unique, work, the Anthology of the nuns, and from scattered references in other literature, we can gather there was astir in the day of Gotama a "woman's movement" to gain greater domestic, social, religious liberty to dispose of her life. I do not wish to exaggerate its energies, but it should be taken into account. I do not see Gotama and his chosen helpers opposed to it, but their main concern would lie with spiritual expansion alone. I do not see them urging-on "Sumangala's mother":—

O woman well set free! how free am I!
How throughly free from kitchen drudgery!
Me stained and squalid 'mong my cooking-pots
My brutal husband ranked as even less
Than the sunshades he sits to weave alway.
Purged now of all my lust and hate,
I dwell, musing at ease beneath the shade
Of spreading boughs—O, but 't is well with me! [1]

I confess to a private hope, that they sympathized—if she was of their day—with Mettikā:

Though I be suffering and weak and all
My youthful spring be gone, yet have I come
Leaning upon my staff, and clomb aloft
The mountain peak. My cloak thrown off,
My little bowl o'erturned: so sit I here
Upon the rock. And o'er my spirit sweeps
The breath of liberty! I win, I win. . . .[2]

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[1] *Psalms of the Sisters*, Pali Text Soc. ed.
[2] *Ibid.*, XXI.

and with Chittā; also aloft:

Thrown from my shoulder hangs my cloak, o'erturned
My little bowl. So 'gainst the rock I lean
And prop this self of me, and break away
The wildering gloom that long had closed me in.[1]

But we shall probably err, if we see anything lower than a true spiritual standpoint in Somā's modern-sounding lines:

(*Māra*) *That vantage-ground the sages may attain*
Is hard to win. With her two-finger wit
That is no woman competent to gain.

(*Somā*) *What should the state of woman do to us,*
Whose mind is firmly set, to anyone
Who, knowledge rolling on, dharma *discerns?*
To one for whom the question doth arise:
Am I a woman in these matters, or
Am I a man, or what not am I, then?—
To such an one are you, sir, fit to talk.[2]

This is no arbitrary eclecticism; it is to see in those first Sakyans the inspired "men" who would, who could, be founders of a great world-religion, and not so much men who placed themselves at the head of this or that social or secular movement. The work called for men who were first and last filled with a purely religious More to bring to man. There might be, there almost certainly would be, sympathy with a wider worthier life aspired to by the friends of "Woman" and "Worker"; but it would be for them a secondary matter. Nevertheless it will have been there, as part of the greater ethics inherent in any religion worthy

[1] *Ibid.*, XXIV, XXIII.
[2] *Kindred Sayings*, i, p. 161.

of the name, even as it is present in Christianity and in Islam no less. And it is here and there evident in the Suttas, that the new equality of woman as Very Man, and of the serf as Very Man, in the Sakyan Order contributed to widen the rift between it and Brahmanism. The stock phrase "shavelings sham friars menials black fellows offscourings of our kinsmen's heels",[1] imputed (but rarely) to a rude Brahman here and there, points to this. I do not find Sakyans decried from without because of their inclusion of women. This does not so much redound to the credit of Buddhism as to the spread of the "woman's movement", possibly resembling the bright flicker during the Tudor period with us. The Jain movement is reputed to have been the work of women.[2]

It is much to be thankful for, that the chronicles of a monastic religion have let survive such testimony to the will and growth of women in that early day as we find. We have two interviews in the Suttas by distinguished early women-teachers: Dhammadinnā with her former husband,[3] Khemā, ex-queen, with the king of Kosala[4]; we have a Vinaya tribute to the talents of Kassapa's ex-wife, Bhaddā Kapilānī; we have other such women in the Suttas and we have the Anthologies.[5] But we do not find

[1] *Dialogues*, i, p. 112, etc. Possibly fixed in wording before women entered.
[2] Commentary, Second Collection (not translated).
[3] *Further Dial.*, i, No. 44.
[4] *Kindred Sayings*, iv, pp. 265 f.
[5] *Psalms of the Sisters; Apadāna*, ii.

the few noted teachers among them, those two and Sukkā, especially, concerned with the question of liberty of any kind. They had won liberty to use their gifts to help their fellowmen, but they were no more mindful of it; it was the "mountain air" they now breathed; it was the Becoming in that air that really mattered. I have made an analysis of ideals, negative and positive, in the "Sisters'" Anthology, and I find that the allusions to liberty won, such as I cite above, are, to allusions to other ideals, in the proportion of one to five.

Liberty (Pali: *vimutti*, Sansk. *môksha*) is in Indian religion, no less than is *suddhi* (purity), a word to conjure with. It has therein a history, for we can see the word emerging in the literature. As invader the Aryan could not afford to have truck with liberty. The Vedas are without the term. With conquest and settlement, the need of room for his own growth would develop healthily. *Vimutti* figures largely in the Suttas and poems of the Second Piṭaka, and points to the early emphasis laid on the reality and "becoming" of the man in a More. But it reveals an aspiration become morbid. Spiritual freedom is essential to spiritual growth. But for monk and nun freedom meant largely severance of human and social ties, as an integral part of spiritual bondage. "Everyman" will see in social ties a means, an opportunity, a test of human growth. It is this hybrid thirst for freedom from all ties that is betrayed in the interesting *Psalms of the Sisters*.

It is surely a yet living testimony to the

great-mindedness of the Founders, that under monasticism, with its habitual decrying of woman, such as is scattered about the Suttas, woman won so far. The same may be said of Christianity. But the monk so far held grip, that women in the Order remained constantly *in statu pupillari*;[1] they did not teach monks, not even the novices; they were and remained an appendage; they linger still, but of their wider work, missionary or otherwise, the greater world hears nothing.

As to what they did mainly teach—those first builders of the religion, women and men—what is there to be told? We should wrong them if we saw in them teachers of a few formulas, such as so many Buddhists seem now content to talk and write about: four truths, an eightfold "path", a threefold shibboleth of negations, a causal "chain", five "sīlas" and nirvana. They will not have been men or women of formulas, and we shall not really begin to understand original Buddhism till we get these "mottoes" out of our path. Even of old a distinct individual preoccupation and talent was ascribed to a number of early members. This can be read (in English) in a Sutta entitled Etad-Agga, "as to this the Foremost"; and it is of interest, both as to its contents and its omissions.[2] Without episode, concise, for which the Commentary makes voluminous amends, the list is of 40 monks, 13 nuns, 11 laymen, and 10 laywomen, each

[1] Cf. *Gradual Sayings*, iv, pp. 183 f.
[2] *Ibid.*, i, pp. 16 ff.

pre-eminent in some gift or virtue, among the 40 being some "double firsts" (Ānanda indeed having 4 firsts). In one case, this is limited to the subject's being "of high caste"! In another it is "lion-roaring", *i.e.* the tendency to make profession. In another it is the somewhat implicit merit of "receiving offerings". In another it is priority in receipt of food-tickets! One again is charming to men, *another to devas*. Yet another enjoys the best health, so quaintly diverse are some of the claims to distinction. Some we wonder to see included with never a Sutta to their credit; some we wonder to find omitted, such as Chunda and Somā.

The one title to distinction we would perhaps be most fain to have adequately explained is that of Sāriputta, chief disciple, who heads the list with "being of great *paññā*", best perhaps translated as "wisdom". The word is the root *ñā*, "to know", with *pa* (*pra*), prefix of a progressive force. As *pandita*, the word might, may mean mere cleverness, a learned man, a pundit. But in early Pali the word *paññā* seems to have had a spiritual force transcending mere mental proficiency. Void of such lofty distinction in the early Upanishads, it becomes in the Suttas and Abhidhamma the most honoured attribute of man. Somehow it gained in early Buddhism a pregnant force which later it lost utterly. I refer to the mediæval manual *Compendium of Philosophy*,[1] where it is merely a mental "constant". In

[1] Pali Text Soc. ed.

exegesis, it came to mean the quasi-philosophical faculty of discerning the truth of the four truths, and this appears also in the Piṭakas. But I have not as yet any "fragment" to bring forward revealing the older force in the term. In the list of equivalents in Abhidhamma,[1] the spiritual is confused with the mental. And translating, in the effort to combine the two, I left "wisdom", and chose "insight". I have come back to "wisdom", convinced that in *paññā* we have the man knowing more (*pra*), in order to "do" better, just as in wisdom, we have a purposeful knowing to be made good in living.

Now, except the multifarious wisdom, with which Sāriputta's name is linked in the (I think) old Sangīti Suttanta, last of the First Collection, he is connected in an outstanding way only with the parable on man and his mind, which has been cited above.[2] He is represented as speaking to individual questioners on a variety of subjects, but neither is he seen putting forward any causation-based gospel such as we might have expected to find,[3] nor does he make any subject his own, so to speak, with the one exception of the wise man as he who has the mind under control, so that it is to him the obedient servant no less than are the appropriate suits of raiment. Further, we find him stating, that *paññā* is, as distinct from mind, something that is to be "made to

[1] *Buddh. Psych. Ethics*, § 16.
[2] P. 117.
[3] Cf. above, p. 172.

become ".[1] Mindful of the praise given him for *paññā*, together with that parable, I suggest that in *paññā*, " wisdom ", we have an attribute held as peculiarly of the very man, or self, the attribute of healthy spiritual growth or becoming,[2] and not just a phase of mind-process.

Healthy growth : this would in terms of the first " charter " mean progress in the " way " of becoming in this or that world of life. I may be accused of being fanciful, but for me I hear those first men ever coming back, ever if you will, " harping " on that. Here, and not in four truths about woe, nor in twelve links of the rising of woe, nor in three marks of the woefully Less, nor in three Institutes of a church, lay their New Word : here in the Road of a great adventure, wherein lay before them, straight ahead or round the bend of the hill, ever another opportunity of growth, of becoming in a More leading to a Most.

But this Way was not, I hold, for them " an eightfold path ". The Way runs indeed a very Leitmotif through the Suttas, but in the " eightfold " division in which it is nearly always stated, good as far as it goes, I do not see the true brand of the charter of a world-religion. I see this " eightfold path " as a charter adequate for the lone man of an old world ; adequate, too, in its silence about Deity and

[1] By what is for me a very irony of " editing ", Sāriputta is elsewhere made to say, that " mind " (*manas*) is the collective enjoyer of sensations—as a king enjoys village-revenues, adds the Commentary.

[2] *Further Dial.*, i, No. 43.

the very man or spirit, to win the approval of the modern Rationalist. But the original Buddhist charter had not the lone man, or the Rationalist as object; what had it as object? "Go on tour, out of compassion for devas and men, for the welfare the benefit the happiness of the Many." What are the eight "parts" (*anga's*)? "Fit view (or opinion), fit purpose, fit speech, action, livelihood, fit endeavour, fit mindfulness, fit concentration."[1]

The list has great merit; it covers thought, will, word and action. Is it just to call it the charter of a lone man? I think so; it was not a Crusoe, a pre-Friday Crusoe I have in mind. It is rather the self-centred man. There was nothing new in prescribing "fit action and livelihood". But at the time this meant, for the many, that in act the other man should not be harmed, nor in a man's calling should the other man suffer. But, if you were to ask a Buddhist what his religion taught as to a man's relations to the other man, he would at once reply: amity (*mettā*), compassion, service. And it is these that we seek in vain in the eight, if we are to see *in them* a New Word brought to man in Buddhism. In this sense it is indeed a "middle way"; it is the way of the lone man, the mendicant friar, at the tangent where his life touches the life of the other man, and no more.

And as to that "other-world man" who is deva, to whom the man of the Way was to

[1] *Sammā* (Sanskr. *Samyak*) is usually rendered "right".

go "on tour"—as to other worlds, which the Suttas never let us lose from sight:—it is true, that, if the object of *jhāna* as I see it (and *jhāna* comes under the eighth "part": *samādhi*) be accepted, this "eightfold" does refer to deva-intercourse. But refers only in a way easily to be overlooked, and which *is* overlooked, lost to view by Buddhism to-day. There is not in the eight any term to show the greater vista *implied* in the one word *jhāna* or *samādhi*. *Paññā*, wisdom, too is absent. And so the eight serve as much to break up, to divide the essence of the first gospel as to knit it together.

Those eight beatitudes of Jesus: he did not call his charter as thus eightfold; he kept to the ampler word: "the kingdom of God is at hand, is within you". But he is shown explaining the beatitudes *in terms of that* "kingdom": "for theirs is the kingdom of the heavens". Similarly I suggest, that, could we recover those first Sayings of the Sakyans, we should find the Way worded in some ampler, more essential terms, and only illustrated later, now by those eight parts, now by other explanatory sets of terms. This may sound fanciful. It is not: this I have already shown,[1] and will here briefly show once more. And here I will put first a context, where the Way fits well *if* we omit the eight, less well if we insert them.

In a Sutta called "Fears", a Sutta so unmonkish in outlook that we might see in it a survival of Sayings intended for "Everyman", the woeful things parting mother and son, war

[1] *Manual of Buddhism*, Chap. VI.

and the like, are said to be " put away " by the eightfold way. It is not easy to see how good conduct in thought, word and deed in either can do this. Moreover there lingers, in the version we have, a hint of hesitation-in-editing about it, thus :[1] " Is there a way, a course for getting rid of these fears for mother about her son, for son about his mother ? Just this way, eightfold way, namely right view ", and the rest of the eight. It is the only context I know, where the " eightfold way " comes as a little explanatory gloss to the phrase of the First Utterance : *Ayam eva maggo* : " just this way ".

But if we see in " the Way " a figure for man's life through the worlds, worlds of earth, of devas, of purgatory, heading for a Goal, then can we see bereaved mother, orphaned son, bidden hope to meet again. Or must a reader be a bereaved mother to see the force of this ?

Has not that " eightfold " tended to shorten our vision ? Has it not possibly been interpolated to replace something *about which monastic values had altered* ? We see this as having apparently happened in the replacing of *attha*, the goal, in the First Utterance by four terms, belonging rather to the More that is the wayfaring to the goal, than to the goal itself. *Attha* had got a lowered value—that of " meaning ". And I have shown that such a lowering, a worse lowering, had been going on in the essential word for that More in growing in which lay the meaning of Wayfaring, the word

[1] *Gradual Sayings*, i, p. 162.

bhava, "becoming". We found *bhava-suddhi* used by Asoka; I suggest that "eightfold" was put in to replace *bhava*: *bhava-magga*: way of becoming.[1]

It sounds doubtless far-fetched. But actually the Suttas come to our help and show us an alternative trying-on of classical lists as definitions for the "middle way". This came to me as a very flash of light. Let the reader consult the Fourth Collection, in the last chapter of the Threes; and let him note that, *in the translation only* of § 152, six Suttas are compressed into one. He will see six lists—the honoured lists cited above, page 109, two of 4 parts, two of 5 parts, one of 7, and one of 8, the eightfold Way—each being used in six "try-on's", as it were, to *define the middle way*. He will then see what, had certain editors somewhere: Sāvatthī, Patna, decided otherwise, might have come down to us as a fourfold, a fivefold, a sevenfold way. And even then, he would have not had a Way prescribing amity: the care of the fellowman, because, as I have shown, the annexed teaching of that unknown Brahman, stressing *mettā*, was never included in those lists as another "four".

In another way he can loosen the tight strangle-hold of the eightfold on the Way, if he note (*a*) the eight given in a list as just "fitnesses" (*sammatta*), without "way", and in the same Suttanta,[2] *no way*, in the lists of eights;

[1] The Commentary on the 2nd Collection gets "warm" with the compound "Way of growing" (vol. iii, 32).

[2] *Dialogues*, iii, No. 33.

again, that an eightfold way *does not occur* in the "Eights" of the Fourth Collection, (*b*) Ānanda refers twice to his deceased beloved Leader as the man of the Way, not of an eightfold way.[1]

Once more, he will sometimes come across a Way of Fours: four ways, implying stages in a way, and four fruits, or won vantage-points. Herein is to this extent a truer point of view than in the eightfold: we are in it wayfarers in a More towards a Most, not of earth only. We have won to the stream, we shall return but once (to earth); we shall wayfare, but no more on earth; we have won supreme worth (*arahatta*). This way is nowhere fitted in with the eightfold; the two occur independently, again suggesting in each of them a later particularizing.

And elsewhere the Way, as the very heart and centre of the Sakyan charter, is losing ground. For it was being made, not this, but a part only, a part of the fourfold "truth", or four truths. The way to *Attha* the goal was become subsidiary to the great central monastic theme of ILL. Here it was that the centre of gravity had come to rest. This, it is said, is Buddhism, and Buddhism is this! Here is such a recent utterance of the man of half-knowledge: "Buddha defined his doctrine in the four great noble truths. . . . This is the whole text of Buddhism." This is more or less typical, a result of studying Buddhism in formulas only. The Four Truths formula may

[1] *Further Dial.*, ii, No. 108.

be said to be the banner of monasticism warring to make itself firmly established as anti-world. Once this had been effected, we note that both truths and way as eightfold are no longer so much flag-wagged. In Buddhaghosa, *e.g.*, the "magga" is repeated as almost a magic word, echoing in his paragraphs, but not insisted on as eightfold or fourfold. It is on the unreality of the "man", the "self", that he spends his shouting.[1]

The way in which I see the first men particularizing the heart of their teaching, their great figure, is more in parables than in "parts". The fertility of the Suttas in parable and simile is becoming known. Less discerned is this, that in the parables themselves we can trace the growing monastic values, the decline in the first values. I have tried to do this elsewhere. The Wayfaring similes are shown in what may be to-day be called hiking incidents, in the popular "raft" parable, and the willed effort needed to effect crossing to the river's further side; in the chariot parables: the relays, the man driving to the goal, the onward-going plough of the ploughman, the stories of caravaners put foremost in the Jātaka-collection, the wheel-story. The similes of growth, or becoming, appear in the hen and eggs, in the seed and soil figures, the judas-tree. Then there are the object-lessons, like the "show me a penny" of Jesus:—the bowl and water in the Edict-noted lesson to Rāhula the son,

[1] So did before him the monk-hero of the *Milinda Questions*.

the cleansing bath, the well-known mustard seed (told only in a Commentary, but not therefore necessarily apocryphal), told to teach, not so much the very modern altruism of Edwin Arnold's imagination, but the need of conquering self-pity. The Commentary is here the better guide. [1]

But these are few compared with the parables bearing on monastic ideals. Here I am fain to let sister Sumedhā, latest in the Anthology, and I think a *writing* poet, speak for me ; with her very fountain of anti-marriage, anti-world figures :

Like the sharp blades of swords are sense-desires,
Like the poised heads of snakes prepared to strike,
Like blazing torches and bare gnawn bones, . . .

Call ye to mind how it was said that tears
And milk and blood flow on world without end,
And bear in mind that tumulus of bones. . . .
Remember ! how the parable was told
Of purblind turtle in the Eastern seas
Or other oceans, once as time goes by,
Thrusting his head through hole of drifting yoke,
So rare as this the chance of human birth !

and much more.

So very pat has Sumedhā got all these, that either we must conclude she has within reach a written literature, or has spent long time listening to and taking notes of oral Sayings, or, and more likely, has had by her a Mātikā [2] of titles of parables, such as her monastery may have drawn up for the use of teachers.

[1] For more detailed reference see *Manual*, Chap. XI ; *Sakya*, pp. 321 ff.

[2] Cf. above, p. 47.

But how unlike is the ring even of the titles—and they can all be traced in the Suttas—to those I first cited. In them we are in *la via smarrita*, in *la città dolente, nell' eterno dolore*, or in an "ill" which is only to be made finite by drying up the very opportunity of Becoming.

Too long would it take to attempt even a summary of what the Suttas yield in teachings alleged to be talks by the Sakyan missioners. And we may see too much in these scores of "sermons", long and short. We are considering a movement, in which the movers were seeking first and last to embody a religious becoming in living, more than in professing and persuading. In the Suttas they are frequently distinguished, not for their eloquence but for their silence. The Founder is famous for his "silences". The phrase "ariyan silence" emerges in the Pitakas. The term "animal talk" for miscellaneous chatter emerges. The Sīlas have more to condemn in kinds of speech than in modes of action. The mission-mandate is the teaching men not a creed, but *dharma*, the inner urge of the "wholly perfect purified God-living, or divine life or conduct (*Brahma-chariya*)".

Hereby, in fervent will to the Better was man to become, to grow in a More.

3. *The Passing*

And what of the end of these "ensamples of godly living"?

Hereon, where there should have been the quiet happy confidence of a promotion at hand into the company of the more worthy, ready to

welcome the Wayfarer to his fresh stage of the Way, lies brooding a heavy cloud. It is true that the Suttas are unwearied in repeating the reward awaiting the morally worthy, the punishment awaiting the morally unworthy. The former could know, that he would not find a world where the murderer, the thief, the adulterer, the liar of earth would be roaming loose to work his will on otherside fellowmen. But the cloud none the less is there, that life in body and mind in any world is itself undesirable, not to be " clung to ", not to be fain for.[1]

Once or twice, however, we see the cloud has dispersed : The parents of Nakula, an obscure member of the Order, or it may be of a deserving citizen—we know not—welcome the Founder to their house and ask him, would they after many years of cloudless married life find each other again after death ? Surely, is the reply, if it be your desire, and if you be well matched in faith, in morals, generous deeds and wisdom (*paññā*), you will see each other there as you see each other now. Then follows the metrical setting of this benediction to these anticipators of a More than our Dunmow flitch :

> *If both, believers, self-controlled, well-spoken,*
> *Living as dharma bids, use loving words*
> *One to the other, manifold the blessings*
> *That come to wife and husband, and to them*
> *The blessing of a pleasant life is born.*
> *The pair, in goodness matched, i' the deva-world*
> *Rejoicing win the bliss that they desire.*[2]

[1] *Further Dial.*, ii, p. 303.

[2] *Gradual Sayings*, ii, p. 69. On the pair cf. *ibid.*, iii, p. 211.

Here is no gloom of monasticism, which even in Ceylon of to-day will sigh over death with the hackneyed words: *aniccā vata sankhārā*! (impermanent are surely compound things!) and leave it at that. But it is only a "fragment", so exceptional is it when it should have many joyous parallels. No cheering word reaches us of the passing of the two chief disciples who predeceased their Leader,[1] and nothing whatever of any other disciples save of the dying of the generous lay-patron Sudatta, called Anātha-pi*nd*ika, "feeder of the forlorn"[2] and of the suicide of two or three disciples, incurably ill, where their act is condoned and even implicitly commended.[3]

The cloud lies heaviest over the passing of the aged Founder. The passionate grief of Ānanda we should expect; passionate grief in stock phrases is also recorded of disciples, lay and clerical, who were not of those who were of the Founder's last home, Sāvatthī. But about that passing, as I have elsewhere affirmed,[4] there is a loneliness, a hushing up, a hurrying, such as belies the many carved groups of attendant worshippers around a recumbent figure. The event may be read in the 16th Suttanta of the First Collection, the longest of all Suttas, a wondrous patchwork of passages cited from a dozen other contexts, mixed with a few unique sentences of high value, such as have been quoted among the "Fragments".

He was on tour, when too old to be so. He

[1] *Manual*, pp. 257 f. [2] *Further Dial.*, ii, No. 143.
[3] *Kindred Sayings*, iv, 33; *Further Dial.*, ii, p. 307.
[4] *Sakya*, Chap. XVIII.

was apparently *alone with Ānanda*; this appears from the unique mode of the procedure, despite the brief and unusual way of wording the "together with a great company", and from the tradition surviving, as a "left-in" in the Tibetan scriptures, that the two were unaccompanied.[1] The morning "sailing-orders" to his cousin: "Come, Ānanda, let's go on to X," not met with elsewhere, should strike the most superficial reader of Suttas. (*Yet it doesn't!*) There is no record of anyone being in attendance on him, dying on his cloak beneath the two sāl-trees at Kusinārā, a little "wattle-and-daub" jungle hamlet, save Ānanda, for twenty-five years his faithful orderly, and Anuruddha. And even Anuruddha springs up for the occasion from God knows where. A curiously jolted passage, where news of the great man's passing is given out *by* Kassapa the ascetic disciple to a casual passer-by, suggests, as a correct version, that the lonely Ānanda has sent word *to* Kassapa, by a casual messenger, to come to his aid.[2] And Kassapa comes hurrying up—was it with feelings of remorse ?—with his own band of disciples, to take charge of funeral proceedings.

That the passing should have taken place "in" *jhāna* is very significant. In the face of present Buddhist (Hīnayāna) teaching *it is meaningless*. If my contention as to the object of *jhāna* be accepted, the tradition becomes fit. Gotama is entering on that "quite happy world of interpresence, interconverse with the

[1] Rockhill, *Life of the Buddha, e.g.* p. 131.
[2] *Dial.*, ii, p. 183; *Vin. Texts*, III, p. 370.

devas "[1] in a fuller, freer way than had been possible for him limited so many years by his earthly body. This tradition of the dying "in *jhāna*" sets a very seal on my guess at what he used to seek thereby, yet is it quite lost for Buddhism, which sees, in this "great utter passing out" (*mahā-parinirvāna*), a ceasing to be a personality, let alone a converse with other personalities. The pity of this teaching-of-the-Less! The tradition links with his First Utterance a wonderful congregation around the little group of six men (the co-founders) on earth: devas directing elemental forces, devas of the next world, and of the next but one (Brahma-world).[2] In the passing on, tradition preserves but the *jhāna*, and brief valedictions uttered by the governors of those next two worlds, Sakka (or Indra), and the Brahmā Sahampati (? the "with-ruler", all-ruler), sayings which Anuruddha would have been able through his psychic gifts to hear and to record as memories.

The silent passing "in *jhāna*" is for me significant also of something else: the lonely thing that his earthly life had become for the founder. Once he could find sympathy in Sāriputta—just a scrap is left: "O Sāriputta, how hard it is to find them who will learn!" That real comrade had left the earth: they who might, yet surviving, have been such, kept away; the younger men were going their own ways:

"The new men suit me not at all!"

In the plea to Meghiya, anxious to plunge into

[1] Cf. above, p. 137. [2] *Vin. Texts*, I, p. 98.

a lovely solitude "to be strenuous",[1] not to leave him till other disciples came to them, there is hinted this loneliness. And I have raised the question, that the last tour was perhaps an effort of indignant protest at the turn the teaching at Savātthī was taking.

The Decease-Suttanta is so chaotic in arrangement, that it is difficult to glean from it what were truly the last words of the Founder. The only utterance, spoken when he was by Ānanda judged too ill to see anyone, was to an inquirer Subhadda. Ānanda is bidden show him near, and behold! it is, as at first, so at the last, the Way that is the subject. But a Way-word that has been evidently editorially handled, so unlike is it to the faint utterance of a dying man. But it was "*ayam eva maggo*": "just this Way". And other last utterances were, we have seen, about man's guide as being the Self and *dharma*, and his "becoming the Height of that Immortal".

Now let us turn to a certain little "set-piece", which he is recorded as having repeated some seven times on this last tour. "Such is *sīla*; such is *samādhi*; such is *paññā*. Made well become by *sīla*, *samādhi* is very commendable. Made well become by *samādhi*, *paññā* is very fruitful. Made well become by *paññā*, the mind (*chitta*) is fitly freed from the vicious tendencies of sense-desire, of becoming, of opinion, of ignorance."

Here is silence about just the subjects of those very last utterances! Here is no Way, no Self, no Dharma, no Man—only man's mind

[1] *Gradual Sayings*, iv, p. 235.

(mind in both *chitta* and *samādhi*, elsewhere called *adhichitta*, "higher-mind").[1] How is it that not one of us has yet noticed this glaring inconsistency? Take now another "set-piece" plastered on to the Founder's earlier teaching about as often as the former, the first lay-"sermon" elsewhere repeated: "Then the Bhagavā preached to them in due course, that is to say, he talked about giving (of alms), morals, heaven, the evils, vanity and sinfulness of sense-desires, the advantage in renunciation."[2] Here also there is not a word about the subjects of those last words, and the only link with the latter set-piece is *sīla*, morals!

How are we to get any shred of consistency into these three divergencies? There is surely in them differing standards of values. There is, in the last two, obviously the hand of editors. In the earlier set-piece it is the person, the mind, the mission of the *monk who is propagandizing*. In the latter, it is a *preoccupation with the mind*, with the man as mind, that is shaping the formula. *Samādhi* became the training of mind. *Paññā* became the development of the mind. In these two growing vogues we may see the two reins which powerfully diverted the Sakyan gospel from its birth-mission.

These we will next consider.

[1] *Ibid.*, i, p. 215.

[2] *Vin. Texts*, I, p. 118 : also pp. 104, 111, and in some Suttas. It should be remembered that "giving" (*dāna*), in the Piṭakas is practically limited to gifts bestowed on monks. "Heaven" (*sagga*, lit. "the bright") was held out as the layman's objective. He was not ready for Nirvana.

CHAPTER IX

MAN AS MONK AND MAN AS MIND

THE *pabbajita*: "the man who has left the world", lit. "has gone forth", is for India not to be dated from the very beginning of what we may call Indian culture. He has a history, for dimly we can see him emerging. India, alas! has no "histories" to show us. She gives us here and there a glimpse, less of things coming to be, than of things as happened. But it is in the glimpses that we can sometimes discern the emerging. We cannot, it is true, see the day when Brahmans, as such, emerged from their fellowmen; nor when the elderly Brahman and his wife laid down their social, civic harness and went into retreat, into *āshrama*, as it is still called. But we find emerging, *once only*, in the early Upanishads the term *shramăna*, a retreater or recluse, and many, many times in the Suttas the Pali parallel *samana*. Here in these North Indian literatures are plain signs of growth in vogue. But the rise of *shramana*-cult outside the Brahman custom is obscure. Possibly the Ariyans brought recluses with them into India, possibly they followed; I doubt it; I do not know whether lingual roots here give us aid.

But solidarity is a terrific need in the invader; he has no use for the lone strayer of the cave and jungle. His people safely settled, the lover of the lone can afford to indulge. He will all the while have "been there". The voluntary Crusoe belongs to human needs. He can better develop in warmer climes. Given this need and the religious mind, it may then have been possible for a new religious revelation, like that of the intense Immanence of the Upanishads, to exercise a "revivalist" force resulting, not in the need to come and confess before men, but in that of "coming apart" to taste it in solitude. Now we find lingering in the Pali books a word for such lone ecstatics: *Brahma-bhūta*: "become God", a word so unlikely to have been started by later Buddhist values that we must perforce see in it a surviving "fragment". Not from the early Upanishads; the Bhagavadgītā of a somewhat later day knows it well:

To the man become Brahma there comes exceeding joy . . . (vi. 27, etc.)

It is possible that we have attested, in this wave of religious reverberation, the beginnings of the Indian religious recluse. But the reverberation outstripped the few lovers of the lone, lovers of the wild. The Anthology of the Elders (Theragāthā) shows us these in some of its loveliest poems. But few men keep a profound joy to themselves, and cenobitic "samanism" began in dependence for food and for clothing (if it deemed this necessary) on the ancient way

of hospitality for the pious claimant, whether he were Brahman or other.

It is this second stage in the monastic vogue that we see growing in the Piṭakas. The pristine purity of quest is mixed with less worthy motives. Men were going forth, not only "from faith" (*saddhā*), but from debt, fear of arbitrary "justice", the shirking work – this is all frankly admitted. Even Mahānāma the Sakyan is shown in the Vinaya desiring to "go forth" to escape the fatiguing round of tilling his estate.[1] From the lay side come comments of scandalized surprise at men quitting the world in the heyday of young manhood, ridicule at the "shavelings", resentment at the "cadging for alms".

> *I ask why are recluses dear to thee?*
> *Not fain to work are they, the lazy crew.*
> *They make their living off what others give.*
> *Cadging are they, and greedy of tit-bits*
> *Come, Rohinī, I ask thee, why is this?* [2]

That the vogue grew and attained an honoured status we also see, in the second Suttanta of the First Collection, wherein the king of Kōsala admits, he would honour as monk a man who had formerly been his slave.

That the monk won his cause is much to his credit. He had set his will to go his own way in the teeth of the majority, to desire what other men scorned or shrank from choosing, to follow an ideal which others might respect, yet would not themselves break out of the groove

[1] *Vin. Texts*, III, pp. 224 ff.
[2] *Psalms of the Sisters*, ver. 272 f.

to seek. Moreover, the leading spirits did not go to the cave, the forest or the monk-settlement in an antisocial vein, the easier to seek their own salvation. It was the somewhat later monasticism in which we see the seeking an exotic sanctuary from the battle of life. I find, that for the founders of Buddhism the business of the missioner was the main preoccupation, and that the "come ye apart and rest awhile" was indulged in only to recreate for a fresh campaign. They could not, in that day, have been missioners while remaining world-workers. The professional Brahman teacher received his rightful fee, but the free-lance missioner had to convince the many that he had no axe to grind, that his gospel was the one thing in the world for him which mattered, whether alms were many or scanty.

In the Pali Piṭakas we are already in a third stage. The mission tours were yet in full vigour; later still it was the laity who sought the monk-teacher at his *vihāra*; but the monk was becoming a highly meritorious person in sole virtue of his monkhood. For him it was believed, there lay already within his reach on earth, or at worst in one more life in a worthier world, the very consummation of his manhood, "supreme worthiness" (*arahatta*). Already *nibbŭto*, that is, "in nirvana", it was *parinirvana*, the super-going out that was drawing nigh. It would be an error to see this maturer meaning of the word *ărăhan* (or *-ant*, or *-at*: all three are correct) in the meaning it had at the birth of Buddhism. The *arahan* of the

Vinaya episodes[1] meant just holy man, with a co-efficient of magic or psychic power which made him, like the yet older concept of the *rishi* (Pali: *isi*), a very formidable person to have as enemy. The *arahan* of the Suttas and Abhidhamma might perfect manhood as a layman, but it was doubtful whether, having so won, he could continue to live as such. This may be seen in the "Debate": "As to whether a layman may be *arahan*", in a work of the third century B.C. and later.[2] The term grew in ethical and religious worth, and were it not that as "man consummate" it implied a woeful contraction in the lost concept of the God-in-man, it might stand beside the Christian "saint" in religious worth. That this growth in the term declined till the *arahan* became a phenomenon of a day long past—as in Buddhaghosa's time—was an inevitable result of losing the man in the mind.

How did this "losing" come about? If the reader can see this "coming about" in early Buddhism, *together with* the "coming about" of a monk-vogue, he will then be in a position, the only truth-giving position, to understand how it came to pass, that the first "mandate" of the Sakyans underwent so great, so tragic a change.

It came about in somewhat the same way it has come about among ourselves. We too have been "losing the man in the mind". We have only to watch our scientific, our philosophic,

[1] *Vin. Texts*, I, pp. 123 ff.
[2] *Points of Controversy* (Pali Text Soc. ed.), p. 157.

even our popular literature and lectures to see that. And the way it has come about is in the main similar. Three centuries ago we began to study analytically the processes which we collectively call "mind". Our thinkers concentrated on "thinking":—Descartes with his *Ego sum res cogitans*, Berkeley with his "*esse* is really *percipi*", Locke with his more specialized *Human Understanding*, Hume with his *Enquiry* concerning the same, La Mettrie with his mechanical parallelism of body and mind—and out of this preoccupation there emerged a "science" of psychology. In this it is "minding" that was analysed; the "minder" was relegated to metaphysic.

Now we have a similar preoccupation arising in India from perhaps the seventh century B.C. It came to be known as *sānkhya* (Pali: *sankhā*, *-āna*): "computing", an early attempt to get at the work of analysing: the perhaps juster term for that: *vibhatti*, emerged later. One Kapila, a shadowy figure, is credited with founding the movement. We note it growing in the Upanishads: There was nothing new in seeing in "mind" (*manas*) man's chief way of self-expression; let readers consult Vedas and Brāhmanas for that; but the conceiving of mind as something as distinguishable from the "man", the "minder", as was the body, and also as uniform in procedure—here was a new aspect, which caught hold of the thoughtful. It was not just *manas* that was considered; it was the manifold More, the *bhūyas*, that was to be brought out under mind: "Is there then a

more in mind ? Surely, there is purpose (*samkalpa*)," and much more is added. And we find a warning too : Seek not mind, speech, action ; seek the man, the speaker, the doer, etc.

In the Pitakas this " preoccupation " has gained strength. We meet with no warning. On the contrary, there was a growing reason why the current should very powerfully draw with it the Sakyan teachers who followed the first generation of these. This was the widening rift with Brahman culture.

That this is vital in the history of Buddhism is too lightly passed over. The Buddhist movement started in harmony with the central religious idea of the Brahmanism of its day : Immanence, and on good terms with the Brahmans of its birthplace : the Eastern half of the Ganges valley. The Founder is, before his mission, consulted seriously by a Brahman (the episode is oddly caricatured, perhaps aided by later dissent).[1] Eminent Brahmans vie with each other in doing honour to Gotama whose first men were mainly Brahmans—this may of course be also coloured, this time by the wish to magnify him.[2] Discussions take place, but never is the central matter of the man as being inherently Deity a subject of dispute, nor is the reality of the self ever discussed, as we see it later debated about, between those who held to the early standpoint shared with Brahmanism and the New Majority who re-

[1] *Vin. Texts*, I, p. 79 ; cf. *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 84.

[2] See especially *Dial.*, i, Nos. 3–7, 12, 13.

jected it.[1] Had there been a difference of view hereon we may be sure that, with the kind of formulated argument against the seeing God in man, which is frequent in the Piṭakas, ready to hand, editors would have eagerly made the most of such memories.

But there was, in Brahmanism, for early Sakyans one great rock of offence: the importance of the ritual in religion, coupled with the monopoly of honour claimed by Brahmans as celebrants. Missioners who would be enjoining the Many to "seek the self", as did the Brahmans, who would be warning the Many not to see the self in body or mind, who taught reverence to parents and teachers:—in their own words: "Become one who has mother-asdeva, father, teacher as deva" (the Sutta omits the Upanishad fourth: "guest")[2]:—such would be honoured by the teachers of the Schools. But when those missioners showed no faith in rite and sacrifice, but stressed the "works" of the good life towards the fellow-man, not as just propriety, but as the very breath of *dharma*, the very *sine qua non* to insure salvation hereafter in "*sagga, svarga*", here the Brahman would join issue, and *it is about this* that we find Gotama and Brahmans disputing. This it is, that would, much as with John Wesley's followers and the Established Church, open up a cleavage.

Into that cleavage, widening it more and

[1] *Points of Controversy*, I, p. 1.

[2] *Taittirīya Up.*, ii, 1; *Gradual Sayings*, i, p. 114 (*deva* is here *Brahmā*). Cf. above, p. 139.

more, would go a Buddhist tendency to depreciate other, even central matters of Brahman teaching, *just because they were taught by Brahmans*. This sort of mixture may be seen in the Thirteenth Suttanta of the First Collection. Here is the early protest about faith in the ritual: "Just as if this river were full in spate, and a man came seeking the other side, wanting to cross over, and were to stand on this side and invoke the further side: 'Come, O beyond from the beyond,' as if such could happen, even so do three-veda Brahmans, avoiding the things that really make the Brahman, say: 'We invoke Indra, Soma, Varuna . . . Yama!'" And we are shown that the right way to attain companionship hereafter with the worthy is to wake up, to loose off all hindrances, and live *as we imagine, as we believe, those worthier ones are living*.

But mixed up with this fine teaching is a worthless teaching-in-the-Less, sneering at Brahmans because they teach as knowledge what we can only hold as faith and, as such, as a matter we should be fools to teach. This is both irreligious and unscientific. The later anti-Brahmanistic sectarian feeling has here made the waters very muddy.

Into this widening cleavage went the Brahman conviction of Immanence. The Self was no longer held as divine, for the "self" was transient, ill, vacillating [1]; not divinely imperishable (*akshără*), blissful (*ānand*), stable. This is the kind of denial of "self" that we

[1] *Viparināma*—"bending about thoroughly".

meet with in the Suttas. It is not yet the reality of the very man or individual self: *it is the divinity of him.* The completion of the cleavage we do not meet with till the exegetical writings of this era, in the works of Buddhadatta and Buddhaghosa. They may have been much influenced by their residence in Ceylon, a little country where there had never been a great tradition of Immanence as in India. Believing in a vague "Mesopotamic" word *magga*: way, they could actually push out the Wayfarer, who alone gives the Way any meaning, writing that "there is a way but no goer (*gamiko*)". It was a terrific fall from Gotama's teaching. Yet scarce anyone as yet seems to see it, so pernicious is the learning a religion by a few formulas.

Now prior to this great bottom bump, there had gone a few centuries of preoccupation with the study of mind as a manifold and as a procedure. This it was which paved the way for the final rejection of the self as real. Brahmanism recognized the value in the Sānkhya method of analysis, but harnessed it as a useful steed in their culture, a complement to the unanalytic discipline of Yoga. But Buddhism, tending to bend away from (*a*) the faith in external observances of the Brahmans, and (*b*) seeing vastly more importance in good works, in conduct, used the Sānkhyan analysis of mind to evade therewith also the Brahman way of conceiving the man.

But there was more to it than this. The Brahman, in Immanence, had been overrating the static attitude in the "knowing" "I am

That!" He had passed too lightly over the effort, the will, required in bridging the immense gap in value between "I" and "That". He was surrendering the fine advance he had made in a cult of Becoming, and superseding it by Yoga. But even this he did not rightly grasp as a gradual becoming. For the Buddhist, who had been taught the true nature of religious effort as a Becoming, the "mind" presented, not an over-emphasized stationary "knowing" or "cognition", but a manifold of procedure, wherein effort or energy was raised to a new power. To this we find nothing in the early Upanishads corresponding. The new Indian psychology, crude though it was, worked thus as a solvent, in Buddhist thought, in worsening the idea of man as "the Mind-er". It saw everywhere mind rather than the man. The result was the "skandha" doctrine.

There is no evidence to show when this considering mind and body as a fivefold manifold emerged in Buddhism. It does not appear as borrowed from any other literature. The only earlier division is pre-Buddhist but mentioned in the Suttas:—that of *nāma* and *rūpa*: the latter, the visible man, the former, all that invisible man who was more than *rūpa*, and was implicated in the name of him. The skandhas (Pali: *khandhā*; group, also trunk of a tree, or the torso) retain *rūpa*, but resolve *nāma* into four different ways of the immaterial manifold: *vedanā*, or bare experiencing (later, feeling), *saññā*, or recognizing (including the naming), the *sankhārā's*, or complex-making, and

viññāna.[1] There is no serial or causal order claimed for these, and the selection of them is obscure.[2] The exegetical explanation, that the Blessed One chose them in such plurality, to exhaust the possibility of the showing of a residual "self", may be at once dismissed. But it is interesting as showing how, by that time, the "man", or self, had been entirely resolved into the manifold, as is still taught in Ceylon. Contrariwise, the fifth group *may* have been included to show, still surviving, the special aspect of the man as a responsible survivor of death, the old use of *viññāna* which we saw above (p. 97).

But though the *skandha* quincunx tried to resolve the man into a mere manifold, he could not, in language, be quite got rid of. He had occasionally to be referred to! And it will have been as a label for *skandha's* that a derogatory term for him, "the *puggălă*", was brought in. The words for "man", *purĭsa*, *attā*, *satta*, still trailed clouds of the glory of Immanence with them. At first maybe, we see a compound: *purisa-puggala* used. But in lists, in the Abhidhamma it is usually *puggala*, as if we said, not man, but wight, fellow. *The reader of translations misses here the depreciation.* Its connection with the *skandha's* is shown in the Sutta "The Burden".[3] The burden is the

[1] *Further Dial.*, i, p. 38. The rendering "plastic forces" for *sankhārā* is unhappy. The idea of "force" in mental analysis came in much later.

[2] There was "luck" in the number 5, but no necessity, logical or natural, to select it.

[3] *Kindred Sayings*, iii, p. 24.

skandha's; the layer-hold of it is the *puggala*. "Woeful the taking up; happy the laying down";—this being, not death, but the giving up desire. *Puggala* means just "male". In later Sanskrit it had a revival in *physical* worth. But Pali commentators are careful to strain the word to mean "hell-swallower", showing an intentional worsening of the meaning "man", a deliberate pessimism.

Meanwhile "mind", especially the more classic *manas*, went up in the scale, and became a sort of dummy-man. If the reader will turn to the opening of the *Dhammapada* anthology, he will see a very palpable gloss of a third line introduced into the first two couplets. In these the older way of the couplet is Upanishadic: man acts "with the mind". In the gloss it is mind that is the leader, the chief. The history of Buddhist thought speaks very plainly in this start marred by later editing.

This is not a treatise on Buddhist psychology, and I pass on. If the reader wonder that the honoured term *paññā* forms no group (it is one item in the complexes), let him remember that neither does it appear in the "eightfold path"! Let him also learn that centuries later, *viññāna*, as become a mere synonym of *chitta* and *manas*, terms for mind, became discarded for the former of these, the mediæval analysis of the man being then into *rūpa*, *chitta*, *chetasika's* (= *sankhāra's*); and nirvana, as accounting for the man having no longer the aspect of personality.[1]

[1] *Compendium of Philosophy*, I, p. 1.

CHAPTER X

THE DISPERSAL OF BUDDHISM

WERE this little book an inclusive history of a world-religion, even only in bare outline, that history, exclusive of the birth-years, would not have been confined within the limits of one chapter. I judge myself justified in so confining most of it, since the historical study of Buddhism being a very new subject, and the materials widely scattered in different tongues, different literatures, I should be a veritable Columbus were I to attempt a "history of Buddhism". It has yet to be written. Aspects, phases of it have been attempted; nothing more. My predecessors and fellow-writers have not adequately sought the real springs of a world-religion such as is Buddhism. Hence they have wavered from the start, led by that institute of ecclesiastical hardening and contraction, the formula, the creed. They have not sought to get behind it, beneath it. So here I just give the reader a few way-notes to go on with, till fuller knowledge, handled by a man or woman who has the religious spirit, or better, who is a religious spirit, shall arise in days to come and serve as worthy guide.

We have seen that the Buddhist movement

began, in definite corporate form, as the chartered work of missioners. The Sakyans went out professedly, not to the learned, not to the School for youth or sophist, but to the "Manyfolk", the *bahu-jana*. That this mission-work was carried on steadily by Founder and co-workers is well attested in numbers of Suttas and Vinaya episodes, carried on in what came to be called in Indian literature the Middle Country: the central length of the Ganges valley. What now do we know about the spread of their teaching, or at least of the teaching of their successors?

We have but a few milestones. We have Piṭaka records of two conferences of 500 and 700 monks respectively, the date assigned being respectively soon after the Founder's death and a century later; we have the rock and pillar edicts of Asoka, referring to (*a*) a visit to the birthplace of the Founder, (*b*) monks and nuns of a Sangha or Society possessing certain religious discourses (*paliyāyāni*), identifiable for the most part with Piṭaka contexts; we have the work (covering some years) called *Questions of Milinda*; we have the Pali Commentaries and other mediæval Pali books; we have one or two books in what is termed Buddhist Sanskrit; we have Tibetan works, and Sanskrit translations from them; we have the Sanskrit Sūtras known as Mahāyānist; we have two mediæval Tibetan histories. Then we have the Ceylon Chronicles, sometimes called Epics, of the fifth and sixth centuries A.D.; we have the diaries kept by certain Chinese "pilgrims", of the fourth to the

eighth centuries A.D. And we have yet to come to us, it may be, an indefinite amount of information from translations of early Chinese and Tibetan works, when improved international amenities render easier the patient work of the man of research (or must I say " researcher " ?).

My few way-notes are about conferences, Asoka and missions.

About the first, it is a curious thing—I believe the future scholar will think it curious—that it should be a learned fashion to shake the head over the first three " Councils " having ever taken place. They have been called " pure invention ", " not impossible ", " a mere sectional meeting ". The evidence for them offers difficulties—thus Tibetan works speak of the Fourth Council as the Third—and these difficulties obscure for some writers the improbability that such an event as a concerted gathering on a large scale is likely to have been a purely faked record. I have yet to learn that the historicity of any of the seven (or eight) chief Ecumenical Councils of Christian history has been questioned. The account given in the Commentaries and Ceylon Chronicles of the third council, held at Patna in Asoka's reign (270–40 B.C.), reveals such a corrupt state of the Buddhist " church ", that we might rather look to Buddhist records suppressing or minimizing an account of it, than inventing one. Poor and jejune as the records of it are, they are at least honest confessions of corruption, disorder and need of doctrinal unity. The records suppressing mention of it are derived mainly

from a body of men whose founders' opinions earned for these expulsion at that council. It is possible, therefore, that the ban on them being held not only a disgrace, but in itself wrong and disgraceful, the event was tacitly suppressed. I think this reason merits at least consideration. Pali literature in its turn suppresses mention of the "4th" or Kanishka Council, yet heads are not shaken over this.

I will here repeat another point deserving consideration, as possibly throwing light, if faintly, on the way of a church's growth. It is about the second council, held at Vesālī a hundred years after the Founder's death, and convened at considerable trouble from eastern and western centres. The earliest record is the last chapter of the translation *Vinaya Texts*, III. The agenda were that ten "indulgences" were, or were not to be longer allowed, and the mixture of the to us quaintly trifling matters with others of to us real weight are curious. It is interesting to compare the ten with the five included in the agenda of the second Constantinople Council, ranked by Catholics as Ecumenical:

Constantinople, 869 A.D.	Vesālī, either *c.* 433 or 383 B.C.
1. Keeping Saturday as a fast,	1. Carrying your own saltcellar,
2. Eating milk and cheese during part of Lent,	2. Dining after the sun has reached two minutes, p.m.
3. Not allowing married men to be priests,	3. Eating left-over food after dinner,
4. Only bishops to confirm,	

Constantinople, 869 A.D.	Vesālī, either *c.* 433 or 383 B.C.
5. Teaching a double way in a certain procession.	4. Separate "sabbath" celebration within one circuit, 5. Provisional decision before official bhikkhu's are due, 6. Performing without leave what one's teacher does, 7. Drinking milk not in the dinner ration to save it going sour, 8. Drinking toddy before it ferments, 9. Having a rug beyond prescribed size, 10. Using gold or silver coins.

In the first place, it is noteworthy that the matter which may to us seem the most important is put last. As to this, it should be remembered that offerings were largely made in kind, and the monetary medium bulked less large. And yet it was precisely this use of money which seems to have been the fat in the fire. Thus: "Now at that time the Vajjian monks of Vesālī on *upōsăthă* (sabbath) day, filled a copper bowl with water and placed it in the midst of the monk-company, and said to such Vesālian lay-disciples as came there: 'Give, sirs, to the Sangha a *kahāpana*, or a half, or a *pāda*, or a *māsaka*. It will be wanted for the Sangha, for providing various utensils'. When they had thus spoken, the venerable Yasa . . . said to the lay-disciples: 'Do, sirs,

nothing of the kind. The use of gold and silver is not allowed to the Sakyan *samanas*. They neither allow these to be given them nor take charge of them. They are men who have laid aside gems and jewelry, and are without silver and gold.' "

Now the ancient specimens of *kahāpana's* in our museums are, I understand, of bronze; it is therefore possible, that it was only when these were of precious metal that they were to be refused.

But this is not my point. It is, that in agenda 4, 5 and 6, we do see what may have been the really important matter for which the men of Vesālī were making a stand. This was the rights of the individual, as well as those of provincial communities, against the prescriptions of a centralized hierarchy. Not only as a unit, but also in the smaller groups, it was sought to uphold the man's free choice. He would count as a man, and not as the mere unit he would be, if his life, even in an order of monks, were to be just the carrying out of Rule this and Rule that with the monotony of herd-life. He would be able as man to wayfare in the Way *atta-dhammo*: "a man of the self and *dharma*", choosing, deciding according to his conscience. So did once English liberties depend on a relatively insignificant matter of ship-money, and New England liberties on a matter of tea-duties. Is our vision dimmer when we have to picture the liberties of those long-ago monks of Vesālī? The "indulgences" were unanimously ruled out by a Committee

of eight, selected in equal shares from the 700 of " Eastern and Western " monks assembled at Vesālī, thus paving the way as a precedent for further measures of a centralistic, hierarchical nature at the council of Patna in a later century.

The Council called " of Kanishka " is, so far as I know, as much ignored by Hīnayānists as is the Patna Council by Mahāyānists, although its occurrence is not called in doubt. Like the latter it has its royal patron, Kanishka, third king of the Kushans, *c.* A.D. 125–55, invaders from the North over all North-West India. Its date and place are not well established, but it was in Kashmir, held also for purging, and for revision, this time of *written* scriptures. These when standardized were engraved—so the Tibetan record—on copper tables and stored in stone chests in the monastery.

I come back to the days of the First Council, convened at Rājagaha, which is as if the early Christians of the newer centre at Antioch had decided to hold a first general council at Jerusalem. I do so for just two purposes. We may, I hope, in a very few years see both a revised and complete translation of *Vinaya Texts* in readers' hands. Till then, just two corrections in the present edition. The 500, *more probably 50*, monks have met to " recite together " (*sangāyati*) both " dhamma and vinaya "—note that later it became " vinaya and dhamma ", the monk-values becoming first in order of place. Actually, we do not discern *any such corporate voicing*. We see two men : Upāli and Ānanda, invited separately, Upāli

first, to answer questions respecting, not all the Vinaya rules, but only four, infraction of which involved expulsion, and also questions concerning the occasions on which the two discourses now heading the First Collection were uttered. Neither man is reported as "reciting", in full, rule or discourse. In the one case the technical term *pārājika*-rule, in the other, not Sutta or Suttanta, but *just the two titles* of the discourses: "God's Net" and "Fruit of Samaṇa-ship", are cited. Nothing more. The record, it is true, tries to make good in adding, that the questioning went on about "both Vinayas", whatever that meant, and about "the five Collections". Moreover a paragraph adds, that the meeting was divided as to whether the five other groups of rules now in the *Vinaya* were properly "minor precepts", all five being named as they are now. We are left in doubt how far a hoary record has here been touched up by men conversant with a developed "scripture", which was then non-existent.

But of the four "pārājika" rules, the second should, in the English version, read as being about, not "human beings", but about "quarrels among men"; the fourth should read as being about, not "superhuman conditions", but "supernormal matters", such as *jhāna*, *iddhi* and the other five referred to above (p. 138).

My other point is this. The "council" meets under the shadow of a great loss. The ruling out of any human successor by him they had

lost gives no room for welcoming of such a new chief as might check the testimony of sober regret. We should expect to find Kassapa at least, the friend and co-worker of perhaps forty, perhaps thirty years, expressing for the meeting, its filial sense of orphanhood, its sense of a debt unpayable, its tribute of reverent loyalty.

There is not a word of anything of the kind; there is not even an allusion to his bequest, so to speak, of heeding *dhamma*—what *dhamma* had *meant for him*—as its heir. "Become ye they who are heirs of *dharma*", is the "text" of an early second Collection talk, the Commentary adding: "who have that which, *for me*, is dharma", as if handing on an old tradition pre-dating the time when "dhamma" came mainly to mean only a body of literature.

And more, the dead Leader, who is only alluded to at the end, when Ānanda refers to his word about "minor rules", and himself gets unworthily rebuked, is called just *bhagavā*, "blessed", or "exalted" one, a current term of respect, not "Teacher"—he *is* called that at the Second Council—*and not* "*Buddha*". This has been already said, and should be remembered when readers are tempted to think that the Sakyan missioners knew anything about a cult of their chief as a superman. It took more than a century at least for that cult to find official expression. It were truer to see, in what the men about him in his last decade may have felt, the feeling we have about a venerable institution, an authority no

longer " up to date ", reverently tolerated, no more. There is more than a hint of it in the coarse expression ascribed, after his dying, to another Subhadda (it was a common name): " Enough! Don't let's weep! We are well rid of the great Samaṇa. We used to be annoyed by being told, ' This beseems you, this beseems you not '. Now shall we be able to do, or not do as we like." [1]

I come lastly to what is, for me, the " Third Council ". In it, granted that something of the kind happened, we see the very Rubicon of Buddhism. Disorder in the Order is admitted. Men never ordained are in its " yellow robes " cadging for alms. There is no unity of assembling; no unity of doctrine. The now mighty house of the Mauryans, who rose to power through the mobilizing of military forces suddenly set free by the death of Alexander the Great, is presenting a united hegemony, a new phenomenon, to North India. It is of importance to gain the present head, Asoka, as patron, who is giving impartially favours to this religious body and that. It is of importance to present to him an equally united hegemony in the Sangha. A monk worthy to lead, who has retired disgusted to his hill-vihāra, is invited to convene a conference, to purge the Order, standardize the body of Sayings, for that purpose summon repeaters of their versions of these from all the centres for training repeaters, and then, testing all who teach, or, it may be any monk, by certain test passages, expel all dissen-

[1] *Vin. Texts*, III, p. 371; *Dial.*, ii, p. 184.

tients from the way which the Revised Version shows is correct.

The account of this, found in works of later date, is, if an honest, a very scholastic compilation. Among other points we note in it the changed view taken of the Founder, some three centuries or less after his passing. There is no mention now of his successor, "dhamma"; it is: Was he, the Sammā-sambuddha, "the fitly-well-enlightened", an Analyser, a Vibhajja-vādin? "Yes". "Then are you also one? If not, out you go." How different from the earlier attitude about the Founder!

In the next place, why, I ask again,[1] *should the term mean orthodoxy?* It is true, that in one or two Suttas we find him demurring to shallow generalizations (*ekamsa-vāda*) and saying "I distinguish . . .", "I am a *vibhajjavādin*".[2] But it is nowhere raised into a guiding rule for monks in general, that they should cultivate analysis. Hence it appears to be a label for the newer orthodoxy of the new centre at the new capital of Patna. Now the book of Debates is, by its Commentary, associated with this Council, as having been "spoken" there. And the first part has as its subjects the reality *versus* the mind-reality only, of the "man", or self, the continuity of being, or coming to be, and points about arahanship. Under the first subject the man, it is claimed, is "got at" only in a fixed number of *dhamma's:* things or "phenomena",

[1] *Outlines of Buddhism*, 99.

[2] *Further Dial.*, ii, p. 113 (translation is unfortunately not literal).

bodily and mental, the defence being, that the Bhagavā ever spoke of the man as something real in himself, and not as just so many *dhamma's*. About this dispute more presently.[1]

The term Vibhajjavādin has a curious history among the ironies of fate. In the Pali accounts of the term, read in the light of those Debates, the Vibhajjavādins are clearly the New Majority in the Sangha, analysing the "man" into *dhamma's*, and able, as majority, to oust the minority who held to the old and ever prevailing Indian view, that the "man" (*purusa*, *ātman*) was not that who might be analysed at all. This was permissible, logical, only with what the Gītā calls his *sparsha-mātras*, his measures of contact, his "instruments". There is no question here of a mere "sect" in the Order. We are as much up against the prevailing view in the Sangha, as were the Arians up against the Athanasians as holding the prevailing view in the Western Church at the Council, at Constantinople 381 A.D., to mention no other conferences. With the victory of the Analysers, this temporary designation—one might almost call it this hustings-name—faded out; "the Sangha" remained. And among the groups of teachers whom those Analysers ejected from the Sangha were the Sarv'âsti-vādins: the "everything-is" group; more correctly the "everything-becomes"-group.[2] But, in a later, a mediæval Buddhist Dictionary, the Vibhajjavādins are

[1] P. 224.

[2] Judging by what we can read of their teachings, Rockhill's *Life of the Buddha*, Chap. VI, esp. pp. 195 ff.

listed as a sect of the Sarvāstivādins, their ancient victims ! Outside this reference,[1] I find but one other, to indicate that the term was in a way alive, at least in Ceylon in the fifth century A.D. Buddhaghosa (*Path of Purity*, III, 622) recommends the teacher of the Causal Chain to seek help in a *mandala*, a circle, of Vibhajjavādins—just that.

And lastly : that Sarv'âstivādins, or any other group linked with a special name, were they who were expelled at Patna, may only be gathered from the Debates Commentary (section I). The text itself mentions no group-names, and is oddly confused, as if compiled later from different memoranda. Thus, not to be a Vibhajjavādin occasioned the dismissal of some, not grouped in the 60,000 first stated as dismissed. This number (perhaps 600, perhaps only 60) are said to have come to grief over this and that opinion derived from the list of opinions in the first Suttanta of the First Collection—a procedure which suggests that a standardized version of the Sayings had then been just completed, and judges found themselves more word-perfect than they would have been before a Revision. One and all the questions, however, turn on the truth *about the man* on earth and hereafter :—was he as self eternal ? Did he as self cease, after this, or one or more lives ? Came he by chance ? Was nirvana of this life only ?

I scarcely think that we have in this little patchwork chronicle a correct account, else should

[1] E. J. Thomas, *Hist. Buddh. Thought*, p. 38.

we not find these many alternatives *followed* by the clear-cut Analyst decision. It is so immensely more likely, that the fate of the whole minority hinged, not on a number of classic alternatives, but on just that, namely, is the man, for you, analysable into *dhammas* or is he More than these ?

And it was just that which brought about (*a*) the terrible impoverishment of Buddhism in India, no less than did the expulsion of the Nestorians at Ephesus from Christianity, or that of the Huguenots from France in the seventeenth century, (*b*) the rift in what we now call " Buddhism " into Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, that is, into, *not* original Buddhism, but the degenerate Vibhajjavādin majority, and the form which, I believe, through the Patna expulsions, the teaching thus scattered came to take in countries east of India.

In that first set of debates : the Talk about the Man (*puggala-kathā*), the position defended by the minority, that man can be " got at " in a real, ultimate sense, as experiencer and as doer, who persists, when body decays, because his nature is a " *bhava* ", a " becoming ", was the position betrayed in those " fragments " cited above. It was a position in harmony with the then current Indian view, but in its dynamic view of man, quickening and expanding that view. And if the central Sangha at Patna had defended this position instead of condemning it, the world might have seen " Buddhism ", under the ægis of an Asoka, *whose edicts conform to it*, and *not* to the position of the Vibhajjavādins,

grow into a renascent religion of India, instead of slowly dwindling down, a decaying, a dead thing. But Buddhism bled itself white at Patna, or, if not there and then only, more gradually, through those two suckers, the monastic ideal and the merging of man into mind, i.e. into a complex, where only *dhamma's*, " states " bodily and mental, were real, and where " man " was but a " name for something that does not exist ".[1]

Buddhism, as Hīnayāna, not, I repeat, as original Sakyan teaching, found its way to Southern Asia, to Further India, and has lived on, has outlived the Mother. But that is, because under changed skies it changed its ways. Loyal it has remained to both monkhood and to the view, opposed to the Founder's teaching, of man as essentially mere mind and body. Herein it has, in the first place, not had to contend with a renascent Brahman teaching in India, wherein India was also loyal, loyal to her earlier ideals, quickened by the new dynamic of *shakti*, or what amounted to " will-force ", where had been only a static ideal, and only a " knowing ", as expression of man's worth. In the next place, whereas Ceylon has held, and held closely to the ancient monk slogans of " transience, ill and not-self ", she has infused her own meanings into these, partly through ignorance of her own scripture, of which she has been the treasurer for India, partly through a logical necessity for modifying, for re-interpreting these

[1] *Compendium of Philosophy*, P.T.S. ed., p. 200.

ancient ideals. The man, as "self", is real enough for her, but only not as permanent or unchanging. This is *not the* "*an-attā*" of Buddhadatta and Buddhaghosa; but so much the better for Ceylon!

But what of Mahāyāna? First, a word more on Asoka.

Asoka's place in Indian politics is no part of this book's subject. But Asoka's work, as either dictating, or supervising the work of teaching his widespread domains in what I have elsewhere called "an Everyman's Gospel",[1] is one of the very noteworthy facts in the history of religion. I do not find, that inscribing anything on stone, in its natural state or architecturally shaped, gave him in his own country a precedent. But he was the child of a great transition: the impact on India of the Western world. And that Western world had long brought itself to use the written word, to an extent from which India still shrank. I imagine, too, that in the worth of the man, as a social and civic unit, over against other such units, Greek influence may have taught much to the thoughtfully influential of India.

To what extent Asoka's convictions were a blend of these new influences with the influence with which the Sakyan missionizing of three centuries had leavened the lay Indian mind, it is impossible to say. Our knowledge of the "Buddhism" of his day is merely the religion as seen through monks' eyes and expressed in their mass of Sayings. The degree to which the

[1] *Manual of Buddhism*, Chap. XV.

Suttas give us *the lay point of view* is limited, but it runs practically on all fours with the injunctions, the outlook in the Rock Edicts. In these we are not in the world of the formula at all. There meets us in them no "eightfold way", no "four truths", no "causal chain", no "three marks", no "nirvana". In just one, and one only, we find the three (not "gems"); Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha; we find admission that whatever the Buddha said was well said; we find Asoka has made an advance of some kind to the Sangha (*upete*),[1] calling himself a "lay-disciple"; we find him paternally advising (not only laymen, but also) monks and nuns to (mind their business and) carefully study their Sayings, especially certain passages. This is all the specifically "Buddhist" reference that there is.

The specifically *unmonastic* religion enjoined upon his people I have summed up under three heads: (1) the positive satisfying human worth (not "ill") of the life in the world led according to *dharma*; (2) the interesting nearness and certainty of the next step, and of the happy nature in it of the life awaiting the man who had so lived (the very man, not a new collocation of *dhamma's* somehow compounded by his past acts); (3) the all-importance in the good life of the human fact (not the mere bodily or mental fact) of growing, of becoming.

As to these three, so ill understood as yet by writers on the Edicts, we shall not get near their

[1] Either "visited," or "entered". Cf. Hultzsch, *Inscrip. of Asoka*, p. 167, n. 21.

significance until we see the weight laid by the Sakyan missioners in the preceding generations on *dharma*, the closeness of their teaching to the truth and active influence of the next world, and the fact of man's growth or becoming as the very centre of their message. The word *dharma* (*dhamme* and *dhrama* in the Edicts) is not "morality", as it is unfortunately rendered in the *editio princeps*,[1] nor is it "law" or "good form". Senart's *religion* is better, but too ambiguous. F. W. Thomas's definition: "based on revelation and custom", and "sphere of conduct leading to heaven", is a better guide.[2] But why the weighty, the lofty term for "that which ought to be done, or not done", namely "conscience", is never used by translators is strange. Or if not "conscience", then at least "duty". *Externally* considered, *dharma* is, for India, "law", for Buddhism, "worded doctrine". As belonging to man's inner world, conscience or duty is far more fit. It is the urge of this "sense" that makes a man truly "moral". Because of that urge he wards his fellowman, in his person and in his interests.

"In how many ways (*kati*)", ask the Edicts, "is there *dhamma*? Few evil tendencies, many virtuous (deeds), kindness, giving, truth, purity." . . . And then: "This *dhamma*-writing was caused to be written that they might walk in accordance and that it might long persist. And he who will thus ever walk will do good deeds." . . . "In one who is immoral there is no walk-

[1] Hultzsch, op. cit.
[2] *Cambridge Hist. of India*, I, p. 503.

ing by *dhamma*. . . . The king, persisting in *dhamma*, in *sīla*, will teach *dhamma* " . . . and so on. A man must " walk by dharma " if he will become *sīlasa* (moral).

Here is no proper " definition " of *dharma* ; here is only what " walking according to " it involves and brings to pass. It does not convey all that Gotama saw in *dharma* : the seeing the Self as not static in body and mind-ways, but as dynamic, as a Divine urge in Man-as-Becoming. It was but an echo of that. With the decay in both Brahmanism and in " Buddhism ", it had grown faint. But Asoka's attitude is still sounder than a confounding *dharma*, the effective cause, with morality, the outcome. Moreover, he lifts morals on to the plane of " religion ", in that, as outcome of conscience, they become, not just " what is done " by nice people, but the very way to *svarga*. No, the " Way ", I know, is absent from the Edicts ; it had, alas ! been made, in that contracted " eightfold " view of it, a matter reserved for the special training of the " adept ".[1] But " wayfaring " is strongly implicit throughout Asoka's injunctions, as all who read may see.

Again, as to (2), I would connect with this his misunderstood saying : that men of India were now, as not heretofore, mingling with devas. If with this we compare the Sutta passage above

[1] *e.g.* " When the monk is an adept in the noble eightfold path, . . . this makes the triumphant recluse." *Further Dial.*, ii, p. 16, etc. Cf. also the well-known talk to the layman Sigāla : the Way *is not permitted to appear.*

(p. 137) of how, in *jhāna*, a man could happily meet and converse with devas, and remember how large, and, may be, how long *jhāna* with its original object, bulked in the Sakyan mission, we may see what Asoka really meant.

And as to (3), the *80 times* in which "growth" and "becoming" are used in the Edicts are very convincing signs of the fruit borne by the message the Sakyan missioners actually took to the Manyfolk.

I wish I could discover, in Indian literature, testimonials to the benefit consciously exercised by these wonderful Edicts. It was a glorious start given by the Indian spirit to its belated conversion to writing. It is true, of course, that not one man or woman in a thousand who passed by this or that inscribed rock or pillar could read the writing, but had to learn the meaning from the few. But then this was true also of every royal edict or papal bull pinned up on church door or in market-place for centuries in Europe, and yet men learnt what had been thereby commanded. Crudely worded and in many varieties of unstandardized spelling and idiom, they must have been very impressive "sermons in stones . . . and good in everything".

They were in their way true missionary effort, as was also Asoka's system of watching over and warding his people by the visiting officials called *dhamme-mātras*, and his own journeys to look after the sick and aged. But, I repeat here, I cannot see him as author of any missions in the more exclusive sense in which we use the

word, either in his own realms or beyond his borders. That he did so will one day be reckoned as "the Asoka-myth". Perhaps Kern began it (1896); Vincent Smith (1908) carried it further; Anesaki accepted and carried on the blunder (E.R.E. "Missions"). But neither Oldenberg nor Rhys Davids encouraged it, nor did the Cambridge History (1922). Yet one still hears it from "popular" pens.

Of contemporary evidence of Asoka-sent missions there is none. That the president of the Patna Council, Moggaliputta-Tissa, organized missions to the northern borders of Asoka's kingdom—missions by *theras* (or senior monks)—is claimed by the Ceylon chronicles, dating from 600 years later. And recent research in India has brought to light urns claiming to hold the ashes of individuals bearing some of the same names as those borne by those *theras*, but with no reference to missions. Had Asoka been the instigator or even only the patron of such missions, the Ceylon chronicles would have loudly acclaimed the fact. They do not.

And that the *dūtā*, or envoys, whom Asoka declares in famous Edicts he has sent to certain Western rulers—the heirs of the Alexandrian reconstitution of the Hellenic empire—can have been also "theras", religious "missionaries", this we are in no way warranted to hold. There is in the Edict an allusion to conquests by *dhamma*, as being more desirable than conquests by violence. That this will have meant for Asoka conversion to any religious cult is due to our seeing in the word *dhamma* our idea of

" doctrine ", a meaning which we have seen it did not have for Asoka. For him it will have meant at the best the wish to practise international courtesy, which was akin to that intermondial courtesy to which, as I hold, he alludes. On a lower level of political prudence, it referred to the relations of " security "—our present political shibboleth—which he, as even more a parvenu than some rulers, will have wished to cultivate. Rhys Davids's irony is sage : " We may imagine the Greeks' amusement at the absurd idea of a ' barbarian ' teaching them their duty ; but we can scarcely imagine them discarding their gods and their superstitions at the bidding of an alien king." [1] Asoka's worth is well enough merited without our seeking to credit him with more than his due.

To whom, then, is credit due, that Buddhism, faithful to the spirit of that early mission-charter,[2] carried what it held to be " *dharma* and the Godlife " into lands beyond India ?

We should first note that its expansion was much more certainly eastward than westward. We can see that Asoka's international moves were all westward. We may yet come to find plausibility in Buddhism touching the Essenes of the Dead Sea banks, and the beginnings of Christian monk-values in Egypt. But we are in no doubt of the spread of Buddhism as being *eastward*, namely to China. And we are told, that the first appearance of " Buddhist monks " . . . " in the capital of She-Huangti of the Tsin

[1] *Buddhist India.* [2] Above, p. 132.

dynasty " was in the year 218 B.C. These monks will have come without books to an ancient cultural world of both written and printed books, whatever material or shape the books there and then may have had. Why they came or how we know not. It may have been by land or by sea. But the journey will have taken not months but years. The reverse journey took Fa-Hien six years by land, five centuries later than when they came. Assuming that the Patna Council took place late in Asoka's reign (if indeed it was covered by his reign), late because there is no word of it in the Edicts, this leaves an interval of from twelve to, say, twenty years between (the end of) the Council and the arrival of those monks.

Now I have put forward the suggestion, that in these men, few or many, probably a handful, we have some of the keener more earnest souls whom, because of their defence of the " man's " reality and his becoming, the Sangha had dismissed with obloquy. And I have pointed out, that an opening, possibly a new opening, in trade as " living books ", there being a demand for such as bringing the " Wisdom of the West " to cultured men of China, may have shown them a way for an outlet to their unabated zeal to teach, combined with a great physical and mental adventure of no mean hazard. I saw the hint of such an opening in the demand of Bindusāra, for the " Wisdom of Greece ", recorded above (p. 60), to have him sent figs, wine and a teacher. The request, and the reply : " Figs and wine we send you, but trade in teachers is for Greeks not lawful ", has been preserved by a

Greek chronicler Athenaios, who is quoting from a lost Greek historian Hegesandros.[1] (The request is said to have been " written " ; more probably it was a verbal message spoken by the envoy.)

The anecdote is plentifully quoted, but that it suggests a new or current trade overland, overseas, in the living book—so essential in the case of a bookless India—has apparently occurred to no one. But if, in Bindusāra's request we see *nothing unique*, but just one case of other such requests for " live books ", made to merchants, say, in China, by cultured men wishful to know something about other cultures, and ready to pay for the importation of the teacher and his maintenance, till he could make his native " wisdom " intelligible, we have here the opening for the expelled Buddhist monk by which his entry into China from about a dozen years after his expulsion can be explained.

According to other Chinese records, the " official " invasion of China by invited monks, bringing with them " books " and statues, did not take place till more than two centuries later, A.D. 67, the first result of this, in a no longer " live book ", being a Chinese book of forty-two " sayings "—ascribed-to-" Buddha ", written by Kaśyapa (Pali : Kassapa), one of the " official " missionaries—presumably he had first learnt " Chinese "—followed by several others. Anesaki (*op. cit.*) goes on : " Conversions *en masse* are said to have taken place in A.D. 71 "—a reasonable interval for the missionaries to have taken over mastering such a language so as to

[1] Müller, *Fragmenta Hist. Græc.*

speak and write in it—" many nobles and Taoist priests being among the converts. The new religion was received with open arms and heart ; the way must have been prepared for it."

This gives us " furiously to think " : for my proposition is, that what those earlier monks of 200 years will have taught was by no means of identical values with what their " official " succeeders taught. Whether the latter values were perforce adapted to the " way prepared for them " ; whether that earlier teaching had itself taken on such a shape as appealed to the Chinese listener is not easy to say. We only know this : that the negations in Hīnayāna Buddhism form but a slight feature in Mahāyāna Buddhism, and that the Man has in the latter become—I would rather say, *remained*—a very cardinal reality in his becoming. We know too that, in Mahāyāna, man's face is no longer averted from the worlds ; that there is little or no talk about death bringing about merely a refashioning of body and mind ; that on the contrary the " man " persists, growing as he persists, till the saintship of " bōdhisattva " is reached, condition precedent of consummated Buddhahood for one and all. So different is this from Hīnayāna Buddhism, that the wonder is the two are ever yoked under the one name of Buddhism !

To neither belongs any true claim to be called " original " Buddhism ; this is too far from " official " Buddhism for that. To both belongs the claim to have sprung from the mandate set forth in North India by the man Gotama, called the Buddha. But Mahāyāna claims to have

expanded where Hīnayāna contracted. The difference between the two is usually called that between the ideal of the *arahan* (or of *arahatta*) and that of the *bodhisattva* (wisdom-being, enlightenment-being). More clearly expressed it may be in terms of the Man (*homo, purusha*, soul) :—arahanship means the man fading out, when consummated, into no-longer-man, whatever else that may ultimately mean ; *bodhisattva* means the man, in consummating, culminating as man, as *de jure*, if not *de facto* a Buddha. That this means myriads of Buddhas is but a way of expressing the universal pervasion of Man.

I much doubt, if this was what those invited monks brought to China in A.D. 67. I can imagine it was what the teaching of those live books in 218 B.C. *expanded into under Chinese influence*. In the former case the official teaching will have been strongly monastic, strongly antitheistic. In the latter case the teaching will have been less monastic, not antitheistic, more resembling the gospel taught in Asoka's Edicts. For be it remembered, that we have to account for the acceptance of " Buddhism " in a country where in religion, not the man, much less the monastic corporation, was the unit, but the family. And the initial success of Buddhism is rendered less inexplicable, if we see in those earliest visitors, not convinced exponents of monasticism, but champions of the reality, the becoming of the man, as defended at Patna by the monks of Vesālī. This leaves us anyway with the one obstacle only, not the two : the Man as religious unit, not the monk as superior

religious unit. We have the man *versus* the family. And I have suggested, that, since such swings of the pendulum are an accepted feature in ideals, it may quite possibly have been a revulsion, in an advanced wing of Chinese culture, from the cult of the Family. In this cult the Man was merged; to some he may as such have seemed to be unworthily conceived. And I can picture the appeal to such there can have been in a creed having the Man-in-Godhead, an appeal which the swing-over from Family to Man-as-Monk would not have had.

Apart from this hypothesis, it is far less devious a way to Mahāyāna ideals to trace them from the Man-ideal of Vesālī than from the Not-Man of Patna. The men of Vesālī were more generally known at one time as the Mahāsanghikas, "they of the Great-Company". And there is a tendency among Japanese Mahāyānists to derive their cult from these. So long as they are careful to distinguish the Mahāsanghikas from the Patna Sangha, which expelled them, they for me speak truly. But let them be ever careful not to confound Hīnayāna in general with original Buddhism, with what India long called Sakya, or Shākya. The real parent-stem is not, as the Commentaries flatter themselves, the Theravāda, the Analysers, the editors of the Piṭakas, the compilers, the completers of the Piṭakas. *That* is the true Hīna-yāna. The parent-stem proper is represented by our "Fragments", and peeps out in the edited "Debates": —that the Man is indeed a real entity, and lives on by Becoming.

The Mahāyānist explanation of their "expansion" is a pathetic feeling out after what is historic truth. The tradition is, that Gotama (an emanation from the eternal Buddha-Godhead) became inspired with both a gospel about things as they appear and an ultimate gospel about things as they really are; that he hesitated as to teaching the latter, land and time not being ready for it; that he taught only the former, in the truths about "ill" and the three marks; that he confided this gospel to Sāriputta to be handed on to a chosen few as "occult" (*guyha-vyakta*: secretly uttered), till the right conjuncture should arrive. Here is at once the error of seeing in *just those formulas* "original Buddhism"; in not getting behind them. There is no less the error, according to the Piṭakas, of seeing such a withholding in Gotama. He is found explicitly declaring, in his last days, that he made no Inner, no Outer, that he had not the closed fist.[1]

But Hīnayāna also has its explanation by way of an esoteric teaching. When, say the Commentaries, the unenlightened are taught, the man is spoken of as if he were a real thing; the enlightened (lit. awake) are made to see, that what is real, and only real, are *dhamma's* of body and mind and "ideas about them", to wit, the formulas.

Here let two things never be forgotten. (1) We find Gotama (and Sāriputta) speaking of the man as a real entity and as surviving, as

[1] *Dialogues*, ii, p. 107; discussed in my *Milinda Questions*, pp. 122 f.

man, this life when speaking, not to the Many-folk, *but to the elect few*. (2) This explanation is *not found* at all in the Piṭakas. Had it been put forward in Asoka's day, it would have been the sheet-anchor of the Analysers in the "Debates". It is never mentioned there.

To whom then finally, cutting out the "Asoka-mission myth", is credit due for the mission-zeal ascribed to Buddhism, and in its results, evident?

This is for future research to settle. We have "defendants of the Man" (Mahāsanghikas) and defendants of the Man as Becoming (Sarvâstivādins), recorded as having been expelled from the Buddhist "Order" at Patna. We have that first record of "Buddhist monks" arriving in China not officially invited. We have Sarvâstivādins spreading themselves over the North of India, in Mid-Asia, and along the seaboard of the route oversea to the East. We have the official mission two centuries later to China. We see a "Mahāyāna" cult of the Man emerging in the Far East and recorded later, by Chinese pilgrims, A.D. fourth to eighth centuries, as being also in India. We see *any cult* of a Buddhist nature not Mahāyānist called by those pilgrims Hīnayānist. And then there is always with us the (very late) record of the so-called conversion of Ceylon.

About that two words. It appears as having been under Asoka's patronage, conducted by his brother or son (Mahendra, Mahinda), supported by his daughter. That there was really *more* than an exchange of greetings and gifts between Asoka and the ruler of Ceylon is very question-

able. The Edicts leave us quite in doubt. Mahinda's name has appeared on ruins at the Southern end of India. It was less a conversion-mission than a Revival towards Monk-propaganda. But these materials cannot be gone into further in this limited space.

One thing more I have to repeat, and that is, in seeking to plant credit rightly for missionary effort. I have called this chapter, not the expansion, but the *dispersal* of Buddhism. We should now incline to say, that the missionary zeal of the expelled Nestorians from Ephesus right through Asia was more truly a dispersal of corporate centralized effort, than an expansion of such. Centrally considered, it was a leakage. I see in the unofficial visit of 218 B.C., and in the spread of the Sarvâstivādins, no less a leakage, a dispersal of missionary interest in the Indian mother-church. For consider only the Pali literature : I have yet to find in it the signs of any interest in making other lands acquainted with its " dhamma ". It is inconceivable that, had there been any such interest, it would have been left unrecorded. Where we might well have found it, namely, in the inclusive treatise *Path of Purity*, there is of missions not a word. Only in one chapter may we be said to come out of the local cloister, and that : the IXth, on the Four God-moods, is *about an annexed practice.* If there has been to-day a stirring of the waters, first (and in Burma, only while one saintly man was on earth,[1] and then to a less extent in

[1] Ledi Sayadaw : Soc. for the Propagation of Buddhism in Foreign Parts.

Ceylon), it will be mainly through a perennial stream of Christian effort in missions shaming the Buddhist monasteries out of their apathy.

Let it be remembered that the leakage in those expulsions was of the very faith in the man. Where that is lost, where the fellowman is no longer a unit of infinite potential becoming, to be speeded up in the long way to perfection, but is a momentary complex destined to fade out, the result will be a concentrating on lofty abstract *ideas* of holiness, but not on the *man* as capable of attaining holiness. He is eventually to fade out—well, let him fade. Let those who saw in the man as individual only a transient complex of ways of body and mind, concentrate on self-culture on "the way out" of it all. Better the consummation of the few who knew aright than to worry over trying to save the many who knew all amiss :—so do I imagine this apathy in mission-work telling. Or how are we to explain the apathy ? Or have I in ignorance overlooked where the reverse of apathy is shown ?

We know that leakage of religious will went on in India till Buddhism drooped to a dishonoured death long before Islam broke in, dead everywhere save in a corrupt form in Orissa and Chittagong. Here again is a problem, raised indeed, as the former has not yet been raised, but not yet convincingly answered. As problems in the history of religions, both are of vital interest. Will the historian of the coming day answer them truly ? It will depend on whether he values in a true light the original message of Buddhism.

CHAPTER XI

LAST WORDS

I HAVE pleaded, that we have only truly won to the source of a world-religion, if we can show it as bringing the gift of a More to man, about his nature or life or destiny or all three. I have pleaded, that if such a religion be found teaching to man a Less in his nature, life or destiny or all three, we are not at the true source; we are in the stream of later values, values in which certain influences have brought about shrinkage.

I have admitted this to be an hypothesis, for it involves the faith, that in the source, divinely inspired, we have what is truer than the later values. And even if my fragments have served to show the message of a More, where the main superstructure of a scripture shows relatively a Less, the matter remains one of faith ultimately.

But then a religion is an adventure in faith, no less than was the journey of a Columbus, or the hypothesis of a worker in science.

Is then "Buddhism" rightly described as such an adventure in faith? Is Buddhism rightly included under "religion"?

My husband raised this question in his last

published writing.[1] He submitted "Buddhism" (and certain other creeds) to the test of Max Müller's "five broad foundations on which all religions are built up", namely, "the belief in a divine power, the acknowledgment of sin, the habit of prayer, the desire to offer sacrifice, and the hope of a future life". His conclusion was, that either we must exclude Buddhism from "religions", or we must define religion otherwise.

Now for me I pin not what I am pleased to call religion, or my religion, on the worth in any word. "A rose by any other name. . . ." and the sweet odour comes nearer to the very thing maybe than does the name. But then we have surely as yet no other word fit to imply all that religion implies. Thus "Buddhism" is not fitly called a philosophy. Buddhist philosophy is a very late scholastic product of the monastery, with which the mission work of the Sakya-samaṇas had nothing to do. Whether we call "philosophy" a metaphysical system, or an attempt to explain the world, or just "love of wisdom", on such matters the Founder is recorded as refusing to be drawn. We must come down to this era for any Buddhist "philosophy" properly so called. Neither is "Buddhism" "just ethics". In ethics we are never taken beyond this life, whether it be our own or that of "men". But Buddhism we find much concerned with other-world life, connecting it with this life in a way unheard of in India before.

[1] *Proceedings of the Brit. Academy*, VIII, 1917.

How then do its scriptures call it? We shall not expect to find an exact equivalent of "religion". That word, while it does not represent a need only of other countries, has its own Western history. We have to get Eastward of it, we have to get back of it. Take the "fragment" on "will" as the initiative in the God-life (p. 122) as a test question: "What is this —— of the Bhagavan in which he trains his disciples, and in which they, trained and having found comfort, confess as 'will is the beginning of the God-life'?"[1] Now, where I have left a blank, we should certainly tend to say "religion". Actually the word is *dhammo*, the nearest Buddhist equivalent for "religion".

But "will" finds no place in Max Müller's five points. So much the worse for a man of Schopenhauer's country, so much the worse for us of his adopted country, that such an omission was possible! Let us then run through his five. It may be, that if we but conceive religion adequately, truly, we shall find it, as word, sufficient, and Buddhism, that is, the Buddhism of the Fragments, rightly to be included under it.

First, 2: "acknowledgment of sin": if in "sin" we see offence against not only a power conceived as externally transcendent, but also as vested in the fellowman corporately, whether on earth or in other worlds, there is no religion in which confession of, and amends for "sin"

[1] "Will" is here *ajjhesanam*: tendency, inclination. There was no fit word, as we saw, for "will".

is more carefully dealt with than Buddhism. But come back of "confession"; see it as *outcome* of "belief in a man that he is not habitually as he ought to be"; see in it Conscience, and we are at the very heart of *dharma*.

Next, 3: "habit of prayer": most now acknowledge in prayer more than just petition. See in it that which is so much closer to a religion of Immanence than petition:—the commending the self to will the Will of the Self, the "Deitie within my bosom":—here all our Fragments on the "self" yield ready response. It is just the *Attā* that we "seek", whether we call that "seeking" "prayer" or otherwise; the *Attā* that we take as lamp, as refuge. And the making become (*bhāvanā*) this and that in us which is like our concept of the great self is the will, the effort running through genuine Buddhism.

Then the fourth: "desire to offer sacrifice": neither here do I see Buddhism ruled out. Outward rite of self-surrender, direct or vicarious, is more accidental than essential. In the essentials the Founder of Buddhism is shown as anything but a defaulter. Once more let me quote lines, among the most moving in Pali verse:

> I lay no wood, brahman, for fires on altars;
> Within the self burneth the fire I kindle!
> Ever my fire burns; ever tense and ardent,
> I worthily live the life that is Brahma.[1]

[1] *Kindred Sayings*, i, p. 212.

For me such a fundamental were best worded as " man willing to place himself in the Highest Will :—' the life that is Brahma '."

Lastly, 5 : " hope of a future life ". Only the word " hope " could here sanction exclusion of Buddhism, a word which for that matter is very rare in both the Gospels and Indian literature. The Suttas tend to use for it a stronger word : " expect " (*pātikankhā*). Show me, Gotama is recorded saying several times, a man doing this, not that : growth is to be expected of him, not decline.[1] It is the expectation of a happy world, not merely the hope, that is the keynote in both Sutta and Edict, when the worthy life is pursued. But there is more to it than lay within the scope of Sutta or of Edict. And it is here that the Buddhism of " the Pali tradition " partly forfeits its claim to rank as religion. No religion worthy as such of a great name is content to land its votaries safely over the next step only. There is so much more to come. And it was in that original keynote of Becoming in a More on the Way to the Most that lay for the first message the more abundant hope, the greater expectation for each man.

Come we back to : " belief in a divine power ". The word " power " was not well chosen. It is made to bear too heavy a mission. This and all the attributes usually ascribed to Deity are just matters of faith, about which religions and their critics may differ ; matters in which man has mainly worded his ignorance. But in

[1] *Dial.*, ii, p. 79 ff., etc. Cf. above, pp. 104.

fundamentals we seek deepest certainties, and it is in the concept of a Most, a Highest, a Best, a Consummation of Manhood that we need not believe only; we know. We know that we do seek a More than we have been, than we are. And the More implies a Most, even it be as yet but an ideal point. Its reality alone makes the More have a meaning.

Much to seek have been we writers on Buddhism in passing over the way in which, to speak only of Hīnayāna, the Most finds expression. No one heeds much *attha*, originally meaning the Thing Sought, the Thing Desired, so soon it grew ambiguous, and was used only for "meaning"; so soon will it have been replaced by the relatively feeble word Nirvana, a merely negative term. No one renders rightly the great word Brahma, in such compounds as "God-life", "Become-God", "God-abiding".[1] When the Piṭakas were finally edited, there had arisen an externalizing of the term; Brahmā had become just a group of higher devas, *Brahmā's*. But no one gives due worth to such terms of the Most as *Agga* (the Greek *akra*); to *Uttāma*, *Anuttāra*: supreme; to *Uttarim*, *Pāram*: the Beyond; to *Tat-uttarim*: what is beyond (the deva-worlds). No! We go on saying Buddhism knew nothing, had nothing to say, about God i.e., the Highest, or Soul, i.e. the Man!

The New Word of the Sakyas was, it is true, a bringing out to India the More, which lay too implicit in the great mantra of the "Is"

[1] Also Net of God (Brahmajāla), Wheel of God, cf. Wheel of Dharma.

and the "Most": That art *Thou*! "Only by the will to Become in the better life canst thou, long hence, realize the Most that thou art. For thee it is the day of the More." Yet without a More there can never become a Most.

The Buddhist of to-day rates, it may be in a serious, it may be in a scurrilous way, the conception of, the faith in, the Man Consummate (that is, Deity as a Being) as unworthy and turns away. He has no Agga, no Anuttara: no Highest, no Supreme, save in man-conceived ideas, save in the tradition of a great man of earth, hampered by body and mind, repudiating for himself that men should call him omniscient.[1] I am woeful at the loss this means to him at every hour of his life. He does not yet see how much more glorious is that great man seen, not as a little deity evolving a New Word in isolation, but as the Messenger of a New Word from the Unseen, inspired as with a coal from off the altar, willing to co-operate in a greater will: Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord. Hosanna in the Highest! He may yet come to see this. He is in the stream of Becoming. I shall not be here to see. But I shall wait for that day.

[1] *Further Dial.*, i, p. 340.

APPENDIXES

I

CHRONOLOGICAL NOTE

SIXTH CENTURY B.C. Probable period of Go'tama Buddha's life and work. The orthodox Ceylon tradition (recorded in the metrical chronicles *Mahāvamsa* and *Dīpavamsa*—the "great" and the "island" chronicle) place the birth of Go'tama late in the seventh century B.C., *viz.* in 624, and his death (Parinibbāna) in 544 B.C. Thus the year 1934 is, for Buddhists, 2478 B.E. (Buddhist Era). These dates are obtained by reckoning backwards the sum of the years assigned to each Ceylon king's reign, recorded in the chronicles, till Asoka's son Mahinda introduced Buddhism into Ceylon. This is dated in the eighteenth year after Asoka's coronation (269 B.C.), and in the first year of the reign of Devānam-piya-Tissa (Tissa, beloved of gods), King of Ceylon. Asoka is further stated to have been crowned "two hundred and eighteen years after the Parinibbāna of the Sambuddha".

Now this method of reckoning fractions of years, when reigns began or ended, as whole years, obviously stretches the interval, after a time, to an appreciable extent. It is unfortunately impossible to say exactly to what extent. But historical critics have a rough corrective in the important rock-cut edicts of Asoka. In one of these, inscribed both at Kapurdagarhī on the Indus in Kashmir, and at

Khauli on the Jumna, near Masuri, Asoka refers to neighbouring rulers :—Antiyoka (Antiochus) Yona raja (King of Greece), " and beyond him four kings, Tulamaye (Ptolemy), Antikina (Antiochus), Mākā (Magas), and Alikasandare (Alexander) ". Working by this and other clues, it is judged that a more accurate *approximate* date for the eighty to eighty-one years of the Buddha's life is 563–483 B.C.

Inscriptions in Orissa, however, throw this date into uncertainty, and *tend* (not more) to make the earlier reckoning the truer one. This is stated more fully in *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 41. We need to correct Ceylon's " 18 years ", " 218 years " lest we put Asoka back *before* Alexander. But the earlier reckoning may be true, in despite of them.

II

THE PITAKAS IN TRANSLATIONS

VINAYA-PITAKA

1. Pātimokkha Mahā-vagga, Chullavagga,	*Vinaya Texts*, I–III (S. Bks. East, XIII, XVII, XX).

SUTTA-PITAKA

First Collection (Dīgha-Nikāya)	*Dialogues of the Buddha* (S.B. Buddhists, II–IV).
Second Collection (Majjhima-Nikāya)	*Further Dialogues* (S.B.B., V, VI).
Third Collection (Samyutta-Nikāya)	*Kindred Sayings* (Pali Text Society edition, 1–5).
Fourth Collection (Anguttara-Nikāya)	*Gradual Sayings* (Pali Text Society edition, 1–5).

Fifth Collection (Khuddăka-Nikāya)	
Khuddaka-pātha .	Text of the Minor (Sayings) (S.B. Buddh., VII).
Dhammapada . .	Verses on Dhamma (S.B. Buddh., VII) (with the above) both giving text and translation.
Udāna . . .	(in the press, S.B.B., VIII).
Iti-vuttăka . .	Ditto
Sutta-Nipāta . .	S.B. East, X; and Harvard Or. S.
Vimāna-vatthu, Petavatthu	(in preparation, S.B.B., IX).
Thera-therī-gāthā .	Psalms of the Early Buddhists, I, II (Pali Text Society edition).
Jātaka, verses and Commentarial stories	(out of print: Camb. Univ. Press).

(And five other works not translated.[1])

ABHIDHAMMA-PITAKA

First Book (Dhamma-sangani)	*Buddhist Psychological Ethics* (R. Asiatic Soc.).
Fourth Book (Puggala-Paññatti)	*Designation of Human (Types)* (Pali Text Society edition).
Fifth Book (Kathā-vatthu)	*Points of Controversy* (Pali Text Society edition).

(And four other works, untranslated, all catechetical.)

I give the above list in place of the usual bibliographical list of books about Buddhism for readers

[1] One of these, *Buddhavamsa*, is translated incidentally in *Buddh. Birth Stories* (Broadway Series).

who wish to seek further afield than this slight Manual can guide them. Since its first edition appeared, some twenty more volumes of translations have been published, and it is to translations that I would refer him, in connection with what I have here called " fragments ", and obstacles across his path. But with some misgivings. Italy is right in saying that translators can be traitors. How they are that, many warnings in these pages may show him. Guides they are ; bandits they may be. For guides in Buddhist literature beyond the limits of Piṭaka translations, he can now consult such recent additions as Dr. E. J. Thomas's *History of Buddhist Thought* (1934), with the earlier *Life of the Buddha as Legend and History* (1927), and Dr. B. C. Law's *History of Pali Literature* (1933). Equally useful for reference will be found the revised edition in English of Vol. II of Dr. M. Winternitz's *History of Indian Literature* (1934).

III

HINTS ON PRONUNCIATION

Phonetic note.—The upright " m " in italicized Pāli names, or *vice versa*, *e.g.*, *Samyutta*, is pronounced " ng ". The upright (or italicized) *t, d, n,* do not affect pronunciation appreciably. To aid pronunciation, and to harass the reader as little as possible with unfamiliar marks, the transliteration, in other respects, is not meticulously accurate. *Chitta, e.g.*, should be *citta*. Every " c " in Pali = ch. Where vowels have no long accent, they should be pronounced short, and in any case as Continental vowels. Stresses are usually early, thus Go′tama, Jā′taka, Ā′nanda, etc. Max Müller's *K, Kh, G, Gh,* for *C, Ch, J, Jh,* are no longer used. They led to popular errors.

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